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Cover
The Sinai Peninsula, as seen from the
space shuttle Challenger (mission STS-
41G) in October 1984. Clearly visible,
stretching from the Mediterranean on the
right through the Great Bitter Lake to
the Red Sea, is the Suez Canal, scene of
the Suez Crisis of 1956, a half-century
ago this year. Those momentous events
are recalled and assessed in this issue by
Michael Coles, a former Royal Navy
officer.
The photo appears in The Home Planet
(1988), edited by Kevin W. Kelley for
the Association of Space Explorers in
Houston, Texas, by courtesy of which we
reproduce it.
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FROM THE EDITORS
The appearance of this issue of the Review coincides with the formal establish-
ment of the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), and our
two lead articles serve to introduce the work of the institute to the security studies
community in this country and abroad. The first article, “China’s Aircraft Carrier
Dilemma,” by Naval War College faculty and CMSI members Andrew Erickson
and Andrew Wilson, offers a detailed account of the state of thinking and program
development in the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) relating to aircraft
carriers, long a controversial and obscure subject. As future CMSI analyses will be, it
is based on a thorough and careful exploitation of the large and growing Chinese-
language military and military-technical literature now available from open
sources, much of it known only very imperfectly, if at all, in the West. The second
article is a translation of an important, wide-ranging article by Senior Captain Xu
Qi of the PLAN, “Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy
in the Early Twenty-first Century,” which appeared in China Military Science—the
leading People’s Liberation Army periodical—in 2004. As such, it carries very sub-
stantial (if somewhat indeterminate) weight as an expression of views held at se-
nior levels of the Chinese military and political hierarchy, and it should therefore
be of much interest to Western scholars and decision makers as they attempt to
come to grips with the thinking of a Chinese leadership that is increasingly sophis-
ticated technically, operationally, and as this paper shows, strategically as well.
Second-guessing and recriminations of various kinds over the conduct of the
Iraq war continue to roil the arena of civil-military interaction as well as the po-
litical arena in the United States today. Mackubin Thomas Owens usefully re-
minds us that the civil-military relationship is never easy and that there is no
simple division of responsibility between civilian and military decision making
in time of war. He thereby opens a discussion on the subject of “Leadership and
Decision,” one we hope to pursue further in these pages in subsequent issues.
The importance of military leadership is also a theme of Gary Ohls’s article on
the little-known Union amphibious operations against Fort Fisher in North
Carolina during the late stages of the American Civil War.
This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the military operations carried out
against Egypt in 1956 by a combined Franco-British expeditionary force acting
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn2006.vp
Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:30:41 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
10
Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/1
in conjunction with Israel. Though much has changed since that time, this his-
tory, reexamined here by Michael H. Coles, holds some intriguing lessons for the
conduct of coalition warfare in today’s Middle East.
2006 PRIZE WINNERS
The President of the Naval War College, accepting the nominations of faculty
committees, has chosen winners of the Hugh G. Nott Prize and the Edward S.
Miller History Prize. The prizes are awarded by letter.
The Hugh G. Nott Prize, established in the early 1980s, is given to the authors
of the best articles (less those considered for the Miller Prize) in the Review in
the previous publishing year (in this case, 2005). This year’s winners are:
• First place: Capt. David C. Hardesty, USN, for “Space-Based Weapons:
Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives,” Spring 2005 ($1,000)
• Second place: James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, for “Taiwan: Melos or
Pylos?” Summer 2005 ($650)
• Third place: George H. Quester, for “If the Nuclear Taboo Gets Broken,”
Spring 2005 ($350).
The Miller Prize was founded in 1992 by the historian Edward S. Miller for
the author of the best historical article appearing in the Naval War College Re-
view in the same period. This year’s winner is “Midway: Sheer Luck or Better
Doctrine?” by Thomas Wildenberg (Winter 2005).
FORTHCOMING: NEWPORT PAPER 27
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents, edited by John H. Hattendorf
(the Naval War College’s Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History) and sched-
uled to appear in winter 2006, will collect documents reflecting the evolution of
official thinking within the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps during the post–Cold
War era concerning the fundamental missions and strategy of the sea services. It
will form part of a larger project bringing greater transparency to a dimension of
our naval history that is now seen as having urgent interest. Professor Hattendorf
initiated the undertaking with his authoritative study in Newport Paper 19 (2004)
of the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. In Newport Paper 27, covering the 1990s,
Professor Hattendorf will assemble for the first time in a single publication all the
major naval strategy and policy statements of that decade.
F R O M T H E E D I T O R S 5
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Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in
1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps
program at the University of South Carolina. His initial
assignment was to USS Blakely (FF 1072). In 1979,
following a tour as Operations and Plans Officer for
Commander, Naval Forces Korea, he was selected as an
Olmsted Scholar and studied two years in France at the
Paris Institute of Political Science. He also holds
master’s degrees in public administration (finance)
from Harvard and in national security studies and
strategy from the Naval War College, where he
graduated with highest distinction.
After completing department head tours in USS Deyo
(DD 989) and in USS Mahan (DDG 42), he com-
manded USS Aries (PHM 5). His first tour in Washing-
ton included assignments to the staff of the Chief of
Naval Operations and to the Office of the Secretary of
the Navy, as speechwriter, special assistant, and per-
sonal aide to the Secretary.
Rear Admiral Shuford returned to sea in 1992 to com-
mand USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60). He assumed
command of USS Gettysburg (CG 64) in January 1998,
deploying ten months later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet oper-
ating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the
USS Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the
Battle Efficiency “E” for Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.
Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he di-
rected the Surface Combatant Force Level Study. Fol-
lowing this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy
Division as chief of staff of the Navy’s Roles and Mis-
sions Organization. He finished his most recent Penta-
gon tour as a division chief in J8—the Force Structure,
Resources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint
Staff—primarily in the theater air and missile defense
mission areas. His most recent Washington assignment
was to the Office of Legislative Affairs as Director of
Senate Liaison.
In October 2001 he assumed duties as Assistant Com-
mander, Navy Personnel Command for Distribution.
Rear Admiral Shuford assumed command of Cruiser
Destroyer Group 3 in August 2003. He became the fifty-
first President of the Naval War College on 12 August
2004.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
A New Maritime Strategy: Admiral Mullen’s Challenge
DURING OUR CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM this past June, Admiral
Michael Mullen, the Chief of Naval Operations, called for the de-
velopment of a new maritime strategy and asked that the Naval
War College take on the responsibility for coordinating the efforts of the Naval
Postgraduate School, the Naval Academy, and other organizations in the strategy-
development process. The Naval War College has been the spawning ground for
American naval strategy since its opening in 1884. Combining high-level profes-
sional military education with consistent institutional commitment to research,
analysis, and gaming has created the conditions—academic freedom coupled
with a keen sense of academic responsibility and a spirit of objective inquiry—
that have produced first-class strategists and many of the most influential con-
cepts, plans, and strategies in the U.S. Navy’s history. Today, Navy leadership has
again turned to the College for help in crafting a new maritime strategy to deal
with the complex and challenging global geostrategic environment that has
emerged since the 9/11 attacks.
Why is a new maritime strategy needed? I believe that there are more than
sufficient new strategic challenges manifesting themselves since 9/11—indeed,
since the fall of the Berlin Wall—to require a fundamental rethinking of the tra-
ditional tenets of seapower that most policy makers and strategists still hold as
truisms. It is clear, for instance, from language in the National Security Strategy
that the seas no longer represent the definitive strategic barriers they once did.
Losing this most important geostrategic source of depth reduces the time avail-
able for deliberate, diplomatic response options by our national command au-
thority. Yet, the U.S. Navy has been the guarantor of national strategic depth
since the age of Teddy Roosevelt and the Great White Fleet. What is it that the
Navy should do to reestablish this important relative advantage? Should the sea
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be the medium by which preemptive counter-force operations are made more
responsive, or should we be working to establish the lost strategic depth through
achievement of maritime domain awareness? The doctrinal legacy of “. . . From
the Sea” suggests the former, while the concept of a Thousand-Ship Navy sug-
gests the latter. Is the choice limited to “either/or,” or must we do both? Options
need to be clarified and choices made: a coherent maritime strategy is required
to establish the ways, means, and resources to reestablish strategic depth.
There is another reason that a maritime strategy is necessary at this point in
time. The changing nature of warfare is forcing all services to conduct a reexam-
ination of their structure and doctrine. This is happening in the world of the
Global Information Grid, where information appears to be the most valuable
warfighting resource. The result is a premium on obtaining, analyzing, and dis-
tributing information via new, more capable means of command and control. In
this environment, traditional roles and missions become fungible and open for
renegotiation. However, if we make roles-and-missions decisions simply on the
basis of emerging technical capabilities, we may back our way into serious
warfighting seams in the future. The logic of an overarching strategy is needed in
order to make sense of novel, emerging technical capabilities and concepts as
part of a coherent and ultimately more effective whole. A broadly understood
maritime strategy would provide a powerful logic for roles and missions relating
to all our maritime partners.
The U.S. Navy has a long and successful history of articulating national mari-
time strategies, since the founding of the Naval War College. Starting with Alfred
Thayer Mahan’s seminal work The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890), the
Navy has generally crafted a new strategy when the flow of world events made it
clear that one was needed. The prospect of a trans-isthmian canal, for example,
and the rise of Germany and Japan as great naval powers provided much of the
impetus for Mahan’s pioneering work. In the 1930s, in response to the increased
chances of a war with Japan, the Navy developed a trans-Pacific strategy that even-
tually brought success in World War II. In the Cold War, the Navy aligned itself
with the nation’s grand strategy of containment and deterrence and created ele-
ments of its force structure that could support nuclear warfighting if deterrence
failed. As the Cold War matured, the viability of nuclear weapons as warfighting
weapons deteriorated, and the Navy developed the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s
to provide a foundational logic of conventional warfighting using its forces in a
forward, offensive manner. After the Soviet Union fell, the Navy morphed the
strategy of early, forward operations into a littoral warfighting doctrine.
The Naval War College has fully embraced the challenge laid down by Admi-
ral Mullen and is proceeding at full speed to put in place a process that is intellec-
tually rigorous and accommodates ideas from around the fleet, around the
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country, and around the world. We plan to move forward in an integrated fash-
ion with the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps, and with early, close involve-
ment with our other joint-service and agency partners.
We will also involve our international maritime partners. The College has
been an effective forum for international naval cooperation over the years, and
we intend to take it a step farther via international participation in the maritime
strategy development process. Given the objective of a secure international
commons for legitimate commerce, regional peace and stability, and the general
benefit and progress of all mankind, this approach to strategy is timely and ap-
propriate to the international community’s growing appreciation of the unique
contributions maritime collaboration makes to these objectives.
The fundamental philosophy underpinning the College’s development effort
is that any maritime strategy must derive from and support national policy and
grand strategy. We intend to consider a range of potential grand strategies that
might be adopted by current and future administrations. By examining the
range of maritime strategies suggested by them, we hope to understand the fun-
damental strategic imperatives of any maritime strategy. Moreover, since any U.S.
national grand strategy is necessarily global, this approach promotes maritime
thinking in global terms. Also, this approach helps keep the level of discussion and
analysis elevated—that is, it keeps workshop and war-game participants from im-
mediately focusing on ship types, deployment patterns, and operational concepts.
These topics have all but governed the dialogue on the future of the Navy for a
number of years and have generated differing points of view that cannot be re-
solved without an overarching strategic logic.
We expect that logic to emerge from a competition of ideas. But the competi-
tion must be based on disciplined and objective analysis—something for which
the College has established a sound reputation. In order to establish rigor, and
also to increase the odds of obtaining genuinely creative thinking, we are going
to conduct a novel type of exploratory war game in which “Blue” players repre-
senting the United States and international partners react to well-developed
“Red” strategies to create a composite of the future plans for a number of what
we term “strategic entities.” The outcome will be an understanding of the dy-
namics of strategic challenge-and-response cycles. Follow-on workshops will
synthesize key insights and conclusions into candidate maritime strategies.
These strategies will then be subjected to additional perspective and analytic
scrutiny to clarify strategic options for Navy leadership.
The U.S. Navy developed a highly successful maritime strategy in the 1930s
and again in the 1980s in response to specific threats. Today, our task is far more
complex, as the distinction between friend and foe is not as clear and the world is
faced with numerous insurgencies, ethnic clashes, and regional competition
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among states. What some writers term the “super-empowered individual”—a
person or group capable of inflicting strategic harm on a nation via advanced
technology—adds significant new complexity to strategy making. This height-
ens the importance of bringing a rigorous, intellectual approach to strategy
development.
The need for a new maritime strategy is manifest, and Admiral Mullen’s call
for one is both timely and compelling. Many institutions and organizations are
responding to his appeal, and the Naval War College is serving as a clearing-
house for the ideas emerging from their efforts. The College will also serve as
guarantor of rigor and subjectivity, fulfilling this critical institutional role of in-
tellectual conscience for the Navy.
J. L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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CHINA’S AIRCRAFT CARRIER DILEMMA
Andrew S. Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson
China’s national leadership is facing a dilemma that has bedeviled manyother powers in modern history. The challenge—an especially difficult one
in an era of rapid technological change—is discerning when and how to spend
finite military budgets on new technology, organization, doctrine, and force
structure. The history of navies trying to anticipate and prepare for the next war
is replete with both positive and negative analogies to which Beijing can turn.
These include Germany’s attempts prior to World Wars I and II to strike the right
balance between fleet-on-fleet and guerre de course and missing on both counts;
Japan’s pattern prior to World War II of innovating with aircraft carriers and
amphibious warfare but keeping the battleship firmly at the center of its naval
doctrine; and even China’s own naval embarrassments in the 1884–85
Sino-French War and the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War, in which poor standard-
ization, divided political and military leadership, and slow mobilization cost the
Qing dynasty two very expensive fleets.
The numerous sources available suggest that these issues weigh heavily on
China’s naval strategists today. Getting the answers right in the near term will
appropriately shape China’s force structure and inform training and doctrine in
anticipation of the most likely scenarios. Obviously, analyses regarding the na-
ture of the next war, the relative strengths and weaknesses of the possible
belligerents, and the characteristics of the likely theater will determine those an-
swers. In other words, strategic focus and concentration on the nature of the
next war can spur modernization. Taiwan scenarios certainly dominate Beijing’s
attention, but while they narrow the decision sets, they do not resolve the central
dilemma facing China’s maritime strategists.
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Of the issues that confront Chinese naval modernization, the most compre-
hensive and far-reaching is the extent to which Beijing has faced a choice be-
tween a navy focused on large-deck aviation and one based fundamentally on
submarines. The answer is the simplest possible—not at all. China has yet to
confront the issue in any meaningful way, and that is so because its technology,
assets, and facilities are far from a state that might force the issue.
Whether it makes sense now for China actually to develop an aircraft carrier
has apparently been the subject of considerable debate in China.1 Hong Kong’s
Phoenix Television has quoted Song Xiaojun, editor in chief of Jianchuan Zhishi
(Naval & Merchant Ships), as stating that a PLA faction advocates aircraft carrier
development but must compete with elements urging submarine and aerospace
industry development.2 One Chinese analyst states that Beijing, reflecting the
interests of the submarine faction, is currently focused on developing new types
of submarines in part precisely because they can attack carrier strike groups
(CSGs), presumably those of the United States. Carriers present large targets and
have weaker defenses than (and cannot easily detect) submarines. Submarines
can attack CSGs with “torpedoes, sea mines, and missiles,” thereby rendering sea
lines of communications and seaborne trade itself vulnerable to undersea at-
tack.3 The analyst contends that China’s Type 093 and 094 submarines will in-
crease the sea-denial capabilities, strategic depth, coastal defense, and
long-range attack capability of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).4 In a
recent meeting with the authors, a senior Chinese official elaborated that al-
though he had “been an advocate of aircraft carriers for many years because we
need them,” until recently carriers had “not been the best use of national re-
sources” because China “lacks an escort fleet,” thereby making any carrier a vul-
nerable target. China has therefore invested instead in “submarines, mid-sized
ships, and fighters [aircraft].”5
At the same time, however, dismissing China’s carrier aspirations could be
myopic, given its rapid development of all other major aspects of its navy over
the past few years. Submarines currently dominate China’s naval development,
but they might not do so indefinitely. Contending that submarine force develop-
ment is not a panacea for the PLAN, one Chinese analyst calls for “rethinking the
theory that aircraft carriers are useless and [that one should] rely solely on assas-
sin’s maces,” or asymmetric silver bullet–type weapons: “Allied ASW is very
strong. . . . [T]he U.S. and Japan carefully monitor PLAN submarine activities. . . .
PLAN submarines’ 533 mm torpedoes are insufficient to constitute a strong
threat to a U.S. aircraft carrier [and] PLAN submarine-carried guided missiles
are insufficient to wound an aircraft carrier.”6
The aforementioned Chinese official stated to the authors in 2006 that
“China will have its own aircraft carrier” in “twelve to fifteen years.” In 2004,
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however, he had declared to a group of Western academics that there was an in-
ternal political and military consensus that China had no intention of develop-
ing an aircraft carrier. When asked to explain this apparent contradiction, the
official stated that over the past two years the subject of aircraft carrier develop-
ment has become a “heated internal debate” in Beijing as Chinese national inter-
ests have grown, sea lines of communication have become ever more important,
the need to rescue Chinese citizens overseas has become increasingly apparent,
and “air coverage” is viewed as an essential component of “balanced naval
forces.”7
China has made great progress in
many dimensions necessary to sup-
port the development of aircraft car-
riers, though in some areas it is
unclear whether substantial efforts
have been made at all. The PLAN’s
submarine program is far ahead of
its carrier (CV) program. In India, by
contrast, the CV program is far
ahead of the ballistic-missile sub-
marine (SSBN) program; Spain, Ja-
pan, and Thailand have carriers
though they lack SSBNs entirely,
whereas the United Kingdom and
France deploy both carriers and
SSBNs. The Chinese literature notes all of these potential force structure models
and the disparities in capabilities and experience between not merely the PLAN
and the world’s leading navies, but most notably between the PLAN and its re-
gional peers, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Indian
navy. In that literature the discussion of submarines, both as machines and as
operational and strategic platforms, is much more advanced and grounded in
reality than that of carriers—which is still notional, if not romantic, and largely
comprises rather generic analyses of possible ship-configuration options.8 Cer-
tainly, there is logic, reinforced by the German and Japanese examples, in not
playing to the adversary’s strength. If the greater payoff is to be found in an
asymmetric “silver bullet” or “assassin’s mace” that SS/SSNs or mine warfare
seem to offer, why should Beijing invest in a war-fighting specialty—that is,
power-projection carrier operations—in which the PLAN is so clearly out-
matched by the U.S. Navy and that appears ill suited to China’s overall defensive
posture?9
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Pierside view of ex-Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev at Binhai Aircraft Carrier museum in Tianjin,
China.
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This, however, does not mean that the way ahead for the Chinese navy—
which currently has a submarine-centered force structure and doctrine—is cast
in stone or that the choice need be mutually exclusive. In fact, while submarines
seem to be ascendant, the Chinese are still actively engaged with the carrier
question and are reframing the terms of the debate. That debate, moreover, has
been reinvigorated by recent events, notably the 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami,
which the above-cited Chinese official averred had “definitely” changed Chinese
thinking about the utility of aircraft carriers, and by the advent of China’s elev-
enth “five-year plan,” for the period 2006–10. This paper examines China’s prog-
ress thus far, the road ahead, and a range of ways in which an aircraft carrier
might ultimately fit into the PLAN’s emerging order of battle.
CHINA’S CARRIER DEVELOPMENT HISTORY AND
FUTURE OPTIONS
The aircraft carrier has long had determined, if not numerous, advocates at the
highest levels of the Chinese military. Adm. Liu Huaqing, a student of Soviet ad-
miral Sergei Gorshkov at the Voroshilov Naval Academy in Leningrad (1954–58),
championed the aircraft carrier when he became chief of the PLAN (1982–88) and
vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (1989–97). “Building air-
craft carriers has all along been a matter of concern for the Chinese people,” Ad-
miral Liu insisted. “To modernize our national defense and build a perfect
weaponry and equipment system, we cannot but consider the development of
aircraft carriers.”
10
Liu has been credited with an instrumental role in modernizing China’s navy
and with conceiving ambitious goals for its future power projection, in the
framework of “island chains.”11 Liu and others have defined the First Island
Chain, or current limit of most PLAN operations, as comprising Japan and its
northern and southern archipelagos (the latter disputed by China), South Korea,
Taiwan, and the Philippines.12 The Second Island Chain, which Liu envisioned as
being fully within the scope of future PLAN activities, ranges from the Japanese
archipelago south to the Bonin and Marshall islands, including Guam.13 Some
unofficial Chinese publications refer to a “Third Island Chain” centered on
America’s Hawaiian bases, viewed as a “strategic rear area” for the U.S. military.14
The ultimate goal is a Chinese navy that can perform a mix of sea denial, area de-
nial, and varying degrees of power projection within and out to these island
chains.
In his 2004 autobiography, coverage of which by China’s Xinhua press agency
implies quasi-official endorsement, Admiral Liu described in some detail his as-
sociation with, and aspirations for, efforts to develop an aircraft carrier.15 As
early as 1970, Liu “organized a special feasibility study for building aircraft
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carriers as instructed by the higher authorities and submitted a project proposal
to them.”16 In May 1980, Liu became the first PLA leader to tour an American
aircraft carrier, USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63). This experience left him “deeply im-
pressed by its imposing magnificence and modern fighting capacity.”17 Liu
stated that he emphasized to the PLA General Staff the need to devote great ef-
fort to “two large . . . key issues” essential not only to “long range combat opera-
tions” in “wartime but also to deterrence power in peacetime”: development of
aircraft carriers and of SSBNs.18
Liu recalled that the question of Chinese aircraft development had weighed
particularly heavily on him when he became PLAN commander in 1982. “With
the development of maritime undertakings and the change in the mode of sea
struggles, the threats from sea we were facing differed vastly from the past,” Liu
assessed. “We had to deal with SSBNs and ship-based air forces, both capable of
long-range attacks. To meet that requirement, the strength of the Chinese Navy
seemed somewhat inadequate. Despite our long coastal defense line, we had only
small and medium-sized warships and land-based air units, which were merely
capable of short-distance operations. In case of a sea war, all we could do was to
deplore our weakness.” But “by developing air carriers,” Liu believed, “we could
solve this problem successfully.”
In early 1984, at the First Naval Armament and Technology Work Confer-
ence, Liu recalled stating, “Quite some time has elapsed since the Navy had the
idea of building aircraft carriers. Now, our national strength is insufficient for us
to do this. It seems that we have to wait for some time.” In 1986, however, “when
briefed by leaders of the Navy Armament and Technology Department,” Liu re-
visited the issue. “I said that we had to build aircraft carriers,” Liu recalled, and
that “we must consider this question by 2000. At this stage . . . we need not dis-
cuss the model of carriers to be built, but should make some preliminary stud-
ies.” The Gorshkov-educated Liu saw a historical analogue: “The Soviet Union
spent 30 years developing carriers. At the beginning, there were different opin-
ions about building carriers. The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist
Party did not have a firm determination to do this, but the Soviet people wanted
carriers. Shortly afterward, they started building carriers. Judging from our
present situation, even for defense purposes only, we are in need of carriers.” Fol-
lowing Liu’s entreaty, “the leaders of the Navy Armament and Technology De-
partment promptly passed my idea to the Naval Armament Feasibility Study
Center. Then, the two departments teamed up to organize a feasibility study in
this respect.”19
Liu suggested that in 1987 China was finally on track to address the “key
question” of the carrier platform and its aircraft.20 On 31 March of that year, he
reported to the PLA General Staff that Chinese aviation and shipbuilding
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industry leaders and experts assessed that their country was “technologically ca-
pable of building carriers and ship-borne aircraft.” Liu allowed that “with regard
to some special installations, of course, there are questions that we must deal
with seriously. But they can be solved.” Liu suggested that China begin carrier
development “feasibility studies in the Seventh Five-Year Plan period, do re-
search and conduct preliminary studies of the platform deck and key questions
on the aircraft during the Eighth Five-Year Plan period, and decide on the types
and models in 2000.”
Liu contended that “the annual spending for the present and the following
years will not be too much” and that “technologically [the plan had] many ad-
vantages.” These included catalyzing “the development of technologies required
by the state and by national defense.” Moreover, “through the preliminary stud-
ies, we can get a deeper understanding of the value of aircraft carriers and the
need for their existence in war preparations. This understanding will be condu-
cive to making a final scientific policy decision.” Liu maintained that his “report
had a certain effect on the PLA General Staff Department and the Commission
of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense [COSTIND]. After
that, the science research units concerned and the Navy’s armament department
started to make relatively in-depth feasibility studies for developing aircraft car-
riers under the auspices of [COSTIND].”
Throughout his vigorous promotion of aircraft carriers, Liu insisted, he
weighed overall naval and national interests carefully. “During the feasibility stud-
ies . . . I stressed the need to make a combat cost comparison between using aircraft
carriers and ship-borne aircraft and using land-based air divisions, aerial
refuellers, and land-based aircraft,”he continued. “Later, when I was working with
the Central Military Commission, I continued to pay attention to this matter. I
asked [COSTIND] and the Armament Department of the PLA General Staff De-
partment to make an overall funding plan for developing carriers, including the
funds needed for preliminary studies, research, and armament.”Liu stated that the
aforementioned plan “should be listed along with the plans for developing war-
ships, aircraft, weapons, and electronic equipment rather than included in the air-
craft carrier development program so as to avoid creating an excessively large
project that the higher authorities could not readily study. I told them clearly that
any plan they made should be discussed by the Central Military Commission.”21
As for foreign technology, Liu reports,
I gave approval for experts of the Navy and related industries to visit such countries
as France, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine to inspect aircraft carriers. During
that period, departments related to the national defense industry invited Russian car-
rier design experts to China to give lectures. Technical materials on carrier designs
were introduced into our country, and progress was made in preliminary studies
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concerning key accessories aboard carriers. Under arrangements made by the PLA
General Staff Department and [COSTIND], findings obtained from the inspection
trips, materials introduced from abroad, and the results of our own preliminary
studies were analyzed, studied, and appraised. This enabled many leaders and experts
within and outside the military to enhance their understanding of the large systems
engineering [required] for [developing] carriers and ship-borne aircraft.22
In his retirement Liu was to recall that he had “fulfilled [his] responsibility for
making some plans for developing an aircraft carrier for China.”23 In 2005, re-
tired vice admiral Zhang Xusan stated, “I certainly advocate having an aircraft
carrier soon. . . . When I was [deputy commander of the PLA] Navy I advocated
that, and at that time Commander . . . Liu Huaqing advocated it too, but for
many reasons it was postponed. I believe that it will not be too long before we will
have an aircraft carrier. When, what year, I can’t say, because I’m not in charge of
that matter now. But I feel we will have one in the not too distant future.”24
It remains unclear to what extent Liu’s advocacy of carriers, which he termed
the “core of the Navy’s combined battle operations” and considered a symbol of
overall national strength that many other countries had already developed, has
actually influenced PLAN development.25 As Liu himself was careful to empha-
size, “the development of an aircraft carrier is not only a naval question, it is also
a major question of national strategy and defense policy. It must emerge from
the exact position [of] and prudent strategy [concerning] comprehensive na-
tional strength and overall national maritime strategy.”26 In light, however, of
both Beijing’s determination to be respected universally as a great power and its
growing maritime interests, the Chinese navy has clearly been contemplating
various alternatives for developing aircraft carriers—research that provides crit-
ical indicators of Beijing’s emerging maritime strategy.
Overseas New Construction
When it comes to obtaining a working carrier, China has several options, but
each largely limits what the carrier could be used for. Buying a big-deck, Western
strike platform akin to the Enterprise or Nimitz has apparently never been seri-
ously considered. It would simply not be within the realm of the possible to ac-
quire such a ship from the West—including, apparently, even Russia, which
China reportedly approached in the early 1990s.27 Moreover, operating a
Nimitz-class aircraft carrier or equivalent is among the most complex tasks of
modern warfare. Matching American or French expertise at large-deck power
projection would involve incredible cost and many years of trial and error.
China may be weighing the costs and benefits of vertical-and-short-takeoff-
and-landing (VSTOL) and catapult aircraft carriers, the latter of which could
support larger aircraft with greater payloads. Specialists at China’s Naval Engi-
neering University and Naval Aeronautical Institute have conducted research on
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steam-powered catapults, but it appears to be theoretical in nature.28 Only a few
navies, notably those of the United States and France, have solved the perplexing
mechanics and daunting upkeep of steam catapults or the subtleties of arresting
gear, and they are unlikely to sell them to foreign powers. When it comes to air-
craft for a conventional deck, only the United States and France have third-
generation catapult-capable planes (we will return to aircraft below).
Another option for overseas purchase would be a small-to-midsized
VSTOL-capable carrier from a European producer, such as Spain’s Navantia, the
builders of Thailand’s ten-thousand-ton Chakri Naruebet.29 In fact, there were
some tentative moves in this direction in the mid-1990s, but nothing developed
from them. Empresa Nacional Bazán, which merged with Astilleros Españoles
S.A. (AESA) to form Navantia in 2000, reportedly attempted to market its
SAC-200 and -220 light conventional-takeoff-and-landing (CTOL) designs to
China in 1995–96, but apparently Beijing was interested in obtaining design
plans, as opposed to a prebuilt carrier.30 Given the continuation of the
post-Tiananmen U.S.-European arms embargo on the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), the acquisition of operational carriers from overseas seems highly
unlikely for the foreseeable future.
Notwithstanding all of this, however, buying a carrier undeniably saves time,
trouble, and expense, by capitalizing on the expertise of others and securing a
proven commodity, and it is notable how the Chinese debate has accommodated
to this reality.
Indigenous New Construction
This approach would appear to offer a wider range of options and would allow
the Chinese to take engineering and architectural clues from other navies and
tailor the ship more closely to China’s anticipated naval doctrine and aspira-
tions. Nonetheless, start-up costs are very high, and the “delta” between plans
and construction is large. China would confront such challenges as a long time-
table and a lack of relevant experience. Prestige issues would seem to push China
toward the biggest ship possible, but lately there have been signs of favoring a
more modest ten-to-twenty-five-thousand-ton ship that would carry helicop-
ters or VSTOL aircraft, like the British Harrier or newer versions of Russia’s
Yak-141. These discussions include some speculation that such a ship might
even be nuclear powered, although conventional power seems more realistic.
This proposal has drawn intense interest within China’s navy and in the opinion
of the authors is the most realistic course of action if the PLAN is to bring aircraft-
carrying naval vessels into service in the near future.
However, according to sources of varying credibility, a more ambitious construc-
tion plan, sometimes referred to as “Project 9935,” is under way that would produce
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a large-deck, conventionally powered CTOL carrier in the fifty-thousand-ton
range capable of launching and retrieving carrier-capable versions of Russian
Su-30 aircraft, possibly within the next few years. While these aspirations are not
to be lightly dismissed, Chinese-language sources reflect little attention to this
program, far less than to smaller helicopter and VSTOL-carrying ships. If a ves-
sel along the lines of the 9935 concept were to come down the ways in a Chinese
shipyard, it would be likely to do so under the twelfth five-year plan, which will
begin in 2011. In the near term, it is critical to monitor the purchase or produc-
tion of support ships, aircraft, and shipboard systems that would be required to
support an operational carrier strike group regardless of whether the notional
9935 carrier or some other vessel is to constitute its core.
Rebuilding
China has already purchased four decommissioned aircraft carriers, to consid-
erable Western media speculation. In 1985, China purchased for scrap the Aus-
tralian carrier HMAS Melbourne, from which it may have learned engineering
principles—albeit limited and perhaps antiquated ones—when dismantling it.
The ex-Russian Minsk, acquired by front companies in 1998, is now the center-
piece of a Chinese “military education” amusement park in Shenzhen.31 A ship
of the same class, Kiev, arrived in Tianjin in 2000;32 it was subsequently reno-
vated to attract tourists as the center of “China’s largest national defense educa-
tion base” and “the world’s largest military theme park.”33 A visit to Kiev in June
2006 revealed a replica of a PRC J-10 aircraft, of which China may be developing
a carrier-compatible version, below deck. The vessel itself, however, appeared to
receive only cosmetic maintenance and is therefore likely in no condition to go
to sea.34 Finally, the Russian “heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser” Admiral
Kuznetzov–class Varyag (purchased from Ukraine in 1998 for twenty million
dollars and delivered in 2002) has attracted renewed international attention af-
ter having recently received a fresh coat of PLAN silver-gray paint, and possibly
other renovations, at Dalian Shipyard.35 The subject of much press speculation,
Varyag is the most likely candidate if a decommissioned carrier is to be made op-
erational. At the very least, its expensive acquisition and lengthy refurbishing
seem to contradict the stated intention of its original buyer, Macao’s Agencia
Turisticae Diversoes Chong Lot Limitada, to use it as a floating casino. There
have even been claims that by 2008 Varyag will be operational and based in
Yalong Bay, Sanya City, on Hainan Island, to protect the Spratlys and the Taiwan
Strait.36 A senior Chinese official has told the authors that “some naval officers
want” to refit Varyag and that “there is still a heated debate.”37 The significance of
this insight is that operationalizing Varyag is not a dead letter in senior naval cir-
cles and that debate over its general utility and possible future roles continues.
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Many of Varyag’s apparent disadvantages as a first carrier for China can be
viewed in fact as advantages. Varyag was delivered without weapons, electronics
suites, or propulsion, so though start-up costs would be high, the potential for
customization is considerable. Further in its favor, Varyag is a very large ship, de-
signed to displace 67,500 tons fully loaded; it can therefore be equipped with a
variety of aircraft and shipboard systems. It is also a known quantity, in that the
Soviets experimented with similar carriers and thought through related doc-
trinal issues. Finally, “off the shelf ” aircraft, including helicopters, CTOL, and
VSTOL, already exist that are known to work with the design and have been de-
ployed aboard the Varyag’s sister ship, Admiral Kuznetzov.
On the downside, and though the Chinese can build a conventional power
plant as well as a shaft and screws sufficient to propel the Varyag, it seems un-
likely that the reverse engineering this effort would entail could be easy or fast.
In addition, a large conventionally powered carrier could not operate far from
Chinese home waters without a combination of friendly foreign ports (to which
access is presently uncertain) or a robust underway-replenishment capability.
On this latter point, the PLAN regularly performs resupply and even repairs at
sea and could obviously learn from the practice of navies that now deploy con-
ventional carriers. The Chinese, no doubt, are closely watching Indian efforts at
purchasing and eventually operationalizing the former Soviet Kiev-class VSTOL
carrier Admiral Gorshkov. Since India has operated ex-British carriers for years,
it already has a great deal of carrier experience, however, so China will inevitably
start far behind India’s level of expertise in actual carrier aviation and operation.
China’s old carriers, especially Minsk and Kiev, were probably purchased as “ca-
davers” to be dissected to inform indigenous design. Varyag—while it will cer-
tainly serve that purpose, especially as it reflects the largest and most advanced
Soviet carrier design—may ultimately also be used for pilot and deck crew train-
ing, as well as a “test platform” for general research and the development of cata-
pults, arresting gear, and other ship-board systems.38 To this end, Varyag may be
retrofitted with a power plant, shafts, and screws so that it can go to sea under its
own power, but training and equipment experimentation will likely be the extent
of its capabilities in the near term. Further out, a modestly capable Varyag may be-
come a centerpiece of Beijing’s naval diplomacy by showing the flag and, in addi-
tion to training (following the model of the Shichang, discussed below), could
potentially be used for humanitarian operations and disaster relief. But as with
everything concerning Varyag, these projections are highly speculative.
COMMERCIAL CONVERSION
A final option would be to reconfigure a large commercial vessel as an aircraft car-
rier. A possible indication of austerity, flexibility, and commercial orientation is
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apparent Chinese interest in Australian shipbuilding corporation INCAT’s “Evo-
lution One12.” This wave-piercing catamaran is claimed to be “the world’s largest
diesel powered fast craft,” a distinction corroborated by INCAT. INCAT has re-
portedly proposed a “multifunction” VSTOL and helicopter ship for the Royal
Australian Navy.39 Were it to pursue a parallel course of development, China could
exploit its large and rapidly advancing shipbuilding sector, projected to become
soon the world’s largest.40 China’s shipbuilding industry appears to combine eco-
nomic dynamism and broad-based Western technology assimilation with close
military coordination.41 Indeed, Shanghai’s Jiangnan shipyard—China’s largest
and perhaps soon the world’s largest—already contains both commercial facilities
and others for advanced submarines and surface warships.
Indeed, while commercial technology is not directly applicable to military
vessels—substantial modifications are necessary—China might prove more adept
at this process than many other nations. It is conceivable that carrier-relevant
research, development, and even production could proceed at one or more of
China’s major shipyards on a scale and with a rapidity that might surprise West-
ern analysts. Certainly, however, there would be extraordinary challenges in
converting a merchant ship into a combat-ready carrier. Producing a ship capa-
ble of ferrying helicopters would be comparatively straightforward, but even
then the final result would likely be of minimal tactical utility and a tempting
target for an adversary. Ultimately the aircraft carrier itself is simply a platform
for air operations—the system of systems that allows for the projection of air
power from the sea. The acquisition of a Chinese carrier vessel is simply one step,
and a relatively simple one at that, along a complex continuum that may some-
day lead to a truly operational Chinese aircraft carrier. The subsequent steps in-
volve hardware, software, and training.
The Carrier Hardware Package
All of these options would rely on conventional propulsion. While a theoretical
possibility, nuclear propulsion makes little sense for the Chinese, who do not
currently need surface combatants with the range of U.S. nuclear-powered car-
riers. Conventional propulsion is technologically much simpler and signifi-
cantly more economical. Still, a carrier that can go to sea under its own power is
one thing; a fully operational carrier is another matter entirely. As we have seen,
there are many other technological and doctrinal questions to be answered.
Carrier operation demands a full complement of such elements as aircraft,
deck elevators, radars, and defenses. Already, Chinese specialists have conducted
extensive research in many major relevant areas. Experts at Beijing University of
Aeronautics and Astronautics have studied carrier-aircraft landing gear.42 Harbin
Engineering University’s Naval Architecture Department has examined the
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structural demands of flight decks.43 Other experts have analyzed “ski-jump” con-
figurations (similar to those of Kuznetzov and some European VSTOL carriers)*
and other takeoff issues, deck-motion compensation, wake turbulence, wave-off
procedures, and landing decision aids, as well as aircraft-critical technologies
and command and control.44 In addition to detailed analyses of the require-
ments of current carrier operations, there is discussion of potentially revolu-
tionary technologies that could be employed on next-generation carriers,
including electromagnetic catapults and “integrated full electric propulsion”
(IFEP).45 Nearly all of this research appears to be theoretical in nature, however,
and none of it proves that China has made actual progress in developing its own
aircraft carrier—or even has made an official decision to do so. Rather, it seems
to indicate that Chinese experts have followed closely major foreign aircraft car-
riers and are gaining increasing understanding of the systems and technologies
that their navies employ. Moreover, much of the research is at least indirectly ap-
plicable to targeting enemy carriers more effectively.46 In June 2006, a second
Chinese official informed the authors that in PLA internal meetings, Taiwan sce-
narios and how to target U.S. carrier strike groups are often discussed.
With respect to carrier aircraft, pilot training would be particularly problem-
atic for VSTOL and VTOL aircraft, given China’s lack of relevant experience, if
less so for helicopters, though rotary-wing operations are now very modest in
the PLAN. In general, however, there has been incremental progress in Chinese
naval aviation, albeit from a rather low baseline. The PLA Naval Air Force
(PLANAF) is increasingly aggressive and confident in its basic homeland de-
fense and interdiction missions, and its experience in nighttime over-water
training and patrol is growing. Leading indicators of serious aircraft-carrier prep-
arations include the development of special air control radars and reinforced
landing gear. According to a 2004 article, Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corpora-
tion has been working on a carrier variant of the J-10 but still faces many tech-
nological shortfalls.47 Another recent source claims that China may be seeking
Russian thrust-vectoring-controlled AL-31FN engines to render the J-10 better
capable of takeoff from a ski-jump deck and to reduce its landing speed.48 How-
ever, additional large purchases or licensing agreements for naval variants of
Russian aircraft suitable for carrier operations—such as the Yak-141, the
Su-30MKK, or the Su-33 (the last an Su-27 variant designed for Kuznetzov-class
carriers, and hence appropriate for Varyag)—would be one of the better indica-
tors of where China’s aircraft carrier program is moving.49
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* A ramp, typically twelve degrees, at the bow, that helps impart lift and permits heavier aircraft to
become airborne after a short takeoff run. This allows for greater range and weapon payload than
nonramped vertical/short take-offs, but still not on a par with the range and payloads of aircraft
launched by steam catapult.
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn2006.vp
Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:30:48 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
30
Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/1
Obtaining aircraft would not in itself, however, mitigate the lack of practical
experience with them in a carrier environment. Great leaps forward in opera-
tional capabilities solely through acquisition are unlikely. More incremental im-
provements—akin to Japan’s gradual approach to its helicopter-carrying
Osumi-class, and next-generation, LSTs (which some speculate may deploy
fixed-wing aircraft, possibly the Joint Strike Fighter)—are more realistic. In this
regard, Thailand’s acquisition of the Spanish-built Chakri Naruebet may serve as
a tangible lesson. Bangkok acquired this fully outfitted, very expensive ship in
1997 but due to financial constraints and lack of experience has rarely deployed it.
Therefore, there are many reasons for the Chinese to pace themselves rather than
rush to deploy an operational carrier. The most that a major purchase of new
aircraft, such as the Russian two-seat Su-30MKK, or the Chinese version, the
MK2, can offer the PLANAF is greater ability to perform its basic missions.
Better weapons and more experience with air-to-surface attack can extend
area-denial and interdiction incrementally, but significant growth of that enve-
lope is unlikely without sea-based aviation and land-based, over-water, midair
refueling capability, in addition to some means of coordination and defense
(e.g., an AWACS* equivalent). Both of these capabilities appear to be high prior-
ities for the PLAN. China purchased Russian A-50 AWACS-type aircraft in 2000,
following cancellation of Israel’s Phalcon sale amid mounting American pres-
sure. China is also reportedly developing the KJ-2000, and indigenous
AWACS-type aircraft.50 “While the larger, more advanced” KJ-2000 is envi-
sioned to conduct “long-range, comprehensive aerial patrolling and control
roles,” the smaller KJ-200/Y-8 airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft (nick-
named “Balance Beam” in the West), with an electronically steered phased array,
offers “a less expensive platform for tactical airborne early warning and elec-
tronic intelligence missions.”51 Various sources report that a KJ-200 aircraft
crashed on 4 June 2006, killing forty people and possibly setting back the pro-
gram.52 China is also reportedly considering Russia’s Kamov Ka-31 helicopter
for carrier-based AEW.53 China still relies on Russian aerial refueling tankers
(for instance, the Il-78) but is struggling to achieve domestic production capa-
bilities even there.
If the experience of other navies is any measure, the Chinese also need to real-
ize that getting carrier operations right will involve the loss of expensive aircraft
and hard-to-replace pilots. In 1954 alone, in working to master jet aviation off
carriers, the U.S. Navy lost nearly eight hundred aircraft. In 1999 the Navy lost
only twenty-two, but these were the most advanced aircraft flown by the world’s
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* The U.S. Airborne Warning and Control System, carried by the E-3A aircraft.
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most experienced aviators.54 While the Chinese will certainly benefit from im-
provements in technology and will not be attempting a scale of operations even
close to that of the United States during the early Cold War, they must realize
that their learning curve will be costly in terms of blood and treasure. Moreover,
the PLAN air force has traditionally been poorly funded and its pilots have only a
fraction of the flying hours that their peers in the United States, India, and Japan
have. These factors will make China’s mastery of carrier aviation even more
costly in human terms.
Quantum leaps forward are required not only in sea-based fixed-wing avia-
tion and midair refueling but also in PLAN doctrine and antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) as well as in PLANAF service culture if China’s aerial power-projection
capabilities are to be improved dramatically. Without major improvements in
ASW, for instance, any Chinese CV would be an easy target for a diesel-electric
or nuclear-powered attack submarine (SS/SSN). Chinese ASW capabilities,
while slowly improving, cannot yet
be counted on to provide a reason-
able degree of security in open wa-
ters. In a crisis scenario, many air
support tasks would be performed
by the People’s Liberation Army Air
Force (PLAAF). This means that, un-
like a U.S. carrier strike group, a Chi-
nese CSG would not need to be
wholly self-supporting. But it re-
mains unclear how capable of joint
coordination China’s different ser-
vices are in operations over water.
Integrating operations between a
highly regimented and rigidly struc-
tured PLAAF and an immature and sea-based PLAN contingent would require
technological and service-culture innovations, as well as exercises less carefully
scripted than has been usual, to develop the requisite interoperability and
interservice coordination. Significant additional research is required to gauge
how much coordination exists within the PLAN between its ground-based naval
air and surface/subsurface assets. This is all the more critical as the type and de-
gree of coordination will necessarily vary depending on maritime mission, (i.e.,
humanitarian, interdiction, area denial, sea control, or strike power projection).
The Chinese navy must also determine what mix of surface vessels and sub-
marines would be necessary to support a carrier. Here the evolution of the over-
all naval order of battle may offer insights. China might be unlikely to commit
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View from the flight deck of the Kiev. There are no actual carrier aircraft present at this
museum.
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itself to a militarily useful carrier until it could fill out the strike group without
compromising its ability to fulfill other missions. Analysis here requires
nuanced understanding of exactly what it takes to operate a carrier and what
mixes of indigenous products and off-the-shelf technologies could be combined
in a Chinese strike group. CVs are highly vulnerable even with supporting strike
groups, especially from submarines of the United States and other regional com-
petitors; the time and expense of deploying a carrier will be for naught if it can-
not be protected.
As they currently stand, China’s capabilities are sufficient to give the United
States pause if a Taiwan conflict scenario were to erupt, but truly controlling the
battle space against a determined and capable adversary remains a Chinese aspi-
ration, not a demonstrated capability.
THE ROLE OF A CARRIER IN CHINESE NAVAL DOCTRINE
If China were to achieve any of the acquisition options outlined above and outfit
a carrier, such a ship, while expensive and complicated, would indeed be a useful
asset. It would have little role in a near-term Taiwan scenario, however, as land-
based PLAAF and PLANAF aircraft could probably handle all of the required air
operations across the narrow Taiwan Strait. Unless China is able to produce and
incorporate a range of carriers in a cohesive and effective concept of operations,
it is difficult to envision carriers as the centerpiece of Chinese naval doctrine in
future decades. In his memoirs, Adm. Liu Huaqing described aircraft carriers as
providing air coverage essential to offshore defense. An aircraft carrier would
thus facilitate Chinese air operations in the Taiwan Strait by obviating the need
for short-range fighters to sortie from land bases. This, Liu believed, would max-
imize the utility of China’s existing aircraft.55 However, Liu made these state-
ments in 1987, before modern precision weaponry. Indeed, a concomitant shift
in operational scenarios may at least partially explain apparent indecision in
China concerning aircraft carrier development. Though periodically consid-
ered, it may have been repeatedly postponed in favor of submarines. Even Liu
acknowledged that nuclear submarines are “one of the very most important
pieces of naval equipment.”56 A senior Chinese official has further emphasized to
the authors that “China will not try to compete with the U.S. in the open sea.
Even twenty PRC carriers cannot compete with U.S. nuclear carriers.”57
That said, there are two general categories of potential carrier roles in the
PLAN. The first is as a discrete capability to support secondary missions. The
second is as a complement to China’s submarine-centered fleet. As to using car-
riers as a discrete platform, the most basic motivation is prestige—particularly
for a great power still seeking to right the wrongs of its devastating national
weakness since 1840. As one Chinese analysis emphasizes,
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The enterprise of China’s ocean development has a splendid history dating back to
[Ming Dynasty Admiral] Zheng He’s seven voyages to the West. But its previous feu-
dal rulers locked their doors against the world. They fettered the Chinese Nation’s
vigorous ocean-based development. This included especially the Ming and Qing [dy-
nasties’] severe prohibition of maritime [focus] for over 400 years. This repeatedly
caused the Chinese Nation to miss favorable opportunities [that would have stemmed
from] developing civilization from the sea. Then the Western gunships bombarded
their way through the gate that China’s feudal rulers had locked. Thenceforth, a suc-
cession of wars of invasion from the sea visited profound suffering as well as galling
shame and humiliation on the Chinese Nation. The beautiful, abundant ocean gave
forth only sorrow and tears.58
Chinese interlocutors often tell Westerners that “a nation cannot become a great
power without having an aircraft carrier.” Lt. Gen. Wang Zhiyuan, deputy director
of the PLA General Armament Department’s Science and Technology Commission,
stated in a 2006 interview that the PLA “will conduct research and build aircraft car-
riers on its own, and develop its own carrier fleet. Aircraft carriers are a very impor-
tant tool available to major powers when they want to protect their maritime rights
and interests. As China is such a large country with such a long coastline and we
want to protect our maritime interests, aircraft carriers are an absolute neces-
sity.”59 Zhang’s conception of China as facing both challenges and opportunities
from the sea is prevalent among Chinese analysts.60
Carrier acquisition can also be seen as part of regional power competition.
When the Japanese deploy their larger version of the Osumi-class LST, or when
the Indian navy puts a refurbished Gorshkov to sea, the Chinese may be com-
pelled to accelerate their carrier program to maintain the appearance of a great
power. But this is more than simply an issue of face. Showing the flag is impor-
tant, but as Japan itself maintains, some form of carrier is needed for peace-
keeping operations, as well as for humanitarian intervention and for defense of
vital and lengthy sea lines of communication.
This unique role for aircraft carriers was demonstrated by the 2004 tsunami,
after which the PLAN found itself on the outside looking in, especially com-
pared to the U.S. Navy, but more painfully to the Indian navy and, even more un-
bearably, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).61 An article in the
PLAN publication Dangdai Haijun (Modern Navy) assessed that Japan’s “first
dispatch of a warship overseas [for] search and rescue . . . demonstrated its status
as a ‘great power of disaster relief.’” The article noted that the U.S. “dispatched
[the Abraham Lincoln] carrier battle group to the rescue” and that India’s “navy
served as the daring vanguard.” It concludes, “The rescue activities following the
Indian Ocean tsunami abundantly illustrated that the use of armed forces is not
only to prevent conflict or to wage wars, but also brings into play the key actions
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of national construction, disaster relief, and rebuilding.” Aircraft carriers and
helicopters, it suggests, are vital for such “non-combat military operations.”62
The final category of potential Chinese carrier missions includes collective
maritime security (e.g., sea-lane protection and counterpiracy). This collective-
security force structure is obviously a secondary mission of the PLAN, and it
would be oriented toward friends and rivals in the South China Sea and the In-
dian Ocean. Deployment of an aircraft carrier would enable modest force pro-
jection to assert Chinese claims in the South China Sea. In this vision, Varyag or
an indigenous carrier in the mold of India’s older Viraat, its new Gorshkov, Thai-
land’s Chakri Naruebet, or Japan’s Osumi would be all the Chinese would need.
A more robust and capable carrier strike group might be needed properly to de-
fend Chinese sea lanes and energy access through the Strait of Malacca to the In-
dian Ocean, but even an ability to show the flag in this fashion could have
valuable psychological effects. In an important article in 1998, noted China In-
stitute of Contemporary International Relations scholar Zhang Wenmu con-
tended that America had historically pursued a strategy of monopolizing access
to oil. Land-accessible energy resources in Central Asia offer an important hedge
against Chinese reliance on sea-based energy supply, which is far easier for U.S.
forces to control and disrupt.63 But Zhang strongly believed that China must
control its sea-based oil supplies as well:
China is facing fierce competition overseas in obtaining its share of crude oil. . . .
[U]nder globalization a nation’s energy security is no longer an economic issue
alone. Instead, it is also a political issue, as well as a military issue. . . . [It is therefore
necessary to] build up our navy as quickly as possible. . . . We must be prepared as
early as possible. Otherwise, China may lose everything it has gathered in normal in-
ternational economic activities, including its energy interest, in a military defeat.64
China should strive to develop its naval power. China should not only strengthen its
naval power and defense to protect imported oil, but also expand its navy to achieve
its influence over the offshore resources in the Asia Pacific region with [its] complex
rights dispute[s]. [Sea] power has a permanent [significance for] the trade of coastal
countries, and the backup of a country’s [sea] power is its navy. Therefore, the long
term approach toward ensuring open sea lane and potential ocean resources is to
[develop] a modern oceangoing navy.65
For these reasons and others, Zhang strongly contended, China needs aircraft
carriers—although nuclear submarines are even more important (at least at
present).66
As to the issues of complementary capabilities in Chinese submarine doc-
trine, the Soviet model might be illustrative. Soviet deck aviation had an impor-
tant ASW component. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet navy considered
bastion strategies of protecting SSBNs, performing area-denial and ASW
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centered on helicopter carriers like Minsk and Moskva. The original approach
was later supplemented by the Kuznetzov/Varyag, designed for force-on-force
operations.67 There is some evidence that China might follow this pattern of in-
tegrated air and undersea warfare doctrine, but like all carrier discussions, this is
still very hypothetical.
In the near term, if China cannot solve the extended-deployment issue and its
SSBNs have to stay close to home, there might be logic in the carriers’ protecting
an SSBN bastion in the Yellow Sea, Bohai Gulf, or South China Sea. But pursuit
of such a strategy was arguably problematic for the Soviet Union. A bastion
strategy might be even more counterproductive for China; forces devoted to
supporting and defending a carrier are better spent elsewhere if fixed-wing ASW
assets cannot be developed and deployed either from land bases or onboard ship.
Even then, force protection, as it is in the U.S. Navy, would be a major drain. In an
era in which long-distance precision strike has been emphasized—particularly
by the U.S. military—it is far from clear how survivable Chinese aircraft carriers
might be, particularly in a concentrated bastion, where they would offer dense
targeting options for a wide variety of adversary platforms, although targeting
the right vessel would still be a complex problem for the adversary.
A SMALLER HELICOPTER CARRIER: CHINA’S INTERIM
COMPROMISE?
China already has some experience with a ship that can support multiple heli-
copters, albeit an extremely modest one. The multirole aviation training ship
0891A Shichang has a large aft helicopter deck, accounting for two-thirds of its
125-meter (410-foot) length. The deck has dual landing spots for Harbin Zhi-9A
helicopters. Removing equipment containers (designed for rapid reconfigura-
tion) aft could make space for a total of three helicopters. Shichang was con-
ceived as both “China’s first aerial service capacity ship” and “first national
defense mobilization warship” as part of a larger plan to refit merchant vessels
rapidly for defense mobilization.68 This initiative apparently began in 1989, and
was motivated in part by British and American use of commercial vessels in the
Falklands War and later by Operation DESERT STORM, respectively.69 Shichang is
entirely indigenous in its development and production, and reportedly meets all
relevant domestic and international standards.70
Shichang, which resembles the Royal Navy’s Royal Fleet Auxiliary aviation
training and primary casualty reception ship Argus, was launched on 28 Decem-
ber 1996 in Shanghai; it was dispatched to the Dalian Naval Academy in 1997
following rigorous sea trials, prioritized by the PLAN leadership, ranging as far
away as the South China Sea.71 According to an article that originally appeared in
China’s PLA Daily, Shichang, together with the naval cadet training ship Zheng
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He, serves as an “at sea university,” one that has trained two of every three cur-
rent PLAN officers.72 Shichang’s 9,500-ton displacement, 17.5-knot speed,
crew of two hundred, and range of eight thousand nautical miles suggest a se-
rious effort to develop some limited form of deck aviation.73 It is at sea two
hundred days per year, and its crew is accustomed to handling typhoons and
thirty-degree rolls.74 It supports “simultaneous operations of multiple helicop-
ters,” which “facilitates training for shipboard helicopter operations, as well as
amphibious assault training.”75 Shichang “is widely regarded as the prelude to
construction of a [true] helicopter carrier or amphibious assault vessel [pre-
sumably LPD- and LPH-type ships], and provides a basis for perfecting fixed-
wing aircraft carrier operational concepts.” With its helicopter module, it can
serve as a “transfer station” for “a group of helicopters in wartime.”76 Shichang is
also envisioned as having an ASW mission.77
A detailed 2005 analysis of China’s prospects for developing a helicopter carrier
states that “arrogant intervention of hostile great power(s) in the cross-Strait di-
vide requires us to prepare for successful military struggle. Moreover, China still
has some significant maritime territorial disputes with some peripheral coun-
tries.” Its author believes that a coastal defense strategy is increasingly inadequate
for China’s future needs, which include “energy security, economic development,
and political stability,”all of which “are increasingly intimately connected with the
international situation.” Developing a helicopter carrier is therefore China’s best
“springboard” for such a “development strategy.”78
Considering funding, technology, and tactical issues, a helicopter carrier’s displace-
ment should be approximately 15,000 tons when fully loaded. It should be able to ac-
commodate approximately 15 helicopters (12 ASW helicopters [and] 4 advance
warning helicopters. . . .) The [hurdle] of 10,000 ton ship technology is small. China
has previously constructed the “Shichang” training ship of around 10,000 tons. . . . As
a result of limited tonnage, the equipment demands of a helicopter carrier are lower
than those of a large or medium aircraft carrier, [helicopter carriers] can use [the]
Commercial Off the Shelf Technologies (COTS) method in their construction, and
[their] costs can be greatly reduced.79
Further, “China’s opportunity, funding and technology for developing a heli-
copter carrier are all mature. Because the superpowers have encircled China’s
periphery, and the opportunity for developing a fixed-wing aircraft carrier is not
mature, the author believes that firmly grasping the opportunity to develop a
helicopter carrier is the correct choice. China’s Navy should reasonably call [the
carrier] its own ‘Moskva’ class. I hope this day arrives soon!”80 Among the mod-
els reportedly under consideration is a fifteen-to-twenty-thousand-ton
LHD-like amphibious assault ship, featuring a large deck that can handle heavy
transport helicopters and a mix of amphibious landing craft.81
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The wide range of challenges inherent in developing a successful large-scale
carrier and questions concerning its mission utility suggest that China may take
a creative approach to carrier development, as it has done in other areas. Here it
may be useful to examine other platform developments to seek patterns that
would reveal PLA decision-making patterns and practices.
One notable trend in PLAN de-
velopment has been the production
of single, or short-series, platforms.
Examples include emulation of So-
viet efforts to build a dedicated
minelaying vessel.82 China’s initial
Xia SSBN is another potential exam-
ple. Some Western analysts might as-
cribe such activity to mere copying
of Soviet failures or to a PLAN expe-
riencing growing pains that reduced
its ability to plan for and produce an
effective fleet. But another interpre-
tation, one that is supported by some
Chinese sources, is that such small-
scale experimentation deliberately facilitates learning independent of immedi-
ate combat relevance. Viewed in this light, the Chinese navy might attempt to
retrofit Varyag to begin experimentation with naval aviation—perhaps with lit-
tle or no intention of ever using the resulting platform in battle.83
Such a vessel might also be used to practice operations against foreign carri-
ers. Chinese specialists are acutely aware of aircraft carrier vulnerabilities, hav-
ing conducted a wide variety of research apparently directed toward threatening
aircraft carriers with ballistic and cruise missiles, submarine-launched torpe-
does, and sea mines.84 One Chinese article emphasizes these “trump cards” as
well as “neutron bombs [and] stealth missile ships.”85 China’s rapidly developing
navy might view a carrier-based force posture as entirely premature yet also see
the need to begin preparing for a future in which China’s maritime interests are
more wide ranging and its capability to defend those interests greatly advanced.
By that time, improvements in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and pre-
cision weaponry might conceivably have rendered aircraft carriers and other sur-
face vessels ineffective for some missions—the “floating coffins” that Nikita
Khrushchev foresaw.86 But by cultivating a nascent capability, however modest,
the PLAN would have hedged its bets.
A second trend has been to improvise and compromise. A case can be made
that the PLAN has long recognized its limitations in capability and lived within
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them. Some Western analysts appear to engage in “mirror imaging” in assuming
that China will automatically emulate American and Soviet large-deck aviation
trajectories. But even a serious Chinese carrier development program might
look substantially different from that of the superpowers. In August 1986, Liu
Huaqing recalled, “when I was briefed by the leaders of the Naval Armament and
Technology Department and the Feasibility Study Center, I assigned them a task
regarding the development of carriers. I said, ‘The method of building an air-
craft carrier is a matter of overall naval construction. Whether [we are to build]
helicopter carrier(s) and escort carriers in different stages, or [to] directly build
escort carriers [is a matter that we] must assess carefully.’”87 Recently, the Chi-
nese have been surprisingly open minded as to the definition of a “carrier,” run-
ning as it does the gamut from amphibious warfare ships through helicopter and
hybrid carriers, up to the U.S. supercarriers.88 A senior Chinese official stated to
the authors that “China will not develop Nimitz-class carriers but rather
mid-sized carriers.”89 In this regard, France may be a model for China. Accord-
ing to one article, “Since the 1970s, China has dispatched a large number of mili-
tary personnel to each of the French Navy’s research institutes for exchange.
[They] have conducted thorough analysis on aircraft-carrier-related technol-
ogy. Many people follow France’s aircraft carriers carefully, even learning from
personal experience how to pilot carrier-based aircraft for deck landings.”90
Numerous literature and analyses concerning Western helicopter “carriers”
suggest that this might be a more logical arc for the PLAN.91 These smaller, sim-
pler carriers would be substantially easier to build and operate. Helicopter carri-
ers might also better serve Chinese operational requirements, ranging from
augmenting China’s currently anemic airborne ASW capability to logistical sup-
port and even humanitarian missions.92
The major obstacle to successful Chinese development of helicopter carriers is
the continuing backwardness of its rotary-wing aircraft development and inven-
tory. The entire People’s Liberation Army today possesses fewer than 350 helicop-
ters (roughly three hundred in the PLA and forty in the PLAN). Most platforms in
the PLA’s disproportionately small fleet are either imports (for instance, Super
Frelons) or copies of foreign models (like the Z-8 Super Frelon derivative). The
only remotely capable versions are based on French platforms, such as the Dau-
phin (Z-9). China also operates some Russian imports, such as the Ka-28 Helix.93
It is finally beginning to address this lack by entering into joint ventures with
Eurocopter to produce more capable machines and to obtain related technology
and expertise. Reportedly, China is developing its first indigenous assault helicop-
ter, the WZ-10 attack variant.94 For the foreseeable future, however, China may pre-
fer to purchase European helicopters. One Chinese analyst expresses particular
interest in acquiring the Anglo-Italian EH101 and the multirole NATO NH-90
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helicopter, developed by a joint venture of Italian, French, German, Dutch, and Por-
tuguese corporations.95 This prospect would be greatly strengthened if Europe’s
post-Tiananmen arms embargo were to be further weakened or lifted in the near fu-
ture. In any case, the state of China’s rotary-wing capability and inventory will likely
serve as a leading indicator of any substantial helicopter carrier initiatives.
The long PRC record of avowedly defensive military development, recently
strained by China’s rising comprehensive national power and Japanese national-
ism, suggests that Beijing would carefully weigh the costs and benefits of deploy-
ing so explicit a concept of force projection as a large-deck aircraft carrier.96
Other methods and platforms might accomplish many of the same ends without
alienating neighboring countries. Submarines are less conspicuous than many
other major naval platforms. Diesel submarines may be interpreted as defensive
in nature. Sea mines, better still, are often invisible even to foreign militaries.97
Perhaps that is one reason—aside from survivability and cost-effectiveness—
why China has recently placed so much emphasis on these platforms. Aircraft
carriers, by contrast, are impossible to hide; even to some Chinese leaders they
connote gunboat diplomacy and imperialism, particularly in an East Asia still
consumed by memories of Japan’s bloody attempts to rule it.98 In fact, it is for
precisely these reasons that the Japanese refer to the Osumi as an LST. The Japa-
nese public could also become alarmed by Chinese carrier development and be
stimulated to support constitutional revision, increased military spending, and
even nuclear weapons development. Any form of an arms race with so capable
and strategically situated a nation as Japan is clearly something that China
would prefer to avoid. These are not reasons why China would never develop air-
craft carriers, but they do suggest that China will do so only cautiously and with
full cognizance of opportunity and contingency costs.
No doubt these issues have engendered substantial debate within China’s civil-
ian and military leadership, debate reflected at least in part by the diverse opinions
of Chinese analysts in open sources. Perhaps some of the rumors and activities
that make the question of Chinese aircraft carrier development so fascinating can
be ascribed to just such a process. If and when China does embark on an unmis-
takable course of acquisition, we can expect to see sophisticated attempts to ex-
plain why China’s carriers are different from, and serve different purposes than,
their Japanese, Soviet, and American predecessors or their Indian, Japanese, Thai,
American, and European contemporaries. Whatever carrier China does manage
to deploy will likely be framed within peaceful rhetoric. “Our purpose in manu-
facturing aircraft carrier(s) is not to compete with the United States or the [for-
mer] Soviet Union, but rather to meet the demands of the struggle [to recover]
Taiwan, to solve the Spratly Islands disputes and to safeguard [China’s] maritime
rights and interests,” Liu Huaqing emphasized in his memoirs. “In peace time,
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[aircraft carriers] could be used to maintain world peace, thereby expanding our
international political influence.”99 Like other aspects of Chinese maritime devel-
opment, it will likely be imbued with shades of the Zheng He metaphor, “peace-
ful” voyages of discovery and goodwill commanded by the fifteenth-century
eunuch admiral.100 A recent series in China’s official navy newspaper to commem-
orate the six hundredth anniversary of Zheng He’s voyages emphasized precisely
these factors.101 In fact, Chinese commentators make the case that while China has
historically been able to build great ships, it has never used them to dictate terms
to others.102 For instance, the senior Chinese official we interviewed in mid-2006
emphasized that “a Chinese aircraft
carrier would not be used to seek
hegemony.”103 While the merits of
such claims are open to debate, they
do hint at one way in which naval
power is conceptualized in the con-
temporary PRC. In a more immedi-
ate sense, U.S., Japanese, Indian, and
Thai operations in the aftermath of
the 2004 tsunami have convinced
many Chinese that good carriers
make good neighbors and that they
are a necessity if China’s force struc-
ture available for deployment to
Southeast Asia is to match and com-
plement its diplomatic initiatives.104
In May 1998, for instance, Shichang visited Sydney, Australia, with the de-
stroyer Qingdao and the hospital ship Nancang.105 This was part of a larger mis-
sion of Shichang and fellow training ship Zheng He—to “reveal the graceful
bearing of a new generation of PLAN officers, spread the arena of friendship,
understand the world, open the window of a [new] a field of vision, increase
experience, [and become] a study platform” by visiting over sixty sea areas and
ports, including Hawaii and Vladivostok.106 Shichang has also visited New Zea-
land and the Philippines.107 It is designed specifically to deploy to “disaster
areas.” Under Captain Wang Gexin, its hospital unit has also participated in
domestic flood relief efforts.108 Shichang conducted a “national defense mobi-
lization drill” near Xiamen on 28 July 1999.109 Shichang has proved capable of
long-distance open-ocean navigation. In July–August 1999 “it carr[ied] out
at-sea defense drills, [the] largest, furthest, and longest in PLAN history.”110
Perhaps Shichang was not deployed to help with tsunami relief in 2004 because
it is indispensable to PLAN training. If that is the case, maybe China would
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consider such a role in the future if its helicopter carriers become more sophis-
ticated and numerous.
The logic Chinese sources outline for the utility of a small carrier for regional
purposes raises the interesting ideas of both a naval “ecosystem” and a modern,
regional basis for capital-ship calculations. Chinese calculations of a small car-
rier’s utility in regional diplomacy vis-à-vis the Indian navy and the JMSDF are
very similar to the logic that Alfred Thayer Mahan used when calculating how
many battleships should be posted on America’s West Coast vis-à-vis the Royal
Navy, French, and German navies to prevent adventurism on the west coast of
South America. In a Chinese context, the idea might be to complicate the calcu-
lations of others with claims to the Spratlys or other contested areas. The tactical
utility of these platforms as disaster relief sea bases offers a positive spin-off for
diplomacy. The idea of a regional naval ecosystem is of great potential impor-
tance to the development of a global maritime security network, as the U.S. Navy
goes about rendering naval security assistance. All U.S. actions will have second
and third order effects on these systems. Awareness of such ramifications will be
essential for the conduct of effective Phase Zero (precursor) operations.111
A NEW GOLD STANDARD
In their excellent article in the Winter 2004 issue of this journal, You Ji and Ian
Storey concluded that
with the retirement of Liu in 1997. . . the aircraft carrier lost its champion in the
Chinese navy. At the same time, the need to control the South China Sea as a strategic
priority was downgraded as reunification with Taiwan hurtled to the top of Beijing’s
agenda. In that context, given the relative closeness of Taiwan and improvements in
the capabilities of the Chinese air force and missile arsenal, aircraft carriers are not
now considered vital.112
This and similar U.S. Defense Department assessments of recent years that
China’s carrier program was sidelined were correct and would likely be con-
firmed by senior Chinese officials at the time. Following the 2004 tsunami and
especially with the advent of the eleventh five-year plan, however, those priori-
ties seem to be changing. What even a modest carrier can do in the near term
caught the Chinese by surprise in early 2005, when they watched in horror as In-
dian and Japanese carriers conducted post-tsunami relief operations. Thus, in
reconceptualizing the PLAN carrier, China’s two potential role models—and
competitors—are not the United States and the former Soviet Union but rather
India and Japan. Fixating on the global “gold standard” for aircraft carriers is no
longer the only, or even the most appealing, option for China. Beijing’s strategic
focus on Taiwan militates against developing aircraft carriers, except for small
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helicopter carriers serving as antisubmarine-warfare platforms, for that specific
scenario. To China’s south and southwest, however, especially along the lengthy
sea lines of communication, aircraft carriers of all variations could play more
useful operational and diplomatic roles. A carrier as a discrete capability fulfill-
ing secondary roles, such as sea-lane security and humanitarian and disaster re-
lief missions, is therefore the most likely trajectory.
Nevertheless, once China has multiple carriers in operation, there is no rea-
son to think that new technologies and doctrines will preclude Beijing from
linking the carrier to its more capable and far more numerous submarines. As
many as twelve to fifteen helicopter carriers or a mix of modest carriers and
somewhat larger variants would represent a significant shift in ASW capability
and may better complement the submarine-centered navy, which China is
clearly developing at present, than would large-deck fixed-wing alternatives.
With the wealth of new models of carriers and operational concepts available to
watch, the carrier discussion in China—while still theoretical—has matured.
On paper at least, the Chinese have avoided the pitfall of spending too much on
the wrong platforms at the wrong time. It remains to be seen, however, exactly
what place aircraft carrier development will have in what has been a prolonged,
publicized, and increasingly successful attempt by China to become a maritime
power.
One thing is clear: Beijing will continually search for the most effective plat-
forms with which to assert control over its maritime periphery. As a recent arti-
cle in the PLA Daily emphasizes,
We must absolutely no longer be the least bit neglectful regarding the “world without
markers” of our vast sea area, our blue frontier. We must no longer customarily as-
sert that the total area of our national territory is 9.6 million square kilometers. To
that we must add our sea area of 3 million square kilometers, our blue frontier. Who
will protect this vast blue frontier? How should it be protected? Those are questions
which every Chinese person, and especially every member of the Chinese armed
forces, must ponder carefully. During China’s era of weakness and degeneration in
the past, in the face of power backed up by gunboats, we lost many things which we
should not have lost. It’s a different era now. We must not lose anything. We must
fight for every inch of territory, and never give up an inch of sea area! We must build
a powerful Navy, and protect our coastal defenses, our islands, our vast blue frontier,
and everything within the scope of our maritime rights and interests. Cherishing and
protecting the seas and oceans is the sacred duty and responsibility of our republic’s
military personnel. Every intangible “boundary marker” and “sentry post” at sea
must always be clearly visible in the minds of every one of us.113
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MARITIME GEOSTRATEGY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CHINESE NAVY IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Xu Qi
Translated by Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein
This article, published in 2004 in China’s most prestigious military journal, China
Military Science, merits special attention as a cogent explanation for the recent acceler-
ation in China’s naval development that has been manifested by the wide array of
sophisticated warships that have emerged from Chinese shipyards since 2000. Xu asserts
that contemporary Chinese maritime geostrategy is powerfully informed by a tragic his-
tory in which “China’s rulers shut the door to the outside world [and] the sea . . . was
neglected. . . . [Thus,] the sea became a springboard for invaders.” But the geostrategic
environment for China’s maritime expansion is now favorable, because of a confluence
of global trends, including the collapse of the USSR, the 9/11 attacks on the United
States, the emergence of a “large Chinese economic bloc” as a global force, and Beijing’s
newly agile diplomacy. The author reviews a number of aspects of China’s maritime
development, ranging from expanding commerce to new construction projects in the
Indian Ocean. Senior Captain Xu’s rationale for an expanded PLA Navy rests on his
contention that China’s “long period of prosperity [as well as] the Chinese nation’s exis-
tence, development, and great resurgence [all] increasingly rely on the sea.” 1 He also is
frank in his concern about “a concentration of strategic power in the Asia-Pacific region
on [China’s] maritime flank.”
Geostrategy represents a country’s effort in the world arena to use geo-graphic orientation and principles to pursue and safeguard its national in-
terests.2 Entering the twenty-first century, China’s geostrategic relationships,
especially its maritime geostrategic relationships, are undergoing profound
change. This will have far-reaching consequences for the development of
China’s naval strategy. It will require China’s navy, when confronted with the
new geostrategic environment, to develop a new orientation from the perspec-
tive of geostrategic relationships.
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I. THE IMPORTANT EFFECTS OF THE KEY ELEMENTS OF
GEOGRAPHIC ORIENTATION AND THE MARITIME
GEOSTRATEGIC RIVALRY AMONG THE GREAT POWERS
When considering the geographical relationships between states in order to
study a given state’s geostrategy, the state’s geographical position, comprehen-
sive national power, and spaces separating it [from other powers can be seen to]
constitute the essential elements of [its] geographic orientation and [to] have a
fundamental influence on a nation-state’s development, strength, and
prosperity.
1. The Interrelation between the Sea and National Power Is a Vital Determining
Factor in the Long-Term Prosperity of the State
Two basic factors in geostrategy are geographic orientation and geography. For a
given country, the factor of geographic orientation is a variable, but the factor of
geography is a constant.3 The geographical factor consists primarily of the geo-
graphical environment and position. In history, the geographic orientation af-
forded by a nation-state’s geographical position and its rise and decline have
been closely related. England is a typical case of a maritime state. Enjoying a geo-
graphical position of exceptional advantage, which afforded it both relative sep-
aration from the European mainland as well as control over northern European
sea lanes and critical straits, it held sway over Continental Europe and main-
tained the balance of power to prevent the emergence of any Continental
hegemon, thereby enabling it to create a colossal colonial empire holding sway
over the entire world.
The United States, on the other hand, is situated between two great oceans,
with its territory surrounded by vast sea areas that place it far away from Eur-
asian battlefields. This has provided an advantageous environment for national
development. Furthermore, [the United States] benefited from the guidance of
[Alfred Thayer] Mahan’s theories of sea power, and unceasingly pressed forward
in the maritime direction, capturing in succession Hawaii and the Marianas
Islands in the Pacific Ocean, expanding its strategic depth on its maritime flank,
securing an advantageous maritime geostrategic posture, [and thus] establish-
ing a firm foundation for its move into the world’s first-rank powers. One can
draw a contrast with Germany, which although a nation proximate to the sea,
with its location in Central Europe—unlike the maritime powers—more easily
got caught up in two-front wars. [Friedrich] Engels, in analyzing why Germany
lagged behind England in the nineteenth century, said, “First, Germany’s geo-
graphic position is disadvantageous, because it is too far from the world trade
thoroughfare of the Atlantic Ocean. The second reason is that from the sixteenth
century until the present, Germany has been drawn continuously into wars, all
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of which were fought on its own territory.”4 Inland states such as Poland, which
was stuck between Germany and the Soviet Union, suffered predation from
their neighbors, owing to their geographical position. Other inland states, such
as those of the Balkan Peninsula, suffered invasion and domination by their ene-
mies even more frequently, causing these states to suffer still more from retarded
development.
2. The Sea Has a Profound Influence on a State’s Power and Prosperity
A nation’s geostrategy, including its national power, the fundamental geograph-
ical factor, can more or less determine its levels of development and strength.
The American naval strategist Mahan [1840–1914] suggested geographical po-
sition, naturally good natural ports, territorial area, population numbers, na-
tional qualities, and government system as six key elements that are indicative of
a great maritime power. This suggests that, in order to become a great maritime
power, it is necessary to possess those key elements of national power related to
the sea. It also reflects the profound influence of the key element of maritime
geostrategy for a nation’s power and prosperity.
In terms of the key factors that constitute comprehensive national power, a
nation’s territorial area, natural resources, population size, and [national] quali-
ties are the most fundamental conditions. More than other factors, these bases
of a nation’s economic and military power reflect a nation’s geographic orienta-
tion. During the Second World War, Nazi Germany made a clean sweep of Europe,
capturing much of the territory of the Soviet Union. But the contest of the war was
a contest of comprehensive national powers. Although the former Soviet Union
occupied a geographical area nine times that of Germany and so possessed mas-
sive material resources, it still had to depend on aid from Britain and the United
States. Britain at that time could not match Germany’s national strength; how-
ever, by depending on seaborne aid from the United States [it] was able to
mount a tenacious resistance. Only the United States, however, could rely on its
solid maritime position as an advantage, [by this means] accumulating massive
comprehensive national power, unceasingly providing the Allies with large
quantities of goods and materials for lease, [and thus] becoming a powerful
world force for justice in defeating the strong forces of the fascists. Entering the
twenty-first century, the United States draws support from the economic and
military might of other strong maritime powers, [and in so doing] reinforces the
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geographical weight of its comprehensive national power. It stubbornly adheres
to the path of unilateralism and hegemonism, to such an extent as to violate the
spirit of the UN Charter and widely recognized norms of the international sys-
tem, [by] invading sovereign states under the pretext of counterterrorism, [by]
gravely assaulting the existing international order, and [thus] constituting an
immense challenge to the trend of multipolarization.
3. The Direct Relationship between the Geographical Significance of Vast
Maritime Space and National Security
Oftentimes, threats to a nation’s interests—particularly its security interests—
increase as their spatial distances decrease. Even before the Second World War
broke out, both Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland in order to ex-
pand their defensive buffer zones. Historically, the states of Central and Eastern
Europe have been in a zone of rivalry between the Western great powers and
Russia. During the Cold War, the former Soviet Union used Eastern Europe as a
protective screen in order to expand its security space. Since the Cold War, the
United States, as the head of NATO, has repeatedly infringed on Russia’s strate-
gic space, first by moving the line of defense more than eight hundred kilome-
ters toward the Russian border, [and] most recently with another round of
expansion, both breaking through the not-to-be-exceeded “red line” stretching
from the Baltic to the Black Sea that Russia designated, and approaching to a dis-
tance of some tens of kilometers from St. Petersburg, [thereby] causing Russia’s
northwestern flank to be directly exposed. The vast expanses of the ocean thus
establish the direct relationship between maritime geostrategic position and na-
tional security interests.
The ancient defenders of China’s central plains faced numerous neighbors on
the northern flank, [yet] had no benefit of [strategic depth and buffer zones].
From the Qin dynasty [221–207 BC] onward, each dynasty invariably expended
much of its manpower and material resources in repairing the Great Wall, in or-
der to resist the harassing attacks from its close neighbors. This had a grave effect
on the development of productivity. By contrast, Japan, separated by water from
China, succeeded in using the sea as a protective screen. [This screen] was re-
moved only in the mid-twentieth century, by the American occupiers, [Japan]
never having before in [its] history suffered invasion by foreigners. Of course,
the geographical consequence of maritime space has sometimes also constituted
an indirect threat. Take, for example, the Korean Peninsula and China’s other ad-
joining neighbors, which were often conquered by foreign invaders and became
a springboard for attacking China, thereby precipitating wars. At present, the
crisis on the peninsula remains serious, influencing the stability of the Northeast
Asian region.
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Moreover, because of the progress of science and technology and develop-
ments over time, the function of the geography of maritime space is not really
immutable. In the process of industrialization, Western states cut across the nat-
ural barriers of the oceans and with their heavily armed ships smashed down
China’s gate. During the Cold War era, the United States and the Soviet Union
undertook an arms race, which was especially intense with regard to increases in
the quantity and range of nuclear weapons, and over an even greater space
reached a position of mutual [threat]. Since the Cold War, the United States has
vigorously strengthened its advanced military machine, relying especially on in-
formation superiority and all along maintaining the forward presence of its for-
midable fleet, which is able to project power over thousands of kilometers. But
the 9/11 event caused the United States to recognize that underground nonstate
terrorist groups had the capability to organize a network within the United
States, with the ability to project power against a target at a distance of fifteen
thousand kilometers. This made it clear that the vast ocean space could not allow
the United States to avoid being struck, thereby greatly transforming geograph-
ical theories regarding space and distance.
4. Throughout History, the Struggles for Supremacy among the Great Powers
Have Always Emphasized Maritime Geostrategic Rivalry
Historically, great powers struggling for supremacy have invariably focused
their attention on the ocean and spared no efforts in pursuing their maritime
geostrategic rivalries. At the end of the eighteenth century, Napoleon sought to
expel England from the European continent, and toward that end advanced into
the Mediterranean on the southern flank and attempted to cut England off from
its foreign markets and natural resources by way of the Persian Gulf. On the
other hand, the key elements of England’s strategy were its alliance with Russia
and maintenance of its maritime power in the Mediterranean. As early as the
reign of Peter the Great, Russia initiated a military struggle to gain access to the
sea. It successively achieved access to seaports along its northern flank and ex-
panded its influence to the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf, even contending for
the Black Sea Straits, as well as nibbling at the Balkan Peninsula. Napoleon’s de-
feat caused the breakdown of the balance of power among the great European
powers, as England and Russia emerged as the new hegemonic contenders. Rus-
sia’s strategic goal was to rise beyond the Baltic littoral and the Black Sea to break
through England’s blockade line. England’s goal was to contain Russia’s west-
ward and southward advance, while at the same time preserving maritime hege-
mony in the Mediterranean Sea and also the Indian Ocean.
Meanwhile, the United States was quietly rising on the western side of the At-
lantic Ocean. The First and Second World Wars both spread from the Atlantic
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Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. In the Atlantic Ocean, England and Germany strug-
gled for mastery of Europe, following the same path as England and France had
in the nineteenth century. In the Pacific Ocean, the struggle for mastery between
the United States and Japan mirrored the great power struggle in Europe. Dur-
ing the Cold War era, the focus of the rivalry between the United States and the
Soviet Union also expanded from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, but
their contention for supremacy followed the path of West-East containment and
counter-containment, with the struggle advancing onto the Balkan and
Indochinese peninsulas [and] reaching a final decisive engagement in the north-
ern Indian Ocean. Since the Cold War, the eastward expansion of NATO has
once again erected a new “Iron Curtain” stretching from the Baltic to the Bal-
kans. One may view England, the United States, and such maritime powers as
the “spear,” the sharp point of which is fundamentally directed at containing
both flanks, surrounding Central Asia, and then infiltrating into the Indian
Ocean. And France, Germany, Russia, and such continental powers constitute
the “shield,” supporting both flanks for the decisive battle in Central Asia and
the ultimate advance into the Indian Ocean.
II. THE PROCESS OF CHINA’S ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF
MARITIME GEOSTRATEGY
Although ancient China did not employ a geostrategic conception, there was al-
ready geostrategic theory, especially such geostrategies as “uniting the vertical
and linking the horizontal,” which were directly employed in actual combat.5
But in the modern era, the development of geostrategic theory fell behind that
of the West, and the understanding of maritime geostrategy witnessed a pro-
tracted process of development.
1. The Differences between Chinese and Western Maritime
Geostrategic Thinking
Western geostrategic theory is principally rooted in aggressive and expansionist
goals. This macroscopic geostrategic characteristic is completely obvious. The
[scholarship of] Englishman [Sir Halford John] MacKinder [1861–1947] is rep-
resentative of Western geostrategic theory, which takes a broad, global view. As a
result of its origins in the ruthlessly violent struggle for existence and the long
period of frequent warfare, this theory emphasized that the primary method of
national survival is external expansion. Each state fully emphasizes the building
of peripheral arcs of control, in order to increase the state’s degree of security.
Other geostrategic thought also displays this aggressive and expansionist nature.
After the Great Age of Geographic Discovery of the fifteenth century, the mad
dash for overseas colonies and colonial empire building unfolded on a global
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scale. At the same time, Western geostrategic thought paid close attention to se-
curity developments both on land and at sea, and even representatives of the
“continental school” such as MacKinder stressed the comparative analysis of
land and maritime power, concluding that human history was principally a
struggle between land power and sea power. Mahan [, by contrast,] was a repre-
sentative of the “sea power school,” which placed even greater emphasis on the
global antagonism between land and sea powers, advocating that maritime
states should seek to control a fringe belt on the Eurasian landmass. The modern
sea power school emphasizes the problems of continental powers, their sea
lanes, and their continental shelves. Thus, Western geostrategic thinkers have
not historically had the tendency to emphasize continental power over naval
power and have generally created systematic land and sea power theories.
Because China was exposed over a long period to the Confucian school no-
tions of benevolence and justice, as well as the “doctrine of the mean” philoso-
phy, the influence of these notions was relatively deep. China has always pursued
peaceful coexistence with neighboring countries, taking the form of a national
tradition of goodwill and good-neighborliness. China’s field of vision was
strictly limited to its own territory and borders, [although] the Ming dynasty
[Adm.] Zheng He’s seven voyages into the Western Ocean opened up a maritime
silk route, which preceded the Western Great Age of Discovery by a century.6 But
in comparison to the Western great powers’ [ships], loaded to capacity with fire-
arms and gunpowder that wantonly slaughtered and pillaged colonies in a
frenzy, all that Zheng He’s flotillas carried was silk and porcelain, bringing good
will and friendship to each country. The land area of ancient China was vast and
its actual power and level of cultural development invariably surpassed those of
neighboring countries. The primary threat to the imperial court on the central
plains was the northern nomadic peoples moving south, so that successive
dynasties all built [up] the Great Wall in order to resist this continental threat.
This geographical characteristic determined that most of China’s wars were
ground campaigns. Even if during the Ming dynasty Japanese pirates and small
Western colonial powers invaded China’s littoral, they did not pose a threat to
imperial rule. Although in the Qing dynasty [Gen.] Zuo Zongtang [1812–85]
emphasized paying equal attention to land and sea challenges, he was unable to
have any real impact.7 This kind of land-based survival viewpoint had firm and
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deep roots, causing Chinese geostrategic thought from beginning to end to em-
phasize land power at the expense of sea power.
2. Chinese Maritime Strategic Thought Was Gravely Restricted
From ancient times, China had the beginnings of maritime geostrategic thinking.
In the Warring States period [which began in the fifth century BC and culminated
in the unification of China for the first time by the Qin dynasty in 221 BC], [China]
developed a coastal economy. Zheng He’s intercontinental navigation as envoy
across the Western Ocean, in particular, had a strong geographical impact on the
consolidation of coastal defense, as well as [for] promoting development in
Southeast Asia. But after a long period, China’s foundation of a self-sufficient
agricultural economy and its viewpoint of “China as the center [of the world]”
doomed the Zheng He expeditions and such appreciation and accomplishments
of maritime geostrategy to the same fate as the continuously declining feudal so-
ciety, and [it] remained silent thereafter. During the period of the European
great powers’ unbridled colonial expansion, China’s rulers shut the door to the
outside world with Decree(s) Forbidding Seafaring.8 This societal attitude of
closing oneself off runs counter to the openness and global circulation charac-
teristic of the ocean itself.
In the world, island nations surrounded on four sides by water, such as En-
gland and Japan; other coastal nations that focused on external development
historically, such as Portugal [and] the Netherlands; as well as the contemporary
United States; can all be described as strong maritime nations. The major char-
acteristics of their geostrategies include a tendency to emphasize overseas trade
and alliance strategy, a greater reliance on threats than actual combat, and the
maintenance of supremacy at sea and balance of power on land, etc. The funda-
mental patterns and characteristics of the geostrategies of coastal nations [are as
follows]: first, having a contiguous border with the vast ocean [such that]
geostrategy must take [both] land and sea into account; second, having some
space on land in which to operate, as well as maritime barriers and transport
corridors that can be utilized. When engaged in war with maritime powers,
[coastal nations] have been able to bring their strength to bear on land and limit
the opportunities of their adversaries to occupy territory. When engaged in war
with neighboring land powers, they have had to concentrate forces on their land
flanks, especially to avoid being attacked from the front and rear on land and sea
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[and in this manner] fall into the trap of being encircled by an alliance of sea and
land powers. With respect to military structure, [such powers] have emphasized
a balanced mix of land and sea forces and having a geostrategy that comports
with this balance.
These characteristics have been reflected to some degree in China’s naval
geostrategic conception. Both France and Germany are coastal nations, but the
extent of their coasts is somewhat different, and the emphasis that they place on
land and sea has [also] been somewhat different. Although Russia has a very ex-
tensive coastline, most of this coast is frozen during a majority of the year, inhib-
iting its strategic maritime disposition. Therefore, both Germany and Russia’s
geostrategies have emphasized land power. China’s coastline is quite extensive,
but its land-sea orientation was powerfully influenced by the special circum-
stances of its neighbors; for a time, the sea was viewed as a solid barrier and so
was neglected. In modern times, the sea became a springboard for foreign invad-
ers. While the great powers were smashing in [China’s] maritime gate, China
[simultaneously] confronted the expansionist czarist Russia and dared not let
down its guard on its land flank. This clearly illustrates how a nation’s maritime
geostrategy can be affected by its relationship with its neighbors on land.
3. The Present Situation and Development of China’s Maritime Geostrategic
Relationships
The geostrategic theory of the People’s Republic of China is represented by
[Chairman] Mao Zedong’s “three worlds” theory, which analyzed the division
and composition of world political power from a geographical perspective.9
Deng Xiaoping applied the “North-South and East-West” theoretical relation-
ships to analyze the world situation and geostrategic structure, [thus] providing
an incisive framework for understanding the relationship between global strate-
gic power and geostrategy.10 These concepts helped to safeguard China’s borders
and, from geographical factors, established the overall conception of national
foreign policy. In particular, serious deliberations on maritime geostrategy
within this framework reflect the general direction of the development of
China’s maritime geostrategy.
A. China’s Maritime Geostrategic Development Faces Historical Opportunities.
The “collapse of the Soviet Union” that occurred in the twentieth century and
the “9/11” event of the twenty-first century caused a great transformation of the
international strategic situation and had a profound effect on the global
geostrategic situation. At the same time, these events have provided historical
opportunities for China’s maritime geostrategic development. Along with
China’s full-speed economic development, the economies of Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Macau [have] gradually integrated, thus forming a large Chinese
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economic bloc. This development of economic and geostrategic relations pre-
cipitated a turning point. At the same time, the geostrategic environment along
China’s borders has obviously improved. At the end of the twentieth century,
China successively concluded border demarcation talks with neighboring coun-
tries and signed a “Friendship Cooperation Treaty” with Russia. With China and
Russia in the leading roles, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, operating
on the principles of mutual confidence, equality, and cooperation [and] on the
basis of a “New Security Concept,” initiated and implemented a model of re-
gional cooperation. In 2003, China and India signed the “Declaration on Princi-
ples for Relations and Comprehensive Co-operation” and the two countries’
navies carried out joint exercises for the first time. Meanwhile, China, still
adhering to multilateral diplomacy, signed a “Joint Declaration on Bilateral Co-
operation” with Pakistan. In 2002, at the Greater Mekong Subregion Senior Offi-
cials’ Meeting [the SOM, held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 25 September
2002] and the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] Leadership
Meeting, China adopted toward ASEAN the policies of “eliminating the
deep-rooted China threat theory [and] guaranteeing [that] economic develop-
ment cannot destabilize the peripheral environment” and simultaneously pub-
lished a declaration on avoiding conflict [concerning] the sovereignty of the
Spratly Islands. In 2003, in the ASEAN Forum Ministerial Conference and
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference, China [formally joined] the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. China and ASEAN [also]
signed a trade agreement and initiated a dialogue concerning security and co-
operation. China’s Bo Ao Asia Forum established the theme of “Asia seeking
common gains, [and] cooperatively promoting development,” [which has] had
important significance for promoting peace and stability on China’s maritime
borders, the region, and even the world.
B. China’s Maritime Geostrategic Security Continues to Face Threats. The ten-
sion of the world situation has eased overall, but hegemonism and power poli-
tics still exist and have become major causes of threats to world and regional
peace and stability. There exist many uncertain factors in the security environ-
ment along China’s borders, especially in the maritime dimension. In particular,
China faces a concentration of strategic power in the Asia-Pacific region on its
maritime flank. The geostrategic tendency is dangerously uncertain. Since this
maritime strategic region and, more broadly, the strategic region of the periph-
ery of the Eurasian landmass constitute points of contention, they are also im-
portant arenas for global great-power competition. From a geostrategic
perspective, China’s heartland faces the sea, the benefits of economic develop-
ment are increasingly dependent on the sea, [and] security threats come from
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the sea. The United States has de-
ployed strong forces in the West-
ern Pacific and has formed a
system of military bases on the
First and Second Island Chains
[with] a strategic posture [involv-
ing] Japan and South Korea as the
northern anchors, Australia and
the Philippines as the southern
anchors, [and] with Guam posi-
tioned as the forward base.11
Moreover, relations along China’s
maritime boundary are variable.
From the Korean Peninsula and
the Taiwan Strait to the Spratly
Islands, there exist many uncer-
tain factors. The maritime con-
tradictions between [China] and
neighboring nations and regions
are rather complicated. The new
“Guidelines for U.S.-Japan De-
fense Cooperation” with respect
to “situations in areas surround-
ing [Japan]” has expanded to [en-
compass] Taiwan and the South
China Sea area. The North Korean
nuclear crisis [has] initiated a
chain reaction [involving] Japan
and South Korea and may trans-
form the East Asian maritime
geostrategic situation. India has
improved relations with [China] but is still intensifying its military preponder-
ance in the Indian Ocean, while extending strategic feelers into the South China Sea.
C. China’s Maritime Geostrategic Relations Are Developing amid Trends of
Global Integration. China’s maritime strategic development, [spurred by]
global integration, is continuously expanding the strategic influence of mari-
time geostrategic tendencies. On issues of international security, China empha-
sizes both cooperation and contestation, stressing that any security measure
must be taken in the interest of collective security. China has played an active
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role in the Six Party Talks pertaining to the North Korean nuclear problem and
has also worked with its neighbors such as ASEAN states in an active effort to
improve China’s maritime geostrategic posture. Through cooperation with
nearby countries, during the 1990s, China constructed harbor wharves in the
eastern Indian Ocean in Burma [and] cleared the Mekong waterways, in order
to gain access to the sea in [China]’s southwest. In 2003, China leased a port in
Russia’s Far East and negotiated with Russia in an attempt to develop the mouth
of the Tumen River.12 On the Makran seacoast of southwest Pakistan, China in-
vested U.S. $1 billion to construct a deepwater port [at Gwadar], in order to es-
tablish a trade and transport hub for Central Asian nations and simultaneously
expand China’s geostrategic influence. For the past few years, China has pro-
vided aid to the South Pacific region and also strengthened economic and trade
ties. Particularly since entering the World Trade Organization, [China] has
strengthened economic and trade cooperation with Africa and the Caribbean
region. These [achievements have] all contributed to the development of
China’s maritime geostrategic relationships.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S MARITIME GEOSTRATEGIC
RELATIONS AND NAVAL STRATEGIC CHOICES
China is [part of] what the geostrategist MacKinder termed the “the Inner or
Marginal Crescent” on the fringe of the Eurasian landmass, with undoubted
geostrategic preponderance on the continent. China’s sea areas are linked from
south to north and connected to the world’s oceans; however, passage in and out
of the [open] ocean is obstructed by two island chains. [China’s] maritime
geostrategic posture is [thus] in a semi-enclosed condition. Entering the
twenty-first century, in order to carry out its primary mission of safeguarding
the nation’s maritime interests, China’s navy must make [important] strategic
choices with regard to the nation’s maritime borders, its maritime domain, the
global oceans, and the overall strategic space.
1. The Nation’s Strategic Choice Concerning Land and Sea Territory
Reviewing history, China over a long period of time undertook a policy that for-
bade maritime activities, [thus] precipitating a “deliberate absence” from the
world’s oceans. These Chinese policies enabled the Portuguese, who did not
have an Eastern sea power with which to contend, to rapidly achieve dominance
in the Indian Ocean.13 If the world were forever isolated on the basis of separate
oceans, this would perhaps not have a great effect on a nation. But from the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century, the world’s oceans melded together into an
integrated thoroughfare. In particular, economic and technological develop-
ment made global integration [both] a requirement and a possibility. An
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increasingly connected and inseparable world was reduced in scale to a “global
village.” If a nation ignored maritime connectivity, it would lack a global per-
spective for planning and developing, and it would likely have difficulties in
avoiding threats to its security.
A. The Interconnection between Land Territory and Maritime Territory. Land
territory is a nation’s terrestrial territory, [whereas] maritime territory is catego-
rized as a nation’s sea territory. China’s land territory [encompasses] 9.6 million
square kilometers, the fourth largest in the world; hence, China is a great land
power. But China’s maritime territory is also extremely vast. On the basis of the
provisions of the “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” and
China’s [claims], China has jurisdiction over and administers three million
square kilometers of maritime space. This is equivalent to the combined geo-
graphical dimensions of twenty Shandong provinces or thirty Jiangsu provinces.
Coastal seas and continental-shelf areas [combine to] approach 273 million
hectares. This area is more than two times that of China’s total arable land. For
coastal nations, the development of land and maritime territory are equally im-
portant. As for China, with the world’s largest population and relatively defi-
cient resources, the sea is even more the most important strategic space for
sustainable development. [As land resources are depleted], the sea can serve as a
strategic resource replacement area.
B. The Significance of the Maritime Domain for China’s Future Development Is
Still More Far-Reaching. China is a great maritime power: it has a very long
shoreline, numerous islands, vast administered sea areas, and abundant ocean
resources. For the past few years, it has become a world energy-development fo-
cal point for “methane hydrates”; the reserves in China are vast. The country’s
long period of prosperity [as well as] the Chinese nation’s existence, develop-
ment, and great resurgence [all] increasingly rely on the sea. At the same time,
the sea is an important realm for the nation to participate in international com-
petition. It is the nation’s main artery of foreign trade. Along with the accelerat-
ing process of economic globalization, China’s maritime economy is moving
toward the great oceans. By 2020, China’s maritime commerce will exceed U.S.
$1 trillion. It may be[come] necessary to import three-quarters of [China’s] oil
from overseas. Sea lines of communication [are] becom[ing] lifelines of na-
tional existence [and] development. At the same time, the maritime economy is
a burgeoning economic realm with huge development potential. More than
twenty clusters of industrial groupings have been developed, while maintaining
the relatively rapid pace of [overall] development. In 2001, major maritime in-
dustry increased in value to 3.44 percent of GDP [and is] estimated to reach ap-
proximately 5 percent by 2010, thus becoming an important pillar and a new
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growth point of national economic development. Vigorously developing the
ocean economy involves forming a coastal belt economic zone [encompassing
the] continental shelf, while also administering maritime economic zones and
international seabed mining zones together as a [unified] maritime economic
zone. Simultaneously, the drive for further development of the terrestrial econ-
omy, by forming great ocean provinces, counties, and cities, with [China’s] east-
ern area taking the lead in modernization and comprehensively constructing a
[relatively] affluent society, [will be] an enormous contribution.
C. Naval Strategic Choices Must Be Grounded in the Imperative to Defend
National Maritime Territory. The navy is the armed force [with which the na-
tion can] resist threats from the sea. Defending national sovereignty [and] up-
holding national maritime rights and interests are sacred duties with which the
navy has been entrusted. In peacetime, the navy devotes itself to defending each
maritime area within the scope of nationally administered sovereignty. National
political, economic, and diplomatic policies are closely interrelated and in gen-
eral directly embody national will. Under specific conditions, [such policies]
achieve national political and diplomatic goals. After its founding, the People’s
Liberation Army Navy, from the north at the mouth of the Yalu River to the
south in the vicinity of the Beilun River’s mouth, carried out its unshakable his-
torical mission. Along with continuously expanding maritime and overseas inter-
ests, the relationship between maritime rights and interests and fundamental
national interests becomes ever more significant. To meet the requirements of na-
tional security and development interests, the navy must not only develop the
important function of defending national sovereignty but also unceasingly
move toward [the posture of] a “blue-water navy” [and] expand the scope of
maritime strategic defense, in order to contribute to the defense of national
maritime rights and interests. To this end, the navy must take to heart the mari-
time interests of the nation, pay close attention to changes in the circumstances
of maritime geostrategy, raise the nation’s naval defense combat capability,
[and] provide [a] reliable guarantee of national maritime security.
2. The Strategic Choice of Offshore Regions and Open Ocean Areas
The navy is the maritime defense component of the armed forces, which has an
important international role because naval vessels are symbols of state power
and authority.14 [Naval vessels] are not only adept at administering waters [over
which China has jurisdiction] but also can act as “mobile territory” and freely
navigate the high seas of the world.15 These special characteristics of naval forces
determine that their mission is not limited to offshore defense.
Offshore defense is the fundamental guarantee of national maritime security.
In the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping promulgated our strategy of preparation for
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combat in the offshore area, since the main scope of our maritime strategic de-
fense was close in to shore. This was done for the purpose of designating a prac-
tical set of strategic guidelines for China’s navy and includes the scope of
sovereignty of China’s territorial waters and islands, etc. It also covers all mari-
time areas over which China has jurisdiction under international maritime law.
The distinguishing feature of the maritime strategy put forward on this “off-
shore defense” foundation is the realization of national unification, giving a
prominent position to the safeguarding of maritime rights and interests [and]
emphasizing that the navy must be able to respond to a regional war at sea, [as
well as] to neutralize enemy encroachments. According to the requirements of
national interests and the development of naval battle operations capability,
the scope of naval strategic defense should progressively expand. In the direc-
tion of the South China Sea, the sea area extends 1,600 nautical miles from
mainland China, but the scope of naval strategic defense is still within the first
island chain.
Open ocean-area defense is an essential shield of long-term national inter-
ests. At the end of the twentieth century, the weapons systems of [certain] pow-
erful nations developed extremely rapidly and quickly made other nations’
weapons “technologically obsolete.” In the future, some maritime powers may
employ long-range strike weapons to attack into the depths of China. The vast,
unobstructed character of the naval battlefield [is] favorable for military force
concentration, mobility, [force projection], [and] initiating sudden attacks. Fu-
ture at-sea informationalized warfare has characteristics of noncontact and
nonlinearity [and] in particular uses advanced informationalized weapons,
space weapons, and new-concept weapons, etc. [It] can carry out multidimen-
sional precision attacks in the sea area beyond the first island chain [and]
threaten important political, economic, and military targets within strategic
depth. The maritime security threat comes from the open ocean. [This] requires
the navy to cast the field of vision of its strategic defense to the open ocean [and
to] develop attack capabilities for battle operations [on] exterior lines, in order
to hold up the necessary shield for the long-term development of national
interests.
3. The Strategic Choice of World Maritime Space and Grand Strategic Space
Facing the situation of a new rapid revolution in military affairs, China’s navy, in
order to adapt [to] the requirements of national interest, must also make strate-
gic choices [with] a vast field of vision, in the world maritime space, in inner and
outer space, and in the entire strategic space.
The development of national interests [in] world maritime space. From the
composition of geostrategic relations, one can plainly see that the main territory
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for human mobility, aside from land, also includes the grand strategic spaces of
world ocean space, atmospheric space, and outer space, etc. These do not belong
to any nation but rather to regions of global passage [and] are called “common
space.” The world maritime space comprises three sections, [ranging] from na-
tionally administered sovereign interior waters [to] the entire “international
waters” beyond the territorial-sea exclusive economic zone, [to] the seabed at a
depth of 3,000–3,500 meters or more, beyond which nations do not have the
right of jurisdiction, as well as the [ocean] bottom’s entire “international seabed
area” [and] the “international navigation channels” beyond the breadth of na-
tional territorial seas. Aside from Antarctica, almost every piece of land in the
world has explicit jurisdiction. World oceans beyond the scope of sovereignty
and administration, all “international maritime space,” comprise a total area of
64.2 percent of total ocean area (approximately 231 million square kilometers).
This area is regarded as high seas for humanity’s common use. All nations may
use it with freedom and equality. In international affairs, China attends global-
ized maritime scientific research activities, develops ocean science and techno-
logical cooperation extensively, and jointly develops the ocean with other
countries. We have numerous national interests in “international maritime
space” and “international navigation channels,” [our] open ocean transport
routes pass through every continent and every ocean, [we] navigate through
each important international strait, [and we] have experience with over six hun-
dred ports in over 150 nations and [administrative] regions. China is the fifth
largest investor in international seabed-area [development]. In 1991, with the
permission of the UN International Seabed Authority, China obtained seventy-
five thousand square kilometers of special joint exploration [and] development
area in the Pacific Ocean southeast of Hawaii and within this area possesses in-
ternational seabed development rights [to] an abundance of metal nodules.16
[China’s] ocean technology and economy are constantly developing, [and its]
national interests are spread all over the world ocean space. This requires the
navy to defend a larger scope.
Space warfare has a profound influence on naval warfare. An essential factor
in geographic orientation is spaceflight technology development cutting
across the atmosphere and space. Outer space has become a hot spot for world
powers to race to seize and a strategic space of the utmost importance for
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future warfare. Space weapons can not only strike the enemy’s satellites in
space [but] can also attack any terrestrial target from space. They have a tre-
mendous influence on land and sea warfare. As early as 1964, the U.S. promul-
gated [the notion that] “control of space means control of the world” and later
advanced plans for both “Star Wars” and “Missile Defense.” [The United States
also] put forward such new concepts as “space deterrence” and “using space to
control the sea,” striving to seize absolute superiority in the space domain. In
2001, the U.S. had a hundred military satellites and 150 commercial satellites
in space, which constituted nearly half the world’s satellites. During the Iraq
War in 2003, the U.S. used over fifty satellites to support battle operations. U.S.
Secretary of Defense [Donald] Rumsfeld planned to emphasize strengthening
the military development of space, to define and master the “space control”
mission, to spend U.S. $165 billion on space-related activities in fiscal years
2002–2007, [and] to implement long-range precision strike and achieve deci-
sive victory [by] guiding land, sea, and space-based platforms, either through
direct sea and land attacks or rapid minimum casualty war in order to capture
[objectives]. China’s launch of the Shenzhou 5 manned spacecraft [on 15 Octo-
ber 2003] was successful. China [thereby] became only the third nation, after
Russia and the U.S., to be capable of launching a human into space. This dem-
onstrated that our country’s national interests already extend to the reaches of
outer space. [Space] has become China’s strategic interest and new “high
ground.” At the same time, it also demonstrates that our satellite communica-
tions, global positioning, and radar information and transmission systems,
etc., have obtained prominent success. [This] is beneficial for enhancing the
information strength to safeguard our sea power.
The navy’s strategic choice must be oriented toward the world’s oceans and
formulated with a perspective of the grand strategic space. Confronting a world
that [has] enter[ed] the space age, China’s navy must aim in the development di-
rection of the new global revolution in military affairs, actively advance a revo-
lution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics, [and] on the basis of
informatization leading mechanization, accelerate the achievement of
informatization. At the same time, it is still more essential to surmount tradi-
tional concepts of geographic orientation, to closely monitor the development
of space technology and space weapons in maritime warfare with a long-term
perspective, [and] to build a powerful navy that possesses relative space superi-
ority. In order to answer the threat from the sea, it must continue to improve
China’s maritime geostrategic posture and contribute to peace, progress, and
development in the region.
X U Q I 6 3
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn2006.vp
Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:30:58 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
69
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2006 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
6 4  N A V A L  W A R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W  
M A I N  R E F E R E N C E S
马克思思格斯全集, 第8卷 [The Complete 
Works of Marx, vol. 8] (Beijing: 人民出版
社 [People’s Press], 1961). 
霍小勇等主编 [Huo Xiaoyong et al., editors], 
中华海权史论 [A Historical Theory of Chi-
nese Seapower] (Beijing: 国防大学出版社 
[National Defense Univ. Press], 2000). 
程广中 [Cheng Guangzhong], 地缘战略
学出版社 [National Defense Univ. Press], 
1999). 
刘继贤 [Liu Jixian], 海洋战略环境与对策
研究 [Research on the Maritime Strategic 
Environment and Countermeasures] (Bei-
jing: 解放军出版社[People’s Liberation 
Army Press], 1995).
论 [Geostrategic Theory] (Beijing: 国防大 
T R A N S L A T O R S ’  N O T E S
The article originally appeared in Chinese as  
徐起 [Xu Qi], “21世纪初海上地缘战略与中
国海军的发展” [Maritime Geostrategy and the 
Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early 
Twenty-first Century], 中国军事科学 (China 
Military Science) 17, no. 4 (2004), pp. 75–81. 
Words supplied by the translators are in square 
brackets. 
1. Xu Qi’s PLA Navy rank 海军大校 literally 
means “senior captain.” See “中国人民解放军
军衔” [Military Ranks of the People’s Libera-
tion Army Navy], 中国军事教育学会编 [Ed-
ited by the China Military Affairs Pedagogical 
Association], 汉英-英汉军事大辞典 [The 
Chinese-English, English-Chinese Military Dic-
tionary] (Beijing: 学苑出版社 [Xueyuan Press], 
2002), p. 1701. 
2. The meaning of the phrase 地缘 (diyuan), 
which appears throughout this article, is ex-
tremely difficult to convey in English when 
used as an individual term, and it does not ap-
pear in most Chinese dictionaries. A close 
equivalent might be “geographical relation-
ships among nations.” For the sake of brevity, 
the authors have generally translated diyuan as 
“geographic orientation.” When used as part of 
a compound phrase (e.g., 地缘战略, diyuan 
zhanlue, or geostrategy), diyuan may be consis-
tently translated as the prefix “geo-.” For an 
example of diyuan as used in other Chinese 
scholarship, see 苏浩 [Su Hao], “地缘重心与
世界政治的支点” [Geogravitational Centers 
and World Political Fulcrums], 现代国际关系 
[Contemporary International Relations], no. 4 
(2004), pp. 54–61. 
 
3. Here Senior Captain Xu is apparently arguing 
that each nation possesses both a fixed “geo-
graphical position” and a variable “geographic 
orientation.” The latter appears to be a strategic 
cultural understanding—based on such factors 
as historical experience, security threats, and 
economic development—of how best to exploit 
the nation’s predetermined geographical posi-
tion. As such, a nation’s “geographic orienta-
tion” can seemingly be altered at least to some 
degree by its leadership and its populace to ei-
ther their collective benefit or their detriment. 
4. The author cites 马克思思格斯全集, 第8卷 
[The Complete Works of Marx, vol. 8] (Beijing: 
人民出版社 [People’s Press], 1961), p. 8. 
5. The phrase “he zong lian heng,” or “uniting the 
vertical and linking the horizontal,” in its vari-
ous forms refers to the general use of diplomacy 
to further strategic ends. It is taken to be a hall-
mark of the political culture of China’s 战国时
代 [Warring States Period], which lasted from 
the fifth century BC until the unification of 
China under Qin dynasty emperor Qin Shi-
huang in 221 BC. By the beginning of this period, 
regional warlords had consolidated 战国七雄 
[Seven Warring States]: 齐 [Qi], 楚 [Chu], 燕 
[Yan], 韩 [Han], 赵 [Zhao], 魏 [Wei], and 秦 
[Qin]. Thanks to internal reforms ca. 359 BC, 
Qin emerged as the most powerful of the seven. 
Coping with Qin’s expansionism became a ma-
jor preoccupation of the rulers of its six com-
petitors. Itinerant tacticians, or 纵横家, traveled 
among the Warring States peddling strategies 
that coalesced into two contending schools of 
thought. The 合纵 [Vertically Linked] school 
advocated alliance among the six lesser states to 
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balance against Qin. The 连横 [Horizontally 
Linked] school advocated allying with Qin to 
benefit from its rise. Qin ultimately defeated its 
opponents by using the Horizontally Linked 
strategy to divide them and its superior power 
to conquer them one by one. 
6. 郑和 [Zheng He], a Muslim eunuch official of 
China’s Ming Dynasty, was sent by the Yongle 
emperor Zhu Di on voyages to collect tribute 
and establish friendly relations with neighbor-
ing countries. His “Treasure Fleet” is said to 
have borne over twenty-eight thousand skilled 
workers and soldiers on sixty-two ships, some 
as much as six hundred feet in length. Such 
ships dwarfed those of their European contem-
poraries, such as Christopher Columbus. 
Zheng He’s seven voyages from 1405 to 1433, 
which reportedly ranged as far away as the In-
dian Ocean, have been recorded in “三保太监
下西洋” [Zheng He to the Western Ocean]. 
While these missions were generally explora-
tory and commercial in nature, it has been 
widely recorded that they also engaged deci-
sively in substantial armed conflicts in South-
east Asia. On this last point, see Louise 
Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas: The 
Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405–1433 
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994). 
7. General Zuo, in three decades of distinguished 
government service, suppressed numerous in-
ternal rebellions and advocated military mod-
ernization based on learning from the West. 
Zuo recorded his greatest military achievement 
in 1878, when he put down a Muslim uprising 
and helped negotiate Russian withdrawal from 
Ili, a border region now in China’s Xinjiang 
province. In 1884, Zuo was given the concur-
rent appointments of commander in chief, im-
perial commissioner of an expeditionary force, 
and Lord Admiral of the Navy. This was part of 
a larger Qing Dynasty effort to develop four 
steamship fleets: 北洋 [North Sea], 南洋 
[South Sea], 福建 [Fujian], and 广东 [Guang-
dong]. Zuo marshaled national forces for the 
Sino-French war in Fujian Province but died 
shortly before China was forced to conclude a 
humiliating truce with France in Fuzhou the 
following year, after its loss of a naval battle at 
Mawei on 23 August 1884. 
8. Rather than building on Zheng He’s achieve-
ments, the Ming Dynasty Yongle emperor’s 
successors for “several centuries” enforced such 
restrictions as the “禁海” [Sea Ban]. This and 
related edicts sought to ban private maritime 
trade in a counterproductive effort apparently 
directed at suppressing piracy and other unlaw-
ful activities. For this reason, the West’s “new 
theories on sea strategies were rejected by China 
and did not have a significant influence on it.” 
See 刘华清 [Liu Huaqing], 刘华清回忆录 [The 
Memoirs of Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: People’s Lib-
eration Army, 2004), pp. 433, 524. Admiral Liu 
served as PLA Navy commander (1982–88) and 
vice chairman of the Central Military Commis-
sion (1989–97). All original quotations from 
Liu’s autobiography were checked against the 
wording in the FBIS translation of chapters 16–
20, CPP20060707320001001. Wording different 
from the FBIS translation is used whenever the 
authors felt that it better reflected Liu’s meaning 
or would be more comprehensible to the reader. 
9. In 1974, Mao stated, “The United States and the 
Soviet Union belong to the first world. The in-
between Japan, Europe and Canada belong to 
the second world. The third world is very popu-
lous. Except [for] Japan, Asia belongs to the 
third world.” Mao advocated supporting third 
world nations in their efforts to avoid domina-
tion by the first world superpowers. See 
“Chairman Mao Zedong’s Theory on the Divi-
sion of the Three World[s] and the Strategy of 
Forming an Alliance against an Opponent,” For-
eign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, 
17 November 2000, available at www.fmprc.gov 
.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18008.htm. 
10. In Deng’s view, international security hinged on 
relations between nations in the East and the 
West, whereas economic development hinged 
on relations between nations in the North and 
the South. See “Peace and Development Are the 
Two Outstanding Issues in the World Today,” 4 
March 1985, People’s Daily, available at english 
.people.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1330.html. 
11. Notably articulated by Adm. Liu Huaqing, the 
First Island Chain is formed by Japan and its 
northern and southern archipelagos, South  
Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Greater 
Sunda Islands. The Second Island Chain runs 
from the Japanese archipelago south to the 
Bonin and Marianas islands (including Guam) 
and finally to the Palau group. See map above 
and Liu, Memoirs of Liu Huaqing, p. 437. Some 
unofficial Chinese publications even suggest that 
America’s Hawaiian bases are part of a Third  
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Island Chain. For a detailed graphic from the 
PRC naval studies community that shows all 
three “island chains,” see 阻明 [Zu Ming], “美
国驻西太地区海军兵力部署与基地体系示意
图” [A Schematic Diagram of the U.S. Naval 
Forces Deployed and System of Bases in the 
Western Pacific], 舰船知识 [Naval & Mer-
chant Ships], no. 2 (January 2006), p. 24. A re-
cent issue of China’s official People’s Daily, 
however, mentions only two “island chains,” 
the first and the second. See “美军忙著大调
整” [U.S. Navy Preoccupied with Major Ad-
justment], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], 9 July 
2004. 
Chinese analysts view the “island chains” alter-
natively as benchmarks of China’s progress in 
maritime force projection and as fortified bar-
riers that China must continue to penetrate to 
achieve freedom of maneuver in the maritime 
realm. See, for example, Alexander Huang, 
“The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense 
Strategy: Conceptualization and Implications,” 
Naval War College Review 47, no. 3 (Summer 
1994), p. 18. Because neither the PLA Navy nor 
any other organization of the PRC government 
has publicly made the island chains an integral 
part of official policy or defined their precise 
scope, however, Senior Captain Xu’s reference to 
island chains must be interpreted with caution. 
12. This is apparently a reference to reports that 
China arranged to lease the Russian Far Eastern 
port of Zarubino in 2003. See, for example, 
Vladislav Seregin, Китай Получит Порт в 
России [China Will Receive a Port in Russia], 
RBC Daily, December 15, 2003, available at 
www.rbcdaily.ru/news/company/index.shtml 
?2003/12/15/49395. 
13. The author cites the introduction of 霍小勇
等主编 [Huo Xiaoyong et al., editors], 中华海
权史论 [A Historical Theory of Chinese 
Seapower] (Beijing: 国防大学出版社 [Na-
tional Defense Univ. Press], 2000). 
14. Here the Chinese term 近海 (jinhai) has been 
translated as “offshore.” The term 远海 (yuan-
hai), like its rough synonym 远洋 (yuanyang), 
may be translated as “open ocean.” To avoid 
confusion with the word 公海 (gonghai), 
which appears later in this translation, these 
terms are deliberately not translated here as 
“high seas.” The latter term has maritime legal 
implications that may not correspond to those 
that Beijing applies to yuanhai and yuanyang. 
The related terms 沿海 (yanhai) and 海岸 
(haian) may be translated as “coastal;” 滨海 
(binhai) and 近岸 (jinan) as “inshore” (between 
“coastal” and “offshore”); and 中海 (zhonghai) 
perhaps as “mid-distance seas” (between “off-
shore” and “open ocean”). For a detailed dia-
gram and explanation of these terms, see Huang, 
“Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strat-
egy,” pp. 16–19. These terms do not relate to 
specific geographic distances per se but rather to 
conceptual areas for naval defense and power 
projection progressively further from shore. The 
distance ranges to which these terms pertain, 
while relative as opposed to absolute, do appear 
to have expanded in scope in parallel to growth 
in the PLA Navy’s capabilities. To date, however, 
perhaps to preserve strategic flexibility, neither 
the PLA Navy nor any other organization of the 
PRC government has publicly defined the pre-
cise meaning of these terms.  
Initially, the PLA Navy was a coastal defense 
force. During the late 1970s, the PLA Navy sent 
submarines into the South China Sea and be-
yond the First Island Chain into the Pacific 
Ocean for the first time. By the mid-1980s it had 
developed broader ability to conduct “近海作
战” (offshore operations) as part of a larger “海
军战略” (naval strategy) of “近海防御” (off-
shore defense) approved by Deng Xiaoping and 
articulated and implemented by PLA Navy 
commander Adm. Liu Huaqing. In 1983, Admi-
ral Liu recalls, “I stressed that we should achieve 
a unified understanding of the concept of ‘off-
shore’ according to Comrade [Deng] Xiaoping’s 
instructions. Our ‘offshore’ areas are the Yellow 
Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea, the seas 
around the Spratly Islands and Taiwan and in-
side and outside the Okinawa island chain, as 
well as the northern part of the Pacific.” The 
strategic guidance for the PLA Navy is currently 
represented by eight characters: 积极防御, 近海
作战 (active defense, offshore operations—jiji 
fangyu, jinhaizuozhan). The former “four char-
acters” has a more general application for all 
service branches of the PLA, as 军事战略 (mili-
tary strategy—junshizhanlue) or a 军事战略方
针 (military strategic guideline—junshi zhanlue 
fangzhen). The later “four characters” refers to 
the PLA Navy’s area of responsibility. For quota-
tion, see Liu, Memoirs of Liu Huaqing, p. 434; for 
other data see former PLA Navy commander 
(1996–2003) Admiral 石云生 [Shi Yunsheng], 
introduction, 中国海军百科全书 [China Navy 
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Encyclopedia], vol. 1 (Beijing: 海潮出版社 
[Sea Tide Press], 1998), pp. 16–31; Huang, 
“Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strat-
egy,” pp. 16–19. 
15. This, and all other references to “high seas,” are 
derived from 公海 (gonghai), a quasi-legal term 
that literally means “common seas.” 
16. China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and 
Development Association (COMRA) filed an 
application as a preferred “registered pioneer 
investor” on 5 March 1991 and was recently 
awarded the right to explore for undersea min-
erals in the central Pacific. See “Areas for Ex-
ploration of Polymetallic Nodules: Pioneer 
Investor Application Areas,” International  
Seabed Authority, available at www.isa.org.jm/ 
en/default.htm; 李尚诣 [Li Shangyi], “认知海洋, 
开发海洋” [Know the Ocean, Develop the 
Ocean], 矿冶工程 [Mining and Metallurgical 
Engineering] 26, no. 2 (April 2006), pp. 1–8; 杨
晓光, 樊杰 [Yang Xiaoguang and Fan Jie], “我
国深海资源产业化模式及其对策研究” [Re-
search on the Operating Modes and Counter-
measures of the Industrial Exploitation of Deep 
Sea Resources in China], 矿业研究与开发 
[Mining Industry Research and Development] 
24, no. 1 (February 2004), pp. 1–4; 杨金森 
[Yang Jinsen], “50年, 中国要建海洋强国” [In 
50 Years, China Will Become a Maritime Great 
Power], 海洋世界 [Sea World], no. 1, 2004, pp. 
4–6. 
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RUMSFELD, THE GENERALS, AND THE STATE OF U.S.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Mackubin Thomas Owens
In the Summer 2002 issue of the Naval War College Review, the eminent historianRichard Kohn lamented the state of civil-military relations, writing that it was
“extraordinarily poor, in many respects as low as in any period of American
peacetime history.”1 The article was based on the keynote address that Professor
Kohn had delivered as part of a Naval War College conference on civil-military
relations in the spring of 1999. Accordingly, the focus of attention was on prob-
lems that had bedeviled the Clinton administration.
Some of the most highly publicized of these civil-military problems reflected
cultural tensions between the military as an institution and liberal civilian society,
mostly having to do with women in combat and open
homosexuals in the military. The catalogue included
“Tailhook,” the Kelly Flinn affair, the sexual harassment
scandal at Aberdeen, Maryland, and the very public
exchange regarding homosexuals between newly
elected President Bill Clinton on the one hand and the
uniformed military and Congress on the other.
Other examples of civil-military tensions included
the charge that Gen. Colin Powell, then chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was illegitimately invading ci-
vilian turf by publicly advancing opinions on foreign
policy. During the 1992 presidential campaign, Powell
published a piece in the New York Times warning
about the dangers of intervening in Bosnia. Not long
afterward, he followed up with an article in Foreign Af-
fairs that many criticized as an illegitimate attempt by
Dr. Owens is Assistant Dean of Academics for Electives
at the Naval War College. Earning his PhD in politics
from the University of Dallas, he has taught at the Uni-
versity of Rhode Island, the University of Dallas, Catho-
lic University, the Marine Corps School of Advanced
Warfighting, Boston University, and at the Naval War
College as professor of national security affairs. He is a
senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in
Philadelphia and has been a consultant to the Los
Alamos National Laboratory, Headquarters Marine
Corps, and the Joint Staff. Dr. Owens won the Silver
Star as a Marine Corps infantry platoon commander in
Vietnam; he retired from the Marine Corps Reserve as a
colonel in 1994. From 1990 to 1997, Dr. Owens was edi-
tor in chief of the quarterly defense journal Strategic
Review. His articles on national security issues have ap-
peared in many well known periodicals, and he is
coeditor of the textbook Strategy and Force Planning,
for which he wrote two chapters.
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a senior military officer to preempt the foreign policy agenda of an incoming
president. Critics argued that Powell’s actions constituted a serious encroach-
ment by the military on civilian “turf.” They argued that it was unprecedented
for the highest-ranking officer on active duty to go public with his disagree-
ments with the president over foreign policy and the role of the military.
Closely related to the contention that the military had illegitimately ex-
panded its influence into an inappropriate area was the claim that the U.S. mili-
tary had, in response to the
supposed lessons of Vietnam,
succeeded in making military, not
political, considerations para-
mount in the political-military
decision-making process—dic-
tating to civilians not only how its operations would be conducted but also the
circumstances under which it would be used. This role reflected the post-Vietnam
view dominant within the military that only professional military officers could
be trusted to establish principles guiding the use of military force.
Taking its bearings from the so-called Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, a set of
rules for the use of force that had been drafted in the 1980s, the U.S. military did
everything it could to avoid what came to be known (incorrectly) as “nontradi-
tional missions”: constabulary operations required for “imperial policing”—for
example, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The clearest example of a
service’s resistance to a mission occurred when the Army, arguing that its proper
focus was on preparing to fight conventional wars, insisted that the plans for
U.S. interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere reflect the military’s prefer-
ence for “overwhelming force.” As one contemporary source reported, the mili-
tary had a great deal of influence on the Dayton Agreement establishing an
Implementation Force (IFOR) to enforce peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Accord-
ing to Clinton administration officials quoted in the story, the agreement “was
carefully crafted to reflect demands from the military. . . . Rather than be ignored
. . . the military, as a price for its support, has basically gotten anything it
wanted.”2
Finally, there were many instances of downright hostility on the part of the
military toward President Clinton, whose anti-military stance as a young man
during the Vietnam War years did not endear him to soldiers. Many interpreted
such hostility as just one more indication that the military had become too par-
tisan (Republican) and politicized.
Some observers claimed that the civil-military tensions of the 1990s were a
temporary phenomenon attributable to the perceived anti-military character of
the Clinton administration. But civil-military tensions did not disappear with
O W E N S 6 9
What does “pushing back” by the uniformed
military mean for civilian control of the
military?
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the election and reelection of George W. Bush as president. If anything, civil-
military relations have become more strained as a result of clashes between
the uniformed services and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld over his
commitment to the president’s agenda of “transforming” the U.S. military—re-
shaping it from a heavy, industrial-age force designed to fight the USSR during
the Cold War to a more agile, information-age force capable of defeating future
adversaries anywhere in the world—and the planning and conduct of U.S. mili-
tary operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The actions on the part of some military officers to undercut Rumsfeld and
his polices in pursuit of their own goals—anti-Rumsfeld leaks to the press,
“foot-dragging,” “slow-rolling,” and generally what Peter Feaver has called
“shirking”—are not indicative of a “crisis” in American civil-military relations.
But they do suggest that civil-military relations are now unhealthy and out of
balance.3
REVOLT OF THE GENERALS?
In April of this year, a number of retired Army and Marine generals publicly
called for the resignation of Secretary Rumsfeld. Much of the language they used
was intemperate, some downright contemptuous. For instance, Marine general
Anthony Zinni, Tommy Franks’s predecessor as commander of Central Com-
mand, described the actions of the Bush administration as ranging from “true
dereliction, negligence, and irresponsibility” to “lying, incompetence, and cor-
ruption.” He called Rumsfeld “incompetent strategically, operationally, and tac-
tically.” One has to go back to 1862 to find a senior military officer, active or
retired, condemning a civilian superior so harshly in public.
Observers of what the press called the “revolt of the generals” believed that
these retired general officers were speaking on behalf of not only themselves but
many active-duty officers as well. While there are no legal restrictions that pre-
vent retired members of the military—even recently retired members—from
criticizing public policy or the individuals responsible for it, there are some im-
portant reasons to suggest that the public denunciation of civilian authority by
even retired officers undermines healthy civil-military relations.
First of all, as Kohn has observed, retired general and flag officers are analo-
gous to the cardinals of the Roman Catholic Church. As such, the public is un-
likely to distinguish between the views of retired officers and the views of those
who are still on active duty. Second, because of their status, public criticism by
retired officers may in fact encourage active-duty officers to engage in the sort of
behavior that undermines healthy civil-military relations, signaling to them that
it is acceptable, for instance, to undercut policy by leaks to the press and other
methods of “shirking.” Finally, such actions on the part of retired officers may
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convince active-duty officers that, by virtue of their uniforms, the latter are enti-
tled to “insist” that civilian authorities accept the military’s policy prescriptions.
The implied threat here is mass resignation, which, as we shall see later, is foreign
to the American military tradition.
The central charges in the case against Secretary Rumsfeld include willfully
ignoring military advice and initiating the war in Iraq with a force that was too
small, failing to adapt to the new circumstances once things began to go wrong,
failing to foresee the insurgency that now rages in that country, and ignoring the
need to prepare for postconflict stability operations.
Criticism of Rumsfeld by uniformed officers is predicated on two assump-
tions. The first is that soldiers have a right to a voice in making policy regarding
the use of the military instrument, that indeed they have the right to insist that
their views be adopted. The second is that the judgment of soldiers is inherently
superior to that of civilians when it comes to military affairs. In time of war, ci-
vilians should defer to military expertise. Both of these assumptions are ques-
tionable at best and are at odds with the principles and practice of American
civil-military relations.
First, in the American system, the uniformed military does not possess a veto
over policy. Indeed, civilians have the authority to make decisions even in what
would seem purely military affairs. In practice, as Eliot Cohen has shown, Amer-
ican civil-military relations do not actually conform to what some have dubbed
the “normal theory of civil-military relations,” which holds that civilians deter-
mine the goals of war and leave the strategy and execution of the war to the uni-
formed military.4 Cohen illustrates in Supreme Command that such successful
wartime presidents as Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt “interfered” ex-
tensively with military operations—often driving their generals to distraction.5
Second, when it comes to military affairs, soldiers are not necessarily more
prescient than civilian policy makers. This is confirmed by the historical record.
During the American Civil War, Abraham Lincoln constantly prodded George
McClellan, commanding general of the largest Union force during the Civil War,
the Army of the Potomac, to take the offensive in Virginia in 1862. McClellan
just as constantly whined that he had insufficient troops. During World War II,
notwithstanding the image of civil-military comity, there were many differences
between Franklin Roosevelt and his military advisers. Gen. George Marshall,
chief of staff of the U.S. Army and the greatest soldier-statesman since Washing-
ton, opposed arms shipments to Great Britain in 1940 and argued for a
cross-channel invasion before the United States was ready. History has vindi-
cated Lincoln and Roosevelt.
Many are inclined to blame the U.S. defeat in Vietnam on civilians. But the
American operational approach in Vietnam was the creature of the uniformed
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military. The generally accepted view today is that the operational strategy of
Gen. William Westmoreland (commanding the U.S. Military Assistance Com-
mand, Vietnam) emphasizing attrition of the People’s Army of Vietnam forces
in a “war of the big battalions”—a concept producing sweeps through remote
jungle areas in an effort to fix and destroy the enemy with superior firepower—
was counterproductive. By the time Westmoreland’s successor could adopt a
more fruitful approach, it was too late.6
During the planning for Operation DESERT STORM in late 1990 and early
1991, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. Central Command, pre-
sented a plan calling for a frontal assault against Iraqi positions in southern Ku-
wait, followed by a drive toward Kuwait City. The problem was that this plan
would have been unlikely to achieve the foremost military objective of the
ground war—the destruction of the three divisions of Saddam’s Republican
Guard. The civilian leadership rejected the early war plan presented by
CentCom and ordered a return to the drawing board. The revised plan was far
more imaginative and effective.7
“PUSHING BACK” AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
The cornerstone of U.S. civil-military relations is civilian control of the military,
a principle that goes back to the American Revolution and the precedent estab-
lished by George Washington, who willingly subordinated himself and his army
to civilian authority. “Washington’s willing subordination, of himself and the
army he commanded, to civilian authority established the essential tenet of that
service’s professional ethos. His extraordinary understanding of the fundamen-
tal importance of civil preeminence allowed a professional military force to be-
gin to flourish in a democratic society. All of our military services are heir to that
legacy.”8
The very public attack on Rumsfeld by retired officers flies in the face of the
American tradition of civilian control of the military. Should active-duty and
retired officers of the Army and Navy in 1941 have debated publicly the Lend-
Lease program or the occupation of Iceland? Should Douglas MacArthur have
resigned over the Europe-first strategy? Should generals in 1861 have discussed
in public their opinions of Lincoln’s plan to reprovision Fort Sumter, aired their
views regarding the right of the South to secede from the Union, or argued the
pros and cons of issuing the Emancipation Proclamation?
In support of their actions, many of Rumsfeld’s critics have invoked a very
important book by H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert
McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, the subject
of which is the failure of the Joint Chiefs to challenge Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara forcefully enough during the Vietnam War.9 Many serving officers
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believe the book effectively makes the case that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should
have more openly voiced their opposition to the Johnson administration’s strat-
egy of gradualism and then resigned rather than carry out the policy.
But as Kohn—who was McMaster’s academic adviser for the dissertation that
became Dereliction of Duty—has observed, the book
neither says nor implies that the chiefs should have obstructed American policy in
Vietnam in any other way than by presenting their views frankly and forcefully to
their civilian superiors, and speaking honestly to Congress when asked for their
views. It neither states nor suggests that the chiefs should have opposed President
Lyndon Johnson’s orders and policies by leaks, public statements, or by resignation,
unless an officer personally and professionally could not stand, morally and ethically,
to carry out the chosen policy.10
This serious misreading of Dereliction of Duty has dangerously reinforced the
increasingly widespread belief among officers that they should be advocates of
particular policies rather than contenting themselves with their traditional ad-
visory role.
Kohn writes that a survey of officer and civilian attitudes and opinions under-
taken by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies in 1998–99 discovered that
“many officers believe that they have the duty to force their own views on civil-
ian decision makers when the United States is contemplating committing Amer-
ican forces abroad.” When “asked
whether military leaders should
be neutral, advise, advocate, or in-
sist on having their way in the de-
cision process” to use military
force, 50 percent or more of the
up-and-coming active-duty officers answered “insist,” on the following issues:
“setting rules of engagement, ensuring that clear political and military goals ex-
ist, developing an ‘exit strategy,’” and “deciding what kinds of military units will
be used to accomplish all tasks.” In the context of the questionnaire, “insist” defi-
nitely implied that officers should try to compel acceptance of the military’s rec-
ommendations.11
Ironically, some journalists who normally would reject the idea that military
officers should “insist” that elected officials or their constitutional appointees
adopt the military position seem to be all for it when it comes to the Bush admin-
istration and Donald Rumsfeld. For instance, in a March 2005 column for the
Washington Post handicapping the field of possible successors to Air Force general
Richard B. Myers as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, David Ignatius, citing
Dereliction of Duty, raised a central question of U.S. civil-military relations: To
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what extent should the uniformed military “push back” against the policies of a
president and his secretary of defense if the soldiers believe the policies are
wrong?12 Ignatius wrote that “when you ask military officers who should get the
job, the first thing many say is that the military needs someone who can stand up
to . . . Rumsfeld. The tension between Rumsfeld and the uniformed military,” he
continued, “has been an open secret in Washington these past four years. It was
compounded by the Iraq war, but it began almost from the moment Rumsfeld
took over at the Pentagon. The grumbling about his leadership partly reflected
the military’s resistance to change and its reluctance to challenge a brilliant but
headstrong civilian leader. But in Iraq, Rumsfeld has pushed the services—espe-
cially the Army—near the breaking point.”
“The military is right,” concluded Ignatius. “The next chairman of the JCS
must be someone who can push back.” But what does “pushing back” by the uni-
formed military mean for civilian control of the military?
LINCOLN AND MCCLELLAN: A CASE OF “PUSHING BACK”
Perhaps the clearest example of an American general who “pushed back” against
civilian leadership because he disapproved of administration policy is Maj. Gen.
George B. McClellan. Military historians tend to treat McClellan as a first-rate
organizer, equipper, and trainer but an incompetent general who was constantly
outfought and outgeneraled by his Confederate counterpart, Robert E. Lee. That
may be true, but there is more to the story. McClellan and many of his favored
subordinates disagreed with many of Lincoln’s policies and indeed may have at-
tempted to sabotage them. McClellan pursued the war he wanted to fight—one
that would end in a negotiated peace—rather than the one his commander in
chief wanted him to fight. The behavior of McClellan and his subordinates ulti-
mately led Lincoln to worry that his decision to issue the Emancipation Procla-
mation might trigger a military coup.
There is perhaps no more remarkable document in the annals of American
civil-military relations than the letter McClellan gave to Lincoln when the presi-
dent visited the Army of the Potomac at Harrison’s Landing on the James River
in July 1862. McClellan, who had been within the sound of Richmond’s church
bells only two weeks earlier, had been driven back by Lee in a series of battles
known as the Seven Days. McClellan’s letter went far beyond the description of
the state of military affairs that McClellan had led Lincoln to expect. Instead,
McClellan argued against confiscation of rebel property and interference with
the institution of slavery. “A system of policy thus constitutional and conserva-
tive, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive
the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses
and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend
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itself to the favor of the Almighty.” McClellan continued that victory was possi-
ble only if the president was pledged to such a policy. “A declaration of radical
views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present Armies,”
making further recruitment “almost hopeless.”13
Advice from a general, however inappropriate, is one thing. But for a general
to act on his own without consulting his commander in chief smacks of insubor-
dination. In early June 1862, while the Army of the Potomac was still moving to-
ward Richmond, McClellan had designated his aide, Col. Thomas Key, to
represent him in prisoner-of-war negotiations with the Confederates, repre-
sented by Howell Cobb. But McClellan had gone far beyond the technical issue
at hand, authorizing Key to investigate the possibility of peace between the sec-
tions. In response to Cobb’s assertion that Southern rights could be protected
only by independence, Key replied that “the President, the army, and the people”
had no thought of subjugating the South but only desired to uphold the Consti-
tution and enforce the laws equally in the states. McClellan apparently thought it
was part of his duty to negotiate with the enemy on the terms for ending hostili-
ties and to explain to that enemy the policies and objectives of his commander in
chief, without letting the latter know that he was doing so.
McClellan did not try to hide his efforts at peace negotiations from Lincoln.
Indeed, he filed Key’s report with Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and asked
him to give it to the president. Stanton acceded to McClellan’s request but re-
minded him that “it is not deemed proper for officers bearing flags of truce in re-
spect to the exchange of prisoners to hold any conference with the rebel officers
upon the general subject of the existing contest.”14
As for his own proper responsibilities, McClellan’s generalship was character-
ized by a notable lack of aggressiveness. He was accused of tarrying when Gen.
John Pope’s Army of Virginia was being handled very roughly by Lee at Second
Manassas. Indeed, one of Pope’s corps commanders, Fitz-John Porter, clearly
serving as a surrogate for McClellan, was court-martialed for alleged failure to
come to Pope’s aid quickly enough. A month later, McClellan was accused of let-
ting Lee slip away to fight another day after Antietam; soon thereafter, Lincoln
relieved him.
I have come to believe that McClellan’s lack of aggressiveness was the result
not of incompetence but of his refusal to fight the war Lincoln wanted him to
fight. He disagreed with Lincoln’s war aims and, in the words of Peter Feaver,
“shirked” by “dragging his feet.”15 At the same time, McClellan and some of his
officers did not hide their disdain for Lincoln and Stanton and often expressed
this disdain in intemperate language. McClellan wrote his wife, “I have com-
menced receiving letters from the North urging me to march on Washington &
assume the Govt!!”16 He also wrote her about the possibility of a “coup,” after
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which “everything will be changed in this country so far as we are concerned &
my enemies will be at my feet.”17 He did not limit the expression of such senti-
ments to private correspondence with his wife. Lincoln and his cabinet were
aware of the rumors that McClellan intended to put “his sword across the gov-
ernment’s policy.” McClellan’s quartermaster general, Montgomery Meigs, ex-
pressed concern about “officers of rank” in the Army of the Potomac who spoke
openly of “a march on Washington to ‘clear out those fellows.’”18
Such loose talk did not help McClellan or his army in the eyes of Lincoln, who
understood that he must take action in order to remind the army of his constitu-
tional role. He did by disciplining Maj. John Key, aide de camp to the general in
chief, Henry Halleck, and brother of McClellan’s aide, the aforementioned Col.
Thomas Key. Lincoln wrote Major Key of learning that he had said in response to
a query from a brother officer as to “why . . . the rebel army [was not] bagged im-
mediately after the battle near Sharpsburg [Antietam],” that “that is not the
game. The object is that neither army shall get much advantage of the other; that
both shall be kept in the field till they are exhausted, when we will make a com-
promise and save slavery.”19
Lincoln dismissed Key from the service, despite pleas for leniency (and the
fact that Key’s son had been killed at Perryville), writing that “it is wholly inad-
missible for any gentleman holding a military commission from the United
States to utter such sentiments as Major Key is within [i.e., by an enclosure]
proved to have done.” He remarked to John Hay “that if there was a ‘game’ ever
among Union men, to have our army not take an advantage of the enemy when it
could, it was his object to break up that game.” At last recognizing the danger of
such loose talk on the part of his officers and soldiers, McClellan issued a general
order calling for the subordination of the military to civil authority: “The rem-
edy for political errors, if any are committed, is to be found only in the action of
the people at the polls.”20
On the surface, criticism of Bush administration policy by retired officers is
not nearly as serious as the actions of McClellan, whose “foot-dragging” and
“slow-rolling” undermined the Union war effort during the War of the Rebel-
lion. Nonetheless, the threat to healthy civil-military relations posed by the re-
cent, seemingly coordinated public attack by retired generals on Secretary
Rumsfeld and Bush’s Iraq policy is serious, reinforcing as it does the illegitimate
belief among active duty officers that they have the right to “insist” on their pre-
ferred options and that they have a right to “push back” against civilian
authority.
But the fact is that the soldier’s view, no matter how experienced in military
affairs the soldier may be, is still restricted to the conduct of operations and mili-
tary strategy, and even here, as Cohen shows, the civilian leadership still reserves
7 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn2006.vp
Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:30:59 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
82
Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/1
the right to “interfere.” Civilian control of the military means at a minimum that
it is the role of the statesman to take the broader view, deciding when political
considerations take precedence over even the most pressing military matters.
The soldier is a fighter and an adviser, not a policy maker. In the American sys-
tem, only the people at large—not the military—are permitted to punish an ad-
ministration for even “grievous errors” in the conduct of war.
RUMSFELD VS. HIS CRITICS: THE RECORD
While the military must make its point strongly in the councils of government, it
will not, as instances adduced above have shown, always be correct when it comes
to policy recommendations. In the case of Rumsfeld, it seems clear that although
he has made some critical mistakes, no one did better when it came to predicting
what would transpire. Did Rumsfeld foresee the insurgency and the shift from
conventional to guerrilla war? No, but neither did his critics in the uniformed
services.
Indeed, Tom Ricks reported in the 25 December 2004 Washington Post that
Maj. Isaiah Wilson III, who served as an official historian of the campaign and
later as a war planner in Iraq, placed the blame for failing to foresee the insur-
gency squarely on the Army.21 Ricks wrote:
Many in the Army have blamed Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and other
top Pentagon civilians for the unexpectedly difficult occupation of Iraq, but Wilson
reserves his toughest criticism for Army commanders who, he concludes, failed to
grasp the strategic situation in Iraq and so did not plan properly for victory. He con-
cludes that those who planned the war suffered from “stunted learning and a reluc-
tance to adapt.”
Army commanders still misunderstand the strategic problem they face and therefore
are still pursuing a flawed approach, writes Wilson, who is scheduled to teach at the
U.S. Military Academy at West Point next year. “Plainly stated, the ‘western coali-
tion’ failed, and continues to fail, to see Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in its fullness,”
he asserts.
“Reluctance in even defining the situation . . . is perhaps the most telling indicator of
a collective cognitive dissonance on part of the U.S. Army to recognize a war of re-
bellion, a people’s war, even when they were fighting it,” he comments.
What about the charge that Rumsfeld’s Pentagon shortchanged the troops in
Iraq by failing to provide them with armored “humvees”?* A review of Army bud-
get submissions makes it clear that the service’s priority, as is usually the case with
the uniformed services, was to acquire “big ticket” items. It was only after the
O W E N S 7 7
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insurgency and the “improvised explosive device”threat became apparent that the
Army began to push for supplemental spending to “up-armor”the utility vehicles.
Also, while it is true that Rumsfeld downplayed the need to prepare for
postconflict stability operations, it is also the case that in doing so he was merely
ratifying the preferences of the uniformed military. When it comes to
postconflict stability operations, the real villain is the Weinberger-Powell Doc-
trine, a set of principles long internalized by the U.S. military that emphasizes
the requirement for an “exit strategy.” But if generals are thinking about an exit
strategy they are not thinking about “war termination”—how to convert mili-
tary success into political success. This cultural aversion to conducting stability
operations is reflected by the fact that operational planning for Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM took eighteen months, while planning for postwar stabilization began
(halfheartedly) only a couple of months before the invasion.22
In retrospect, it is easy to criticize Rumsfeld for pushing the CentCom com-
mander, General Franks, to develop a plan based on a smaller force than the one
called for in earlier plans, as well as for his interference with the Time-Phased
Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) that lays out the schedule of forces deploy-
ing to a theater of war. But hind-
sight is always twenty/twenty,
permitting us to judge another’s
actions on the basis of what we
know now, not what we knew
then. Thus the consequences of
the chosen path—to attack earlier with a smaller force—are visible to us in retro-
spect, while the very real risks associated with an alternative option—such as to
take the time to build up a larger force, perhaps losing the opportunity to
achieve surprise—remain provisional.
The debate over the size of the invasion force must also be understood in the
context of civil-military relations. The fact is that Rumsfeld believed that civilian
control of the military had eroded during the Clinton administration, that if the
Army did not want to do something—as in the Balkans in the 1990s—it would
simply overstate the force requirements. It is almost as if the standard Army re-
sponse was: “The answer is 350,000 soldiers. What’s the question?” Accordingly,
Rumsfeld was inclined to interpret the Army’s call for a larger force to invade
Iraq as just one more example of what he perceived as foot dragging. In retro-
spect, Rumsfeld’s decision not to deploy the 1st Cavalry Division was a mistake,
but again, he had come to believe that the TPFDL, like the “two major theater
war” planning metric, had become little more than a bureaucratic tool that the
services used to protect their shares of the defense budget.
7 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Critics argued that General Powell’s actions
constituted a serious encroachment by the
military on civilian “turf.”
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn2006.vp
Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:30:59 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
84
Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/1
It is clear that Rumsfeld is guilty of errors of judgment regarding both trans-
formation and the conduct of the Iraq war. With regard to the former, his “busi-
ness” approach to transformation is potentially risky. Rumsfeld’s approach
stresses an economic concept of efficiency at the expense of military and political
effectiveness. War is far more than a mere targeting drill: as the Iraq conflict has
demonstrated, destruction of a “target set” may mean military success but does
not translate automatically into achievement of the political goals for which the
war was fought in the first place. But the U.S. military does need to transform it-
self, and, as suggested above, the actual practice of transformation in the
Rumsfeld Pentagon has been flexible and adaptive, not doctrinaire.
With regard to the Iraq war, Rumsfeld’s original position was much more
optimistic than the facts on the ground have warranted, but he has acknowl-
edged changes in the character of the war and adapted to them. In addition,
Rumsfeld’s critics have been no more prescient than he. We should not be sur-
prised. As Clausewitz reminds us, war takes place in the realm of chance and
uncertainty.
Uniformed officers have an obligation to stand up to civilian leaders if they think
a policy is flawed. They must convey their concerns to civilian policy makers
forcefully and truthfully. If they believe the door is closed to them at the Penta-
gon or the White House, they also have access to Congress. But the American
tradition of civil-military relations requires that they not engage in public de-
bate over matters of foreign policy, including the decision to go to war. More-
over, once a policy decision is made, soldiers are obligated to carry it out to the
best of their ability, whether their advice is heeded or not. The idea that a general
or admiral—including those on the retired list—should publicly attack govern-
ment policy and its civilian authors, especially in time of war, is dangerous.
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FORT FISHER
Amphibious Victory in the American Civil War
Gary J. Ohls
Historians and military professionals tend to agree on the importance oflarge armies to the outcome of the American Civil War. So much attention
has focused on the major battles and leaders of land warfare that other elements
of military significance often receive less attention than deserved. Yet the ulti-
mate victory of Union forces resulted from a total war effort, involving political,
diplomatic, economic, military, and naval power. In no arena of conflict did the
Union hold greater advantage than in its ability to assert naval force and conduct
amphibious operations, and no operation in the entire Civil War better illus-
trates the Union’s ability to leverage amphibious power projection than the as-
sault on Fort Fisher at the mouth of the Cape Fear River. The actions taken to
capture Fort Fisher and thereby close down the last effective Confederate port—
Wilmington, North Carolina—represent a particularly rich opportunity to
study the amphibious elements of that war.
The fighting for Fort Fisher actually involved two separate but related battles.
The first attack, in December 1864, failed utterly, and it provides many good ex-
amples of bad planning and execution. The second effort, during January 1865,
succeeded magnificently; it stands as a sterling example upon which to build an
amphibious tradition. In the second attack, command-
ers learned from the mistakes of the first and applied
sound principles for the conduct of complex joint op-
erations.1 By studying both the success and failure at
Fort Fisher, it is possible to understand better the pro-
jection of combat power ashore and the evolution of
joint operations within the American military system.2
Gary Ohls, a retired colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps
Reserve, teaches history and is completing a PhD disser-
tation in military/naval history at Texas Christian Uni-
versity in Fort Worth. A holder of three master’s degrees,
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academic year, graduating with honors.
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Other examples of the importance of amphibious assault during the Civil War
exist, including joint operations on the inland rivers, on the littorals of the Gulf of
Mexico, and along the Atlantic coastline.3 The application of naval strategy and am-
phibious tactics constituted an integral element of President Abraham Lincoln’s
thinking, as he sought to maintain pressure on the Confederacy at every point.4 The
effects of this war strategy eroded Confederate strength in many areas, including the
tactical power of their armies in the field. As Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and his lieuten-
ants maneuvered against Southern armies, they faced smaller forces than they might
have, because of the Confederate strategy of defending all points, including the
entire coastline against a free-ranging Union navy.5 In addition, as the Union navy
closed Southern ports to blockade runners, Confederate armies lost important
sources of materiel and equipment needed to sustain their war effort.6
At the beginning of the American Civil War, leaders understood sophisticated
concepts of naval strategy, but very little doctrine or tradition regarding am-
phibious operations existed.7 Between the Revolution and the Civil War, the
United States had undertaken only one significant amphibious action. During
the Mexican-American War, U.S. forces conducted an important joint amphibi-
ous operation under the command of Gen. Winfield Scott and Commodore David
Conner. Using specially designed landing craft and tactical deception, Scott and
Conner landed over ten thousand troops on beaches near Veracruz and sus-
tained their operations ashore for fifteen months during 1847–48.8 The
Veracruz–Mexico City campaign was a masterpiece of strategy and joint service
cooperation, providing a superb precedent upon which to build an amphibious
program, had one been pursued.
American experience with amphibious operations during the Civil War pro-
duced mixed results up to the final action at Fort Fisher in January 1865. Grant
made good use of the Navy in maneuvering his army along the Cumberland,
Mississippi, and Tennessee rivers in the first two years of the war. These did not
represent pure amphibious actions in the classical, blue-water sense, yet they
possessed many of the attributes of amphibious warfare, including a supportive
relationship between army and naval commanders. In the era before the exis-
tence of joint doctrine, nothing required greater attention than cooperation be-
tween service leaders. No one in the Civil War could do that better than Grant.9
Unfortunately, Grant’s subordinate commanders did not always prove as skillful
in applying this aspect of operational art.
The capture of New Orleans by amphibious forces early in the war established
an important strategic advantage for the Union. Yet despite operational success,
cooperation between the naval and army elements had not been ideal. In April
1862, troops under Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler arrived at New Orleans nearly
one week after Flag Officer David G. Farragut initiated his naval attack on the
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city. This delay allowed Confederate officials to remove almost all material and
facilities of military value, including an entire armaments factory.10 Addi-
tionally, discord developed between Butler and then-Capt. David D. Porter,
commanding a flotilla of mortar craft, regarding the role of each service in tacti-
cal operations. This did not bode well for future relations between the two force-
ful commanders.11 As a result, the New Orleans operation embodied both good
and bad elements of amphibious warfare.
Union forces also conducted a series of amphibious operations along the At-
lantic coastline early in the war. The 1862 operations of Flag Officer Louis M.
Goldsborough and Brig. Gen. Ambrose Burnside on the North Carolina littorals
were highly successful and enhanced the reputation of Burnside, contributing to
his subsequent promotion to command the Army of the Potomac.12 But the lack
of determined Confederate defense, coupled with superior Union firepower,
created mistaken ideas about the ease of conducting amphibious operations,
leading to costly errors in later landings.13
Throughout most of the war, the U.S. Navy and Army struggled with the
problems of planning, organizing, and conducting amphibious operations ef-
fectively against important enemy positions ashore. Such actions proved espe-
cially difficult when all support had to come from the sea.14 Moving and
sustaining large armies, such as George B. McClellan’s on the York Peninsula in
1862 and General Butler’s at Bermuda Hundred, Virginia, in 1864 contained im-
portant amphibious elements. From the perspective of power projection and
sustainment, both of these operations proved highly successful, whatever fail-
ures occurred during subsequent operations ashore. But the real test of amphib-
ious capability is a determined defense that must be engaged during or shortly
after the landing, as in the case of Fort Fisher.
The importance of Fort Fisher to the Confederacy lay in the role it played in pro-
tecting the port of Wilmington, North Carolina. During the war, Wilmington
proved a major irritant to the U.S. government, as a source of military supply
and a base for Confederate commerce raiding.15 Throughout much of the war,
tension existed between the Union army and navy regarding what to do about
Wilmington. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells consistently advocated a joint
action against the city and its defenses, becoming more vigorous in his demands
during 1864.16 Although eventually acceding to the operation, Secretary of War
Edwin M. Stanton remained indifferent to it even up to the first attack on the
fort.17 But Grant* came to realize that closing Wilmington would eliminate the
O H L S 8 3
* Promoted to lieutenant general in March 1864 and made general in chief of U.S. forces, Grant es-
tablished his headquarters in the field with the Army of the Potomac, commanded by General
George Meade.
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only outside source of supplies to
Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern
Virginia (with which the Union
Army of the Potomac was in nearly
constant contact after May 1864)
and further isolate it on the battle-
field. After the failure of the first
Union effort, Grant became even
more committed to the destruction
of Fort Fisher and the closing of the
port of Wilmington.18
By December 1864 only Wilming-
ton and Charleston, South Carolina,
remained open to blockade runners,
as Union forces had either captured
or effectively blockaded all other
Confederate ports. Of the two, Wil-
mington proved more important,
due to the difficulty it posed to
blockading ships and its proximity to Lee’s army.19 Located twenty miles up the
Cape Fear River, Wilmington presented a particularly difficult challenge to the
Union navy. Offshore bombardment was impossible, and the hydrography of
the estuary severely restricted avenues of movement for ships attempting to at-
tack upriver.20 Access to the Cape Fear River consisted of two inlets separated by
Smith’s Island and Frying Pan Shoals, which penetrated deeply out to sea. These
conditions forced the blockading squadron to disburse its ships over a large sea
space, thereby making it easier to penetrate.21
Fort Fisher served as the anchor for this powerful defensive complex, and in
1864 it represented the most advanced fortification in the world.22 In addition to
being the strongest defensive structure in the Confederacy, many considered it
the strongest earthwork* ever built.23 For over two and a half years, Fort Fisher’s
energetic and brilliant commander, Col. William Lamb, had labored to improve,
strengthen, and expand its defenses. Working closely with his commanding offi-
cer, Maj. Gen. William Henry Chase Whiting, Lamb created a masterful defen-
sive complex that dominated the mouth of the Cape Fear River.24 As an observer
during the Crimean War, Porter had visited formidable Fort Malakoff just after
it surrendered to French and British forces. In his view, it did not compare to
8 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* The walls, bastions, and batteries were piled sand, contained by heavy wooden gabions and
parapets.
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Fort Fisher in either size (the walls were nearly
four thousand feet long overall) or strength.25
As the naval commander during the attacks on
Fort Fisher, Porter may have been inclined to
overstate his case somewhat, but few would
deny that the fort represented a strong defen-
sive structure.
Fort Fisher lies on a peninsula jutting south
from Wilmington in what looks like an elon-
gated and inverted pyramid. Confederate
Point—or Federal Point, depending on your
persuasion—lies on the lower portion of the
peninsula, which terminates at New Inlet.26
New Inlet was one of the two entrances to the
Cape Fear River for deep-draft ships. The sec-
ond entrance, Old Inlet, lies farther south, near
Smith’s Island, and is controlled by no fewer
than four mutually supporting forts. Piloting
through these two inlets was slow and hazard-
ous even under the best of conditions, and the
guns of the various forts could either protect or
destroy any ship attempting passage.27 Fort
Fisher, only one of numerous forts defending
the avenues into Wilmington, dominated all
traffic through the New Inlet channel. But if
Fort Fisher offered advantages of strength and
location to its Confederate defenders, these
very qualities also offered Union strategists an
operational center of gravity for taking Cape
Fear and closing the port of Wilmington.28 By
neutralizing Fort Fisher, Union forces could
control the entire region.
The design of the fort reflected the tactical
and engineering skills of Whiting and Lamb.
Fort Fisher lies on Confederate Point like a great
numeral 7, with the horizontal top line stretch-
ing roughly west-east about a thousand feet
across the peninsula, and the longer vertical
stem extending roughly north and south, paral-
lel to the coastline for some three thousand feet.
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The horizontal, east-west portion faced north and protected the fort from land at-
tack down the peninsula. Any force large enough to threaten the fortress had to
deploy to the north and assault that rampart, a formidable defensive challenge to
Union commanders.29 A direct assault against the ocean-facing wall offered small
prospect of success, given the weapons and equipment available to attacking
forces of that era. An attack from the rear would first require passage through New
Inlet, an unlikely avenue since the fort’s guns would destroy the shipping before a
landing force could get ashore.30
In early December 1864, Grant decided, in conjunction with naval leaders in
Washington, to send a joint expedition to attack and capture Fort Fisher.31 He as-
signed Maj. Gen. Godfrey Weitzel to lead the assault force but issued his orders
through Butler, who commanded the Department of Virginia and North
Carolina, as well as the Army of the James.32 Exercising command discretion,
Butler chose to join the expedition off the coast of Fort Fisher and personally
take charge of the operation.33 Porter commanded the North Atlantic Block-
ading Squadron with responsibility for actions at sea and against the Confeder-
ate littoral.34 The overall plan of attack agreed on by Grant and Porter involved
moving 6,500 soldiers from Bermuda Hundred* to a rendezvous point off the
North Carolina coast within striking distance of Fort Fisher. The force would
wait in readiness until Porter exploded a powder boat near the fort and con-
ducted extensive naval bombardment to destroy the fort’s guns and defensive
structures. When the defenders appeared sufficiently weakened, the landing
force would go ashore and assault Fort Fisher from the north.35
The concept of operations seems sound, but the detailed planning proved ut-
terly deficient. For example, the detonation of the powder boat, naval “prepara-
tory fires” (in modern parlance), and the infantry assault required synchronized
timing and fluid execution, creating shock for the defenders and momentum in
the offensive.36 Instead, the efforts occurred disjointedly and spasmodically, al-
lowing the defenders to concentrate their full attention on each in turn. The
powder boat detonated at approximately two o’clock on the morning of 24 De-
cember, with absolutely no effect on the troops, defenses, or subsequent battle.37
Throughout the 24th Porter’s fleet conducted a slow bombardment of Fort
Fisher, inflicting only minor damage on its structure and guns. The defenders
themselves suffered very few casualties under this fire, moving into protective
“bombproofs” whenever they could not serve their own guns to good effect.38
On Sunday, 25 December, while Porter continued his naval gunfire, a landing
force of some three thousand men went ashore about three miles north of the
8 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* Butler’s army, assigned in the 1864 campaign to threaten Richmond from the south, had been
blocked since May in the Bermuda Hundred, a bight of land enclosed by a loop of the James River
about twenty miles south of the city.
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fort, out of range of its guns.39 Weitzel pushed down the peninsula, capturing
several small outposts along the way and scouting the approaches to the fort. In
an act of courage and bravado, Lt. William H. Walling of the 142nd New York In-
fantry Regiment actually ascended the fort’s parapet and brought back a Con-
federate flag knocked down by naval gunfire.40 After the fact, Weitzel and Grant
made much of the incident, along with the capture of a dispatch rider, but none
of this had real military significance.41 Weitzel halted and deployed his main
force about eight hundred yards from the base of Fort Fisher to evaluate the situ-
ation.42 An advance force of about five hundred skirmishers had already probed
the fort’s north-facing defenses, with unsatisfactory results;43 the Confederate
defenders had repulsed the Union line with canister and musket fire from strong
positions, inducing anxiety in Weitzel’s mind.44
In fact, what Weitzel now observed from his reconnaissance of the fort ap-
palled him and caused him to question the prospect of success. Whatever his
later tendency to overstate his minor accomplishments at the outposts and to
understate his skirmishers’ repulse, Weitzel at the time saw Fort Fisher’s north
wall as very formidable.45 Attacking it may have been the only viable option, but
that did not make the task any more palatable. The assault force had first to over-
come an electrically detonated minefield and then an infantry line behind the
log-and-earthen palisade, and finally storm a twenty-three-foot rampart hold-
ing twenty-four guns and mortars firing shot, shell, grape, and canister.46 The
wall terminated on the west at a slough covered by field artillery, and on the east
at the formidable Northeast Bastion, which mounted two eight-inch guns.47
Weitzel also noted that despite its apparent accuracy, the naval gunfire during
the day had done little damage to the guns or structure of the fort.48
Thoughts came to Weitzel’s mind of Fort Jackson (south of New Orleans in
April 1862), Vicksburg (on the Mississippi, besieged May–June 1863), and
Charleston (July 1863), where heavy bombardments had failed to destroy enemy
defenses. His recollection of two bloody and failed assaults of 10 July 1863 on
Battery Wagner in Charleston Harbor, “which were made under four times
more favorable circumstances than those under which we were placed,” also
weighed heavily upon him.49 Weitzel took a boat out to the army transport
Chamberlain to meet with Butler and discuss the situation. He reported that in
his opinion—and that of his senior officers—an assault under the present cir-
cumstances would be “butchery.”50 Butler concurred, conjuring up from Weitzel’s
vivid description of conditions his own thoughts of Battery Wagner, as well as
Port Hudson, Louisiana, on the Mississippi (May–July 1863).51 After further con-
sideration, Butler ordered the landing force to disengage and reembark.52
Porter did not agree with the decision to call off the assault on Fort Fisher and
urged Butler to reconsider. He explained that his ships had been bombarding at
O H L S 8 7
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only a slow rate of fire; rapid firing, he was confident, would suppress the fort’s
defenders until the assault force reached to within twenty yards of the ramparts.
He further informed Butler that he had dispatched his largest vessels to Beau-
fort, North Carolina, to replenish their ammunition in order to provide sus-
tained support should Butler and Weitzel resume the attack.53 Whether because
of personal animosity or professional distrust, Butler appears not to have placed
any confidence in Porter’s commitment. By 27 December all troops had left the
beach, and by 28 December most had returned to their bases.54
Grant too disagreed with Butler’s decision. On the 28th, after receiving a pre-
liminary report, Grant telegraphed President Lincoln that the expedition had
“proven to be a gross and culpable failure.”55 “Culpable” was the operative word.
On 7 January 1865, Grant forwarded Butler’s after-action report to Stanton,
stating in his endorsement that he had never intended for Butler to accompany
the expedition and that his orders “contemplated no withdrawal, or no failure
after a landing was made.”56 It is clear that Grant believed Butler had disregarded
his orders and had to assume responsibility for the failure at Fort Fisher. It is also
clear that Grant’s objection concerned primarily the withdrawal of the troops
from the beach rather than the decision not to attack.57 Grant believed that sim-
ply establishing the landing force ashore would have constituted success, be-
cause a subsequent siege would have been sufficient to guarantee ultimate
victory.58 Weitzel had recommended against launching an assault on the fort,
but did not become associated with the decision to evacuate the beachhead. Be-
cause of this and his prestige within the Army, he escaped the full force of
Grant’s wrath. Yet Weitzel had missed his opportunity to excel and would have
no role in future operations against Fort Fisher.
Even the three thousand men Butler and Weitzel had landed, of their 6,500
available, represented a strong and threatening presence ashore.59 Fort Fisher’s
garrison consisted only of roughly one thousand men, including infantrymen,
gunners, and engineers, both regular and reserve.60 The formidableness of the
defenses would give pause to any prudent commander, but did not—as Grant
pointed out—dictate evacuation of the beachhead.61 Nor did—as Butler later
contended, and Porter emphatically denied—developing weather conditions re-
quire evacuation.62 What better explains Butler’s decision to withdraw his force
was the arrival of Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke’s division, dispatched from the Army
of Northern Virginia by Lee.63
As Weitzel’s troops came ashore near Fort Fisher, the advance elements of
Hoke’s division had passed through Wilmington and deployed to a position
known as Sugar Loaf, six miles north of the fort. Commanded by Brig. Gen. William
Kirkland, the Confederates engaged the lead brigade of the Union amphibious
force, under Brig. Gen. Newton Martin Curtis. Seeing himself outnumbered and
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not certain when the rest of the division would arrive, Kirkland pulled back. As
Weitzel and Curtis began moving their troops south, Kirkland established a
cross-peninsula line north of the landing site and awaited reinforcements.
Weitzel had no idea of Kirkland’s strength, but interrogation of prisoners caused
him to inflate it in his mind.64 Undoubtedly, this later weighed on his mind as he
observed the awesome defenses of Fort Fisher’s north wall.
In fact, the Confederates were weak both south and north of Weitzel. Braxton
Bragg, the new commander of the Department of North Carolina, had pulled
forces out of the Wilmington–Cape Fear area, including garrison troops from
Fort Fisher. Whiting and Lamb had become alarmed, considering the fort dan-
gerously undermanned. They also deplored Bragg’s lack of urgency about the
situation, which caused them to distrust his competence.65 The weaknesses of
the Wilmington area had prompted Lee to send Hoke’s division to stiffen its
defenses. Whiting and Lamb considered these reinforcements essential to the
defense of their position.66 Despite Kirkland’s timely arrival, the bulk of Hoke’s
division did not arrive until after Weitzel and Butler had evacuated their lodg-
ment ashore, due to conflicting railroad priorities.67
Union commanders did not appreciate their advantageous position on 25
December 1864, when they decided to end the operation.68 Similarly, neither
Kirkland nor Bragg realized the vulnerability of Weitzel’s force once it began to
withdraw. Whiting later severely criticized Bragg’s failure to send Kirkland
against Weitzel’s constricting beachhead on the 26th. To Whiting and Lamb, the
most important lesson from the December attack on Fort Fisher was the need to
coordinate a total military effort throughout the Wilmington–Cape Fear area.
Unfortunately for the South, Braxton Bragg appears to have been insensitive to
the military situation and its impact on Fort Fisher.69 In fact, Whiting believed,
Bragg demonstrated incompetence throughout both battles for Fort Fisher and
deserved the utmost censure.70 Nonetheless, Confederate forces believed they
had won a victory. In the words of Lamb, on “December 27, the foiled and fright-
ened enemy left our shores.”71
The Union forces did not believe they had been defeated, but they could
hardly deny that they had failed. Joint planning existed only on a superfluous
level and independent action became commonplace during execution, demon-
strating the lack of coordination between the army and navy. Additionally, it is
fair to state that Butler and Weitzel exhibited tentativeness, if not outright timid-
ity. Of course, they had no way of knowing the true strength of the fort’s garrison
or of the troops to their north, but Hoke’s entire division was no larger than their
own force.72 The fire support available from Porter’s guns would have been supe-
rior to anything Hoke could have brought to bear.
O H L S 8 9
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Both Porter and Grant contended that the attack lacked vigor and commit-
ment. But Porter’s support of Butler and Weitzel had been erratic as well. Cer-
tainly he demonstrated the professional capability of his naval force even if the
slow rate of fire had not caused much damage to the defenses of Fort Fisher.73 Yet
Porter’s cooperation with the army in the explosion of the powder boat and the
pre-invasion bombardment had been abysmal.74 Porter had not only exploded
the powder boat too early and without notifying army leaders but failed to es-
tablish any means of communicating with forces ashore to direct or evaluate the
effectiveness of his gunnery. Additionally, his detailed planning with respect to
ammunition and fuel proved deficient. Butler also lacked a logistics plan to sup-
port his troops ashore.75 In general, both commanders failed to integrate their
efforts. They acted like separate commanders, merely informing each other of
their actions, rather than as a cohesive and synergetic team.
Grant’s disappointment in the operation was considerable, but his reaction
appears somewhat disingenuous. Although he contended that he had “contem-
plated no withdrawal or no failure after a landing was made,” his initiating order
to Butler had been ambiguous in that respect.76 It clearly stated the objectives
but concluded, “Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing
at, or near Fort Fisher they will be returned to the army operating against Rich-
mond without delay.”77 No doubt this sentence led Butler to believe he had dis-
cretion to withdraw—since Weitzel never landed more than half of his troops,
he could rationalize that the landing had never been effected.
The best outcome for the Union of the first attack against Fort Fisher was that
leaders learned from its failure.78 Despite their efforts to make Butler the scape-
goat, both Grant and Porter realized that their own leadership could stand im-
provement. Porter and Butler had held several meetings but had conducted no
real joint planning and had not communicated on an effective level.79 Grant had
left a certain ambiguity regarding his intentions and expectations.80 Generals
like William T. Sherman or Philip H. Sheridan would probably have discerned
Grant’s intention better than did Butler or Weitzel. But in any case, Union lead-
ers would avoid similar errors in the second attempt. Grant would make his ex-
pectations perfectly clear to everyone and would require most emphatically
close coordination between the Army and Navy.81
The final lesson from the Fort Fisher failure involved the problem of “opera-
tional security.” The intention to capture Fort Fisher and close Wilmington in
December 1864 had been general knowledge in both armies.82 Even worse, Con-
federate spies at Hampton Roads had reported specific intelligence about ship and
troop movements to Lee, permitting him to send Hoke’s division to interpose.83
Grant did not intend to permit such compromises in the second attempt, in Janu-
ary 1865. Even his new commander, Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, for instance, had
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to wait until he put to sea to open the orders explaining his mission and destina-
tion.84 Rightly perceiving that disinformation could help even more, Grant let the
suggestion leak that Terry and his force were to join Sherman’s army in Savannah,
thus providing a plausible explanation for all the naval activity.85
When the fleet assembled off Beaufort on 8 January, Terry met with Porter to
plan the amphibious operation.86 For the second Fort Fisher mission Porter em-
braced a more cooperative approach at the outset, because he trusted Grant and
had confidence in the new army commander.87 Terry and Porter developed a
strong working relationship, which created the synergy so lacking in the first ex-
pedition.88 After the planning sessions the force proceeded through heavy
weather toward Cape Fear, arriving off Confederate Point after dark on 12 Janu-
ary, too late to attempt a landing.89 At eight o’clock the next morning Porter’s
ships began a bombardment of Fort Fisher, and landing operations commenced
about 8:30. By two that afternoon Porter and Terry had landed eight thousand
men with twelve days’ provisions and all their equipment, again north of the fort.90
Terry’s advance element threw out pickets, who engaged Confederate scouts
and captured a few prisoners. From these Terry learned that Hoke’s division was
still in the area; it had not left to oppose Sherman’s army (which had just seized
Savannah, Georgia, and was pushing northward), as Union intelligence had pre-
viously indicated.91 Terry now had to concern himself with a strong force to the
north as he moved south against Fort Fisher. He had planned a defensive line
across the peninsula to protect his rear, but this new information added urgency
to that precaution and increased the size of the force needed.92 Finding the best
place to establish the line became more difficult than expected. Darkness set in
before Terry could find ideal terrain, and a lake on the planning map upon
which he had intended to anchor the defensive line proved to be only a dried-up
sandpit. In the end, Terry felt compelled to commit over half of his force to pro-
tect his rear.93
By eight o’clock the morning of 14 January, Terry had created a strong north-
facing breastwork across the peninsula. His troops continued to improve this
position throughout the period of the battle. Terry knew he had a secure foot-
hold, which he made even stronger by emplacing field artillery, creating inter-
locking fields of fire, and establishing naval gunfire “kill zones.” He then
conducted a reconnaissance of the fort in conjunction with his engineer officer,
Col. Cyrus Comstock, and the assault force commander, the same Brigadier
General Curtis who had led it in December. What they saw led Terry to decide to
take immediate and aggressive action rather than besiege the fortress.94 That
evening he returned to the flagship to meet with Porter and arrange activities for
the next day.95 Terry and Porter came to a complete understanding, by which a
strong naval bombardment by all vessels of the fleet would begin in the morning
O H L S 9 1
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and continue until the moment of assault, which would be two-pronged, with
army units on the right, attacking the western flank of the north-facing wall, and
a detachment of sailors and Marines on the left, simultaneously attacking the
Northeast Bastion.96 Terry sent a signal team to Porter’s flagship for communi-
cations throughout the battle.97
Brig. Gen. Adelbert Ames’s 2nd Division—which included Curtis’s 1st Brigade—
and Brig. Gen. Charles J. Paine’s 3rd Division, with attached artillery and engi-
neers, had been present in December. Terry also had a brigade under Col. Joseph
C. Abbott and a brigade of sailors and Marines under Lt. Cdr. Kidder Randolph
Breese.98 The naval brigade, specially created by Porter for the attack, did not for-
mally belong to Terry’s command but was made available for his use.99 It con-
sisted of 1,600 sailors and four hundred marines armed with cutlasses, revolvers,
carbines, and Sharps rifles.100
At approximately nine o’clock on the morning of 15 January, most of Porter’s
North Atlantic Squadron began moving into position for the preparatory gun-
fire against Fort Fisher, the remainder supporting Terry’s defensive line north of
the fort. By eleven the ships opened fire initiating a furious duel with the guns of
Fort Fisher.101 The ground attack had been set for two in the afternoon, but not
all of Terry’s forces had reached their positions by that time. At about three,
Terry signaled the fleet to shift to new targets and launched his two-pronged as-
sault against the Confederate bastion.102
Furious fighting developed on both flanks over the next several hours as Terry
sent in one unit after another to break through the fort’s defenses.103 Despite stiff
resistance, Terry made progress on the Confederate left, due in large part to the
defenders’ having mistaken the naval brigade at the other end of the line for the
main Union effort and concentrated their forces against it.104 On the Union left,
despite the courage of Breese’s troops, confusion in the assault formation ex-
posed it to a devastating fire from the ramparts and ultimately defeated the ef-
fort.105 Breese would later declare that the failure of his attack resulted from
organizational problems and lack of cohesiveness within his naval brigade. His
force, assembled from small elements of every ship in the fleet thrown together,
had no training as an integrated unit. Their first opportunity to work together
came in storming the revetments of one of the strongest forts in the world.106 But
Breese had no need to apologize or rationalize, as his attack allowed Terry to es-
tablish a lodgment at the other end of the Confederate line.107
As Breese and his brigade struggled with devastating fire on the Union left,
Terry’s brigades made gradual progress on the right. Having fed in all three bri-
gades of Ames’s division, Terry sent in an additional brigade and regiment
drawn from his northern defensive line.108 Reinforced, Terry pressed the attack
and entered the fort around six o’clock, although resistance continued into the
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night.109 Fearing an attack from Hoke, Terry moved Breese’s spent naval brigade
into the defensive line to replace the troops that he had withdrawn.110 By ten that
night, the Union army had taken Fort Fisher, having killed or captured all its de-
fenders. Whiting and Lamb, both seriously wounded, became prisoners when
the fighting finally ended at Battery Buchanan, roughly a mile south of the fort
proper.111
By any standard, the second attack against Fort Fisher stands as a superb exam-
ple of naval competence, military efficiency, combat effectiveness, and the value
of joint operations. But like all great victories, the results at Fort Fisher reflect
both competence in the victor and deficiencies in the defeated.
Robert Hoke’s division, sent to protect Fort Fisher and keep Wilmington
open, numbered six thousand effectives.112 As we have seen, only Kirkland’s lead
brigade arrived during the first attack in December, and it did very little to op-
pose that landing, aside from the psychological pressure on Weitzel and Butler
its presence created. As it turned out, however, that presence alone, coupled with
the strength of Fort Fisher’s north wall, proved sufficient. In January 1865, the
entire division was present and available, yet it proved of little more value. The
division remained in defensive positions well north of the fighting, posing a
threat to Terry’s force but taking no action against it. The most charitable view is
that Hoke’s proximity required Terry to maintain a strong defensive line in his
rear, manned by over half his troops. Yet even that had no impact on the out-
come of the battle. Hoke and his division were little more than spectators.
In Whiting’s view, Fort Fisher fell to the Union for two principal reasons. First
and most important, as has been noted, was Braxton Bragg’s generalship. Whiting’s
second reason was the naval bombardment on 14–15 January, which he believed
the most powerful of the war.113 If Whiting thought the bombardment in De-
cember “diffused and scattered,” the next one he considered ferocious and tena-
cious. The shelling destroyed all the guns on the north wall, swept away the
palisade, and plowed the minefield, cutting most of the detonating wires. Never-
theless, Whiting claimed, the garrison could have held out if supported by
Bragg. Even if not, Lamb believed that a fresh brigade could have retaken the fort
immediately after it fell but had none in position.114 In Whiting’s evaluation, ul-
timately the defeat at Fort Fisher resulted from Bragg’s failure to send in Hoke’s
division during the fighting.115
Whatever Hoke’s division might have accomplished, the amphibious lessons
are apparent. The most important prerequisite of amphibious success is effec-
tive integration between the naval and landing forces.116 This element was not
entirely missing in the first attack, as exhibited by the fire support on 25 Decem-
ber, but compared to January it was almost feeble. The army signalers aboard
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Porter’s flagship in January illustrates the lengths to which he and Terry went in
order to coordinate. The close and continuous planning that occurred between
Porter and Terry throughout the operation contrasts with the minimal commu-
nication in December. The potential existed for victory or defeat during both at-
tacks on Fort Fisher. Synergy between the Army and Navy is an important reason
why the first failed and the second succeeded.
The rapid transfer of combat power from sea to shore is another key to suc-
cess in landing operations.117 In the first attack, Butler and Weitzel were almost
leisurely. They never got more than half their troops ashore, and even that frac-
tion could not have sustained itself more than a few days. In contrast, Terry and
Porter landed eight thousand troops in about five hours with all their equipment
and supplies for twelve days. This illustrates the difference between a tentative
effort and a determined commitment. Terry also organized his force—including
the naval brigade—in such a manner as to provide his operation flexibility and
fluidity.118 His units could be reinforced tactically without creating undue vul-
nerability elsewhere. There is no evidence of Butler or Weitzel having given any
thought to “task organization” during the first attack.
Related to integration between naval and landing forces is the concept of
unity of effort, or operational coherence.119 Simply stated, this goes beyond inte-
gration of effort to imply a unified approach at all levels, based upon a single-
minded commitment to accomplishing the mission. This unity and coherence
emerged in the second attack in great part due to the failure of the first. Deter-
mined not to experience another such ignominy, the secretaries of war and the
Navy, Admiral Porter, and Generals Grant and Terry realized they had to pro-
duce a common, unified effort, a coherent operation. This resulted at the highest
levels in a unity of effort that flowed down through all ranks and permeated the
entire operation—perhaps more completely than in any other episode of the
Civil War. Certainly, it stands in stark contrast to the disunity and disjointedness
among the defenders. The concept of unity of effort and operational coherence
appears not to have entered into the thinking of the Confederate leadership in
the Wilmington–Cape Fear area.120
As we have seen, despite the superb example of the Veracruz landing, naval and
military commanders of the American Civil War had no doctrine or specially
trained officers with which to plan or execute amphibious operations. Neither did
they have a systematic way to capture, analyze, or document lessons from their
own experience. The lessons of Fort Fisher were not formally preserved for use
during the next major conflict—the Spanish-American War of 1898. Nonetheless,
it is apparent that some institutional memory survived from one war to an-
other.121 Of the four major landings undertaken by American forces in 1898, all
proved successful, if not models of efficiency.122 The commanders associated with
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these amphibious operations—George Dewey and William T. Sampson of the
Navy; Nelson A. Miles, William R. Shafter, and Wesley Merritt of the Army; and
Robert W. Huntington of the Marines—all had had combat experience during the
Civil War. In every case, the planners of 1898 ensured that the landings would be
unopposed at the water’s edge and that sufficient naval gunfire would support op-
erations ashore.
Interestingly, the most outstanding example of interservice cooperation in
both planning and support from the Spanish-American War occurred between
Dewey and Merritt during complex amphibious operations in the Manila-
Cavite area.123 Dewey, who had served on the steam frigate Colorado under Porter
during the fight for Fort Fisher, brought firsthand battle experience to the Manila-
Cavite campaign. In comparison, the Daiquirí landings near Santiago, Cuba,
lacking sound doctrine and officers with direct amphibious experience, ap-
peared amateurish.124
Fort Fisher, Veracruz, and to a lesser extent the Spanish-American War all
contributed to the U.S. amphibious tradition and historical record, in ways use-
ful for the future. They provided twentieth-century military and naval thinkers
with solid examples on which to develop their theories, doctrine, and war plans.
By then a melding of military history with the diligence of professional officers
ensured that the amphibious experiences of the nineteenth century, especially
the example of Fort Fisher, would be available for future commanders. Today,
even in a substantially changed operational environment, many of those lessons
remain valid and instructive.
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SUEZ, 1956
A Successful Naval Operation Compromised by Inept
Political Leadership
Michael H. Coles
This article was originally undertaken to note the fiftieth anniversary of theSuez Affair, the November 1956 Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, which, al-
though originally headed for rapid success, was quickly halted by a combination
of political and economic pressure. As work progressed it became apparent that
much of what happened fifty years ago, and the political and military thinking (or
lack thereof) behind it, has relevance for today’s strategic planners. Indeed, as one
contemplates the present situation in Iraq, Santayana’s oft-quoted axiom—that
those who cannot learn from the past are condemned to repeat it—remains ex-
traordinarily relevant. Suez was a war of choice in a time of peace, one that, we
now know, was largely justified by clandestine political arrangements. It was ex-
traordinarily divisive both politically and among the military leadership, the lat-
ter going to unusual lengths in their attempts to halt it.
The politicians responsible, anxious to sustain their
fictitious casus belli in the face of rapidly moving
events, interfered with tactical operations in a manner
that went well beyond the political/military relation-
ship normal in democracies. Perhaps the most impor-
tant conclusion to be drawn from Suez is that flawed
political decisions are likely to lead to flawed opera-
tional strategy. Nevertheless, as we look at the actual
military performance during the invasion, taking into
account the constraints imposed, we see near copy-
book performance by the airmen, commandos, and
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paratroopers involved. Suez goes down in history as a bad event and carries a
bad name, yet from a half-century’s perspective it appears that those who fought
there, however briefly, performed well. It is to recognize this point that this arti-
cle concentrates on the operational side of the affair as much as, or more than,
on the political.
Following the end of World War II the Middle East became an area of increasing
tension. Many factors were responsible, but the most significant was the contin-
uing conflict between the new state of Israel and its Arab neighbors. In 1950,
Britain, France, and the United States issued a Tripartite Declaration in which
they agreed to take action to prevent any violation of the 1947 armistice lines
separating Israel from its Arab neighbors. Intended to defuse the situation, the
declaration did little to calm tensions, but it did become a central factor in
Washington policy making. In the fall of 1955, Moscow and Cairo concluded a
major arms contract, at which point relations between Egypt and the West
started to deteriorate rapidly. Nevertheless, at the end of the year the United
States, Britain, and the World Bank offered to fund construction of Egypt’s pres-
tigious Aswan High Dam. However, Gamil Abdel-Nasser (Egypt’s new head of
state) and his proposed dam were equally unpopular with Congress, and on 19
July 1956 the financing offer was withdrawn. A week later Nasser announced
that the Suez Canal would be nationalized. The French and British, its principal
owners and users, deemed this unacceptable, fearing restrictions on the use of
this vital international waterway.1
Although Anglo-French diplomacy throughout the affair appeared at the
time to be primarily directed at regaining the canal, events following the nation-
alization owe much to the fact that Prime Minister Anthony Eden of Britain and
Prime Minister Guy Mollet of France wanted also to eliminate Nasser, believing,
respectively, that he was undermining British prestige in the Middle East and
providing support for the Algerians in their rebellion against France. Such feel-
ings resonated with much of popular opinion in the two countries; comparisons
with Hitler and Mussolini were rife. Removing Nasser from power, however, if a
potentially valuable collateral outcome of a successful recovery, represented a
confusing alternative priority for military planners. Even though the two gov-
ernments decided within days after nationalization to use military force, they never
properly defined their political objectives—regime change or canal access—
and could thus give little clear guidance to their military staffs. As historian
Hugh Thomas later noted, “The political aims of the campaign remained some-
what obscure to the officers designated to carry it out.”2
British post–World War II defense policy contemplated two kinds of war: full-
scale operations against the Soviet Union within the framework of NATO, and
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suppression of small-scale colonial insurgencies. In the summer of 1956, on one
hand, a major portion of Britain’s active-duty army was assigned to its Army of
the Rhine, where it represented a significant component of NATO’s military
strength; on the other hand, Royal Marines and paratroopers (Britain’s main
rapid-deployment units) were largely employed on anti-insurgent duties in Cy-
prus and lacked current jump and amphibious assault training, respectively,
while other infantry units and Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons were occupied
in the long-running Malayan Emergency. French troops, barely recovered from
their disaster in Vietnam, were heavily engaged in Algeria. Although Anglo-
French planners were fortunate to have significant naval surface and air power
available for what would prove to be principally a littoral operation, much pre-
paratory work would be necessary before a significant eastern Mediterranean
offensive could be contemplated. Many units had to be redeployed and re-
trained, army reservists recalled, and landing craft and troop transports brought
out of reserve or requisitioned.3
London was concerned that Washington remain at least neutral throughout
any conflict, but American thinking was dominated by the upcoming 1956 pres-
idential election. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was seeking a second term, urged a
diplomatic resolution, but such ran counter to the Anglo-French desire for mili-
tary action. The transatlantic relationship was further frayed by extraordinarily
bad relations between Eden and the American secretary of state, John Foster
Dulles, and by Washington’s irritation at Britain’s apparent inability to accept its
reduced status in the world. Evidence of this reduced status was available for all
to see in the fact that the U.S. Sixth Fleet constituted by far the largest collection
of naval power in the Mediterranean, a sea the British had once dominated and
historically had regarded as a natural extension of its empire.4
For several weeks following the nationalization, high-level meetings involv-
ing the British, French, and American governments (collectively the largest users
of the Canal) and the United Nations struggled to develop compromises accept-
able to all. The diplomatic process was slow, but by early October private negoti-
ations with the Egyptians at the United Nations seemed close to meeting most of
the canal users’ concerns, while Egyptian canal pilots had successfully taken the
places of European waterway operators. The Anglo-French casus belli appeared
to be melting away and with it any excuse for destroying Nasser. At this point the
Israelis, increasingly concerned with their security in the face of a rising level of
Egyptian feydaheen* attacks, provided the alliance’s political leadership with a
convenient solution.5
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On 22 October, representatives of the French, British, and Israeli governments
meeting in a Paris suburb secretly agreed that the Israelis would at the end of the
month launch a major preemptive attack on the Suez Canal Zone. The French and
British would then demand that the Israeli and Egyptian governments withdraw
all troops ten miles back from either side of the canal. If the Egyptian government
did not agree to this ultimatum by the morning of 31 October, Anglo-French
forces would begin military operations. Although its relationship with Israel was
uneasy, Britain had an essential role to play: it alone had the air power deemed
necessary to destroy the Egyptian air force, whereas the Israelis were understand-
ably reluctant to risk their army in the open desert until that had been done.6
Future planning was complicated by the fact that almost no one who would be
concerned with the Anglo-French operation had any knowledge that the
three-way plot existed. A treaty providing that Britain would come to the aid of
Jordan in the likely event of hostilities between that country and Israel further
confused matters on the British side. Indeed, there was a moment in October
when two distinct planning staffs were preparing for war—one against Israel, the
other against Egypt—both assuming the use of largely the same military forces.
One Royal Navy squadron commander recalled expecting to be fighting the Israelis,
and his surprise when he found the opposite to be true. As Israeli general Moshe
Dayan commented later, “I must confess to the feeling that, save for the Almighty,
only the British are capable of complicating affairs to such a degree.”7
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During October the normal free flow of intelligence information between
London and Washington largely dried up. Heavy communications traffic be-
tween London and Paris aroused suspicion in Washington but overwhelmed
American deciphering capacity. Reports from Israel indicated a possible
large-scale mobilization. Nevertheless, unknown to anyone but a small circle in
Washington, a new and highly secret presence was watching what was going on.
On 27 September America’s recently introduced U-2 spy planes were instructed
to conduct high-level reconnaissance over the eastern Mediterranean. In the en-
suing weeks CIA pilots, including the soon to be famous Francis Gary Powers,
photographed most of the Middle East. U-2 reports indicated that the number
of French jet fighters in Israel significantly exceeded the number the French were
permitted to transfer under the Tripartite Declaration, while high-resolution
photographs indicated large quantities of weapons being loaded onto French
and British ships in Toulon, Malta, and Cyprus. However, even though the mili-
tary preparations of the British and French had become well known to the
Americans, their intentions remained unclear. Still, as CIA director Richard
Bissell commented when he saw the photos, all those vessels were not there get-
ting ready for a regatta.8
The Anglo-French (“allied,” for this purpose) naval forces available for the
Suez operation would be asked to perform their traditional roles in military ex-
peditions: to bring the invasion force safely to the enemy shore, soften up de-
fenses prior to the landing, transport the landing force onto the beaches, and
provide cover for the troops while they established a secure beachhead. Royal
Marine commandos, together with army paratroopers, would form the initial
assault force. The Royal Navy and its marines were thus following a tradition
that went back through Cunningham at Cape Matapan at least to Nelson at the
Nile—countering a threat to Britain’s vital eastward lines of communication—
although in 1956, oil from the Middle East rather than trade with India was the
prime motivator.9
The British at the time had a well-developed network of military bases in the
Mediterranean. However, those in Libya and Jordan (made available by treaty)
were largely unusable for political reasons, while more accessible colonial facili-
ties had their own drawbacks: airfields and harbors in Cyprus had limited capac-
ity; Royal Air Force ground-attack aircraft operating from Cyprus would do so
at their maximum range, thus reducing their effectiveness; and Malta was some
thousand miles to the west of any likely action. It was thus clear that carrier avia-
tion would prove a vital part of the invasion plans.10
The Royal Navy that went into action at Suez had just undergone a major
and innovative carrier modernization program. Three years earlier, during the
Korean War, it had provided close air support for United Nations land forces
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using World War II–era straight-flight-deck light fleet carriers and propeller-
driven attack planes. Now its operational carrier strength consisted of five re-
cently commissioned ships equipped with early-model angled decks and a new
mirror landing system, which together provided improved flight deck safety
and reduced the accident rate. Steam catapults had not yet been installed, so
the ships remained much at the mercy of their old hydraulic models, and these
gave considerable trouble. HMS Eagle, a modern fleet carrier already in the
Mediterranean, was hastily reinforced by its smaller contemporaries, Bulwark
and Albion. (Eagle’s operational efficiency was significantly reduced before the
outbreak of hostilities by the failure of its port catapult.) Two obsolete World
War II carriers, Theseus and Ocean, were rapidly prepared for troop carrying
and sailed for Malta in early August. The French navy promised a battle group
consisting of the older carriers Arromanches (a sister ship of Theseus and
Ocean) and Bois Belleau (formerly USS Langley) and the fast fifteen-inch-gun
battleship Jean Bart. South of Suez the Royal Navy assembled a task force con-
sisting of the cruiser HMS Newfoundland and French and British escorts. The
initial allied assault force would have eighteen tank and troop landing vessels.
Troopships with larger combat organizations were to follow some hours be-
hind. Altogether, with escorts and auxiliary vessels, the assault force numbered
over a hundred ships.11
The British carrier air groups, other than helicopters and airborne early
warning (AEW) aircraft, were all modern jet or turboprop, comprising a hun-
dred Seahawk and Sea Venom fighter-bombers, nine Wyvern attack planes, and
eight AEW aircraft. The twenty-five radar-equipped Sea Venoms embarked in
Eagle and Albion had night and all-weather capability, giving the Royal Navy for
the first time the ability to mount around-the-clock operations. The French car-
riers operated thirty-six F4U Corsair fighter-bombers and ten TBM Avenger anti-
submarine aircraft, all propeller driven and of World War II vintage; in his
subsequent report the (British) Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers was particularly
complimentary regarding the aging Corsairs’ operational versatility. In mid-
October, belatedly concerned about a possible underwater threat, the Admiralty
rapidly equipped Theseus with a helicopter antisubmarine squadron, which
would later prove invaluable in another context. French Avengers also provided
antisubmarine capability.12
There were three other navies operating in the rather crowded southeast corner
of the Mediterranean in October 1956. The Egyptian navy in the early 1950s
had two former Hunt-class destroyers, six frigates, and a sloop (a small destroyer-
escort equivalent), all World War II vintage and all acquired from Britain. In
1955 Nasser had acquired two more modern Soviet-built Skori-class destroyers,
as well as four armed minelayers and twenty motor torpedo boats (MTBs). The
C O L E S 1 0 5
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn2006.vp
Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:31:08 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
111
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2006 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
possibility that Nasser had also purchased Soviet submarines was of some con-
cern to the allied navies. The Israeli navy believed that the training of Egyptian
navy crews, by Poland and the Soviet Union, had been considerably more effec-
tive than that received by Egyptian soldiers.13
Israel’s much smaller navy consisted at the outbreak of hostilities of two for-
merly British Z-class destroyers, and a frigate, as well as several MTBs and land-
ing craft. As will be seen, it soon received reinforcement from an unexpected
quarter.
Finally there was the powerful American Sixth Fleet, mustering fifty ships,
twenty-five thousand personnel, and two hundred aircraft. Two modernized
Essex-class carriers, USS Randolph (CVA 15) and Coral Sea (CVB 43), made up
the fleet’s principal striking force. Its air groups included swept-wing F9F Cou-
gar fighters—a fact that would cause considerable confusion to Anglo-French
air crews—and, probably unknown to the rest of the world, small detachments
of F2H Banshees trained to deliver the nuclear weapons that carriers now rou-
tinely carried. The British and American navies in the theater, normally friendly
rivals used to a high degree of informal cooperation, had essentially stopped
speaking to each other by mid-October. The Americans claimed that they knew
nothing of British plans; apart from having been told to evacuate American ci-
vilians from the combat area, the Sixth Fleet’s commander, Adm. Charles R.
Brown, had no better instructions than a message from Adm. Arleigh Burke, the
Chief of Naval Operations, saying: “Situation tense, prepare for imminent hos-
tilities.” Other participants, though unaware of the highly secret U-2 activities,
believed that Washington knew exactly what was going on. In fact, however,
Washington still did not.14
The Egyptian air force, which represented the principal threat to both the
Anglo-French invasion and the Israelis, consisted of 110 MiG-15 supersonic
fighters and forty-eight Il-28 medium bombers, as well as some older fighters.
These aircraft were spread among seven airfields. The MiGs, which outclassed
anything possessed by the allies, were of particular concern, especially if flown
by Eastern bloc “volunteers.” However, these new fighter planes had only just
been delivered, and Egyptian pilot training in them was incomplete. The “vol-
unteers” never did appear, and throughout the campaign it would be a lack of pi-
lots, not of aircraft, that would inhibit Nasser’s air forces. The Egyptian pilots
who resisted were more competent than the Israelis had expected.15
By the end of July the British staff had prepared a preliminary plan and an
interservice command structure; the codeword was MUSKETEER. The planning
staff became Anglo-French in early August, under British leadership. Although
inevitable differences would occur throughout the planning process, the matter
that most distinguished between the allies was British insistence on massive and
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well-prepared force, an approach that contrasted with French emphasis on
speed of preparation and execution. It appears that Eden initially favored the
French view until dissuaded by his military advisers, whose thinking was predi-
cated on World War II experience, and by serious concern about the new weap-
ons with which the Soviets had generously equipped the Egyptian forces. In fact
the British military apprehensions were misplaced, while the French political
judgment was proved right: the long time that elapsed between inception and
action allowed the many voices calling for peace to become mobilized, while the
reasons for war became less convincing.16
In the event, and to the chagrin of the French, who were urging rapid action,
and the bored and occasionally mutinous British reservists, who badly wanted
to go home, the operation was postponed several times while diplomacy ground
on. London eventually approved the final plan of attack on 19 September. The
landings would be at Port Said, but there was still no definite date. Postpone-
ments resulted in equipment problems—weapons and vehicles at sea suffered
from the effects of salt air, without proper maintenance. The Royal Navy’s Medi-
terranean command emphasized to the Chiefs of Staff in London the weather-
related perils of attempting a landing on defended beaches after 1 November.17
By a curious coincidence (one that appeared too good to be true and probably
was), the invasion plans called for a command and communications exercise
(BOATHOOK) to be carried out in early November. Thus on 27 October the head-
quarters ship HMS Tyne sailed from Malta with Royal Navy and Air Force com-
manders on board. The following day French naval units sailed from North
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African ports. On 29 October the Israelis began their Sinai offensive. The British
carrier task force left Malta for BOATHOOK with destroyer and cruiser escorts,
and more cruisers and destroyers sailed from Aden toward the Gulf of Suez. All
naval units likely to be involved were thus assembled in the war zone by 30 Octo-
ber. Unknown to the various combatants, all of this activity was carefully moni-
tored and photographed by the unseen U-2s.18
Hostilities began at 5:00 PM on 29 October when 395 Israeli paratroopers
landed just east of the strategic Mitla Pass. The promised Anglo-French ultima-
tum was delivered to the Israeli and Egyptian governments on the 30th. Accusa-
tions of collusion were already bedeviling the British, despite Foreign Secretary
Selwyn Lloyd’s flat denial. Israel immediately accepted the (previously agreed
upon) diktat, which, since the Sinai Peninsula was at the time Egyptian territory,
meant they could advance some one hundred miles to positions only ten miles
east of the canal. Nasser, for the same reason, rejected it out of hand. The British
and French went to war, the latter with much more conviction than the former.19
Already bedeviled by confused strategic goals, MUSKETEER suffered from
three related tactical constraints. The first was Prime Minister Eden’s obsession
with maintaining the fiction that the allied armada would be landing in Egypt
solely to separate the Israelis and Egyptians. Second, and because of this, the
convoy that would bring the main body of the landing force from Malta could
not be loaded, let alone sailed, until the ultimatum had expired and been re-
jected. The third constraint was the speed of the convoy; although even the slow-
est vessels could make eight knots, the passage was planned for six and a half
knots, to allow for possible bad weather and the mechanical problems likely with
ships only recently taken out of reserve, meaning that a week would elapse be-
fore it could arrive off Port Said. Although diplomatic negotiations had pro-
vided just enough time to assemble and train the troops, ships, and aircraft
deemed necessary by the British, the French clearly feared that the preparations
were overdone and that London’s ponderous time schedule was likely to result in
the failure of the operation.20
The campaign began with surface actions. During the night of 31 October the
cruiser Newfoundland encountered the Egyptian frigate Domiat in the Red Sea.
The Egyptian captain ignored an order to heave to, and Newfoundland opened
fire at less than a mile. Domiat bravely returned fire until incapacitated, after
which it was rammed and sunk by Newfoundland’s escorting destroyer. Only
sixty-nine of the Domiat’s crew were rescued. The same evening a series of con-
fused actions took place off the Israeli port of Haifa. As the midnight deadline of
the ultimatum approached, the Egyptian frigate Ibrahim El-Awal was able to ap-
proach within five miles of the Israeli coast and open fire. Israeli security forces
had assumed that the ship was part of an American flotilla that had been cleared
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into Haifa to evacuate American nationals. Fortuitously, a small French squad-
ron was in Haifa for refueling. One of these units, the destroyer Kersaint, opened
fire on the Egyptians, removing any doubt as to whose side the French were on
but causing little damage. Soon after, a small force of Israeli ships approaching
from seaward also attacked the Egyptian vessel, assisted by a pair of Israeli air
force jet fighters. Given the assembled firepower it is not surprising that the
Ibrahim El-Awal surrendered, allowing an Israeli boarding party to bring it into
port. (After repairs it was given the name Haifa and sent back to sea under the
Israeli flag.) On 1 November, as the Israelis crossed from Gaza into Egypt, the
French cruiser Georges Leygues bombarded Egyptian positions around the bor-
der town of Rafah, but without notable success.21
The remaining time before the arrival of the invasion fleet, expected on 6 No-
vember, was occupied by a sustained air offensive against Egyptian military tar-
gets, designed to soften up defenses and reduce the population’s will to resist.
Phase I of the air offensive began at dusk on 31 October and was intended to
eliminate any threat from the Egyptian air force. After rather ineffective night at-
tacks by Cyprus- and Malta-based RAF heavy and medium bombers, naval and
RAF ground-attack aircraft attacked Egyptian airfields, concentrating on run-
ways and parked aircraft. Great effort was made to avoid damage to civilians, and
it became evident early in the campaign that under such constraints medium- and
high-level bombing was ineffective against small military targets. Nearly all the
meaningful Phase I damage was achieved by low-level ground-attack aircraft us-
ing bombs and rockets. Naval aircraft performed the bulk of this work, since
RAF fighters operating out of Cyprus carried a reduced weapon load and even so
could only spend some fifteen minutes over their targets. Eight Sea Venoms op-
erating at night destroyed six MiGs on the ground outside Cairo. As the attacks
began the Egyptian air force began evacuating its bomber force to airfields in the
south of Egypt or to friendly Arab countries. Egyptian antiaircraft fire was light
and inaccurate, and the few fighters that got off the ground avoided combat. By
dusk on 2 November the Egyptian air force had been effectively neutralized.
Flight to safety proved illusory: on 4 November French F84s destroyed thirteen
out of fourteen Il-28s that had taken refuge at Luxor, some 350 miles south of
Port Said.22
Phase II of the air offensive (3 through 5 November) consisted of attacks on
nonairfield military targets, such as stores, barracks, and military road and rail
traffic south of Port Said. Of particular importance was the Gamil Bridge, which
carried the only road linking Port Said with its hinterland. Because of poor intel-
ligence (what was thought to be a swing bridge was actually a causeway for much
of its length) twenty-seven bombing sorties were required to render it impass-
able (the British carriers were close enough to the target, however, to permit
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returning aircrews to advise changes in bombing technique). Heavy and accu-
rate flak protected the bridge, causing the loss of one Wyvern. Destruction was
finally achieved by a low-level “skip-bombing” attack by eight Seahawks, each
carrying two five-hundred-pound bombs. High priority was also given to pre-
venting the Egyptian blockship Akka, which was moored nearby, from obstruct-
ing the canal. Two attacks were unsuccessful, giving the Egyptians time to tow
the ship into place and scuttle it, together with another forty-seven concrete-
filled ships, effectively closing the waterway. The Syrian army then destroyed
pumping stations on the Western-owned Iraqi Petroleum Company pipeline. As
Hugh Thomas has pointed out, the Anglo-French action thus precipitated what
the two governments had most feared from Nasser’s nationalization, an inter-
ruption in the flow of oil.23
The U.S. Sixth Fleet had been ordered to the area in order to protect the evac-
uation of American nationals, and its commander, Admiral Brown, was to insist
afterward that that was all he did. However, early in the morning of 4 November
the carrier Coral Sea passed through the middle of the British task group. The
British admiral asked his American counterpart to clear the area. The latter re-
fused but signaled Washington, “Whose side am I on?” Admiral Burke replied,
“Take no guff from anyone.” Further, American submarines and aircraft created
problems for Anglo-French air and underwater defenses, and risk of an inter-
national incident remained high. The Egyptian MiG-15s, although less of a
threat than previously feared, remained of considerable concern to French and
British pilots, especially since U.S. Navy swept-wing F9Fs, easily confused with
the MiGs, were reported to be making “attacking” passes at allied formations.
Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers believed that the Sixth Fleet was deliberately ob-
structing his operations; its adjacent air activities rendered his air-warning ra-
dar surveillance virtually useless.
Fortunately, both sides showed restraint, although, as the allied commander
in chief, Vice Adm. M. Richmond, later reported, “The danger of shooting
down an American aircraft with its international repercussions was ever pres-
ent.” Later Admiral Burke vividly recalled what the international repercussions
could have been. When asked by Dulles whether the Sixth Fleet could halt the
operation, Burke responded, “Mr. Secretary, we can stop them, but we will
blast hell out of them.” A French attack on an Egyptian PT boat off Alexandria
brought a quick rejoinder from the British command that American ships
were present in the harbor and no attacks should be made until they were well
clear. The problem of the Sixth Fleet became the subject of “polite signals” be-
tween the local British and American commanders, and it was a great relief
when the evacuation was completed and the latter withdrew, with some two
thousand American civilians.24
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It is fairly clear that Washington wanted to stop, or at least slow down, the al-
lied operation but was uncertain what course to adopt if diplomacy failed. But
there may have been a further consideration driving the U.S. Navy’s actions. Ever
since the Declaration of Independence in 1776, freedom of the seas had been a
basic element of American diplomacy and a constant source of friction with the
British, who had long insisted on their right when at war to stop and search any
ship, belligerent or neutral. The War of 1812 had been fought largely over this is-
sue and had done little to settle it. It was Germany’s resumption of unrestricted
U-boat warfare in 1916 that had brought the United States into World War I in
1917, and freedom of navigation had been an essential component of President
Woodrow Wilson’s “fourteen points.” On this issue Washington recognized no
exceptions: “We would as soon fight the British as the Germans,” wrote Adm.
William Benson, the first Chief of Naval Operations (1915–19). Each of these
actions, as with countless more over the years, was taken to demonstrate that
Washington would not accept any abridgment of its fundamental maritime
rights. Although Admiral Brown’s instructions do not appear to reflect this pol-
icy directly, it is fair to assume that President Eisenhower was unwilling to allow
the Anglo-French action (of which he strongly disapproved) to set a precedent
contravening rights fought for over the previous two centuries. As noted earlier,
Admiral Burke would have been firmly behind him.25
Not surprisingly, the Anglo-French-Israeli attacks on Egypt had produced a
keen negative reaction around the world. The British Commonwealth nations,
other than Australia and New Zealand, were strongly opposed, while British
public opinion, fairly supportive of tough action the previous summer, was by
now bitterly divided. Debate in the House of Commons became so acrimonious
that the speaker had to suspend a session, for the first time in twenty years. Eden
was paying the price for going to war without keeping the parliamentary opposi-
tion fully informed, an unprecedented action. Among the invasion forces, there
was considerable resentment toward the opposition, which, it was felt, should be
supporting those at risk. Britain’s armed forces, like America’s before Vietnam,
were unused to military action opposed by much of the civilian population.
Only the French and the Israelis appeared united and untroubled.26
In Washington, President Eisenhower was furious at what he perceived as an
Anglo-French double cross, given the fact that the Tripartite Declaration re-
quired both Britain and France to come to Egypt’s aid if attacked by Israel. In
New York, on 30 October, the British and French added fuel to the president’s
anger by vetoing a U.S. resolution in the United Nations Security Council calling
for a cease-fire. Two days later the United States took a similar resolution to the
veto-proof General Assembly, where it passed by an overwhelming majority, as
did a plan for the UN to occupy the canal in place of the British and French.27
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The Soviet Union added a further political complication, attempting to use
the crisis to distract attention from its brutal behavior in Hungary, where, while
the Anglo-French invasion was proceeding, Moscow was using its troops to
overturn a short-lived rebellion against Soviet domination. The premier,
Nikolai Bulganin, threatened Britain and France with “rocket weapons” and
suggested that the U.S. and Soviet militaries join forces to protect Egypt, an offer
that was summarily rejected.28
Beset by political opposition at home and abroad, Eden was beginning to
show signs of the breakdown that would eventually cost him his job. Disap-
proval also came from the professional head of the Royal Navy, Adm. Lord Louis
Mountbatten, a cousin of the queen with considerable political influence.
Mountbatten felt that the operation was both morally and militarily wrong and
that the adverse political impact of the impending invasion had been poorly
thought through. Most importantly, he felt that the British, if successful, would
have to occupy the Canal Zone for a considerable period of time, at significant
cost and with a serious impact on their other global responsibilities. He at-
tempted to resign but was overruled by his civilian superior in the Admiralty.
Mountbatten made a final and extraordinary telephone call to Eden, appealing
to him to turn back the assault convoy before it was too late. Eden said no and
hung up the phone.29
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Meanwhile, the assault force steamed on, still due to arrive off Port Said on 6
November. The French, desperate to move before the tide of international opin-
ion overwhelmed their already precarious diplomatic position, urged that the
landings be accelerated. The British reluctantly agreed that a parachute drop,
originally planned to precede landings on the 6th, would instead take place on
the 5th. Awkwardly, however, Israel had by then captured all its objectives and
wanted to obey the UN cease-fire resolution, thus removing any rationale for
further Anglo-French action. The allies managed to persuade Tel Aviv to attach
sufficient conditions to its cease-fire acceptance that it could not become effec-
tive immediately. The landings would go ahead.30
At dawn on 5 November, a small force of six hundred British and five hundred
French paratroopers descended on Port Said, landing four miles west and a mile
south of the town, respectively. The risks they ran were considerable, since there
was no way in which they could be given significant assistance for the next
twenty-four hours. Historian H. P. Willmott later noted of this event that the
British paratroopers proved “better than their equipment,” while the French op-
eration was a “model of how an airborne operation should be carried out.” The
drop was successful, largely due to the effective support provided throughout
the day by naval aircraft directed by air contact teams dropped with the para-
troopers; “cab ranks” of Seahawks and Corsairs were available to be called in as
needed. There were never less than twelve aircraft patrolling above the British
troops, plus six Corsairs for the French. Missions could be effectively planned,
on a minute-by-minute basis. The British eastward advance was slowed down
on the beach road by an old coast guard barracks that had been turned into an
Egyptian strongpoint. The structure, which had proved impervious to Seahawk
rocket attacks, was quickly devastated by thousand- and five-hundred-pound
bombs placed with great precision by Wyverns of Eagle’s 830 Squadron. While
this was happening, French paratroopers, well-trained veterans of colonial wars
unburdened by their ally’s inhibitions about civilian casualties, were blasting their
way northward. Allied paratroopers emphasized later that their rapid advance and
low casualty rate would have been impossible without naval air support.31
The main assault force arrived on time on 6 November and took up position
five miles out to sea. The passage in to Port Said had already been swept for con-
tact and magnetic mines by an Anglo-French minesweeping force. Preliminary
bombing runs against the landing beaches were followed at dawn by naval gun-
fire. Initially all naval bombardment had been vetoed by Downing Street, due
to concern about civilian casualties. However, the British task force com-
mander determined that what he was about to deliver was “support fire,” not
“bombardment,” and decided to go ahead. Last-minute instructions from
Downing Street limited the fire to no greater than 4.5-inch caliber, lasting no
C O L E S 1 1 3
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn2006.vp
Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:31:15 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
119
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2006 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
longer than an hour. This restriction eliminated from the invasion force the
main batteries of the French battleship Jean Bart and the British cruisers Jamaica
and Ceylon. In his after-action report the invasion fleet commander noted how
“the development of modern communications, though intrinsically of great
value, is inclined to produce a number of last-minute queries and instructions
from London which cannot fail to upset the Command on the spot.”32
Warship fire ceased when naval aircraft started strafing the beaches, the air at-
tack continuing until a few minutes before the arrival of the first assault craft.
Royal Marines of 42 Commando went over the beaches at 6:15 AM, just to the
west of the canal, followed by tanks of the 6th Royal Tank Regiment. By 9:30 they
both had reached their first objective south of the town, supported by air strikes.
By noon they had linked up with the French paratroops, who had been well sup-
ported by their Corsairs. Forty Commando, on 42’s right, advanced south to link
up with British paratroopers moving in from the west. An incident in which
Royal Navy aircraft accidentally attacked a British commando unit, inflicting
considerable casualties, evidenced the risks inherent in providing close air sup-
port in built-up areas.33
Forty-five Commando, held in reserve, came in an hour after 40 Commando
in order to clean up the port area. In a battlefield “first,” this commando was
brought in by a mixed collection of twenty-two RAF and Navy helicopters,
which in an hour and a half brought ashore 415 men and seven tons of stores.
None of the aircraft had been designed for the purpose, but the successful opera-
tion vindicated Mountbatten’s long-held belief in the use of helicopters in bat-
tle. Having landed the commando brigades and related supplies, the helicopters
turned their attention to evacuating the wounded out to Ocean and Theseus. On
7 November the weather deteriorated; strong winds and heavy seas over the next
few days would have made landings over the beaches impossible. Since Eagle’s
second catapult had failed a day earlier, rendering the ship incapable of flying
operations, the Royal Navy’s ability to complete its mission on time owed much
to good fortune.34
The allied carrier force made 1,616 sorties during MUSKETEER, of which
1,164 were offensive, 359 combat air patrols, and the remainder for reconnais-
sance and transport. The proportion of defensive sorties dropped to under 20
percent in later days as the Egyptian air force was seen to represent less of a
threat. Seahawk and Sea Venom aircraft, which undertook the bulk of the opera-
tions, averaged 2.8 sorties per day, compared with the 1.4 per day by RAF
ground-attack aircraft. Naval aircraft flew two hundred “cab rank” sorties in sup-
port of the parachute operations on 5 November. Two Seahawks, two Wyverns,
and one Corsair were lost due to enemy action. The Corsair pilot was killed, as
was the pilot of a Seahawk involved in a deck landing accident. These were the
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only naval losses. Total allied casualties were twenty-six killed and 129
wounded.35
The Anglo-French forces now on the ground were aware of the possibility of a
cease-fire and made every effort to move as far south along the canal as possible.
However, the final outcome of the battle was being decided not by the military or
by the politicians but by anonymous central bankers in capitals as far flung as
Washington, New Delhi, and Beijing.36
In 1956 the pound sterling was the currency most widely used in world trade.
It was also an important reserve currency, particularly with respect to the British
Commonwealth and those countries that did not wish to trust their financial as-
sets to Washington. Willingness to hold sterling was very much a matter of trust,
loss of which could well precipitate major sales by central banks and speculators.
This is what happened in November 1956: for London to maintain trust re-
quired holding the prevailing sterling dollar parity, and doing so in the face of
massive selling pressure required aggressive use of Britain’s own reserves, which
had begun to hemorrhage. In theory the reserves could be replenished from
Britain’s balances with the International Monetary Fund, but this would require
American approval, and the Eisenhower administration made it clear that such
would not be given until all Anglo-French troops were withdrawn from Egypt.
Astonishingly, this development took the British by surprise; the French, less
trusting of Washington, had prudently arranged a stand-by credit three weeks
before the invasion. Eden attempted to bargain for time but with little success;
faced with the possibility of national bankruptcy, he had no choice but to agree
to a cease-fire. The French reluctantly went along. It was all over.37
Arguably Suez represents a seminal turning point in European history. Eden re-
signed and was replaced by the chancellor of the exchequer, Harold Macmillan,
who took immediate steps to repair the “special relationship” with Washington.
Britain would never again conduct a significant foreign policy initiative without
at least token American support. Although the British Empire suffered a gradual
decline throughout most of the twentieth century, many would say that Suez
marked its end. As historian Niall Ferguson argued in his account of the Suez af-
fair, “It was at the Bank of England that the Empire was effectively lost.” In
France, Suez led to further military disenchantment with the Fourth Republic,
the soldiers’ revolt, the recall of Charles de Gaulle, and the creation of the Fifth
Republic. France turned itself toward Europe and the Treaty of Rome—and,
some might say, would never again trust America.38
More generally, Arab nationalism remains a potent force in the world. Egypt
continues to own the canal, which still seems to work, although its importance
to world trade is vastly diminished. The Middle East remains a danger to world
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stability, although Egypt and Israel do have a peace treaty. Wars of choice remain
highly controversial.
Fifty years have gone by, yet it appears that some of the lessons of Suez still re-
quire relearning. Clearly defined political goals, well supported domestically
and well communicated to the military, are arguably more important in wars of
choice than they are in wars of national survival. Smaller powers should not as-
sume that long-standing friendship with a great power provides them with a
military blank check. The political wisdom of high-ranking generals and admi-
rals may possibly exceed the military acumen of their constitutional masters; in
any event, when the question is whether or not to go to war, the senior com-
manders should be listened to with care. Sea-borne expeditions take time, and the
longer the time the more opportunity for the voices of those demanding peace
to drown out the voices of those arguing for force, and the more opportunity for
weather to change for the worse—something even the best-organized military
cannot control. Shore bases continue hostages to political fortune, while float-
ing airfields still retain their freedom of action. Task force commanders today
must expect political micromanagement to an extent unimaginable by Nelson,
Jellicoe, or Halsey. An expeditionary force must go in equipped with either an
exit strategy or an occupation strategy; in small wars winning is often decep-
tively easy—what you do after you win is more difficult; Mountbatten was right,
no one had thought about what to do with a defeated Egypt and the associated
cost. And finally, debtor nations that value their currency’s reserve asset status
must be very, very, careful when they choose to go to war.39
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IN MY VIEW
THE SSGN: SOMETHING WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?
Sir:
The article “SSGN: A Transformation Limited by Legacy Command and Con-
trol” by Capt. Charles Sykora (Winter 2006, pp. 41–62) fails to answer many of the
questions being asked by congressional staffers, Department of Defense analysts,
and even fellow naval officers. These questions about the SSGN can be addressed
in three categories:
(1) Mission crossover: What happens if an Ohio-class SSGN has landed people
on the beach and receives a Tomahawk “fire order”? Will she launch missiles,
which will reveal that a U.S. submarine is in the area? Or, perhaps to reach the
launch (wave) point the SSGN will have to leave the area, essentially abandoning
people on the beach. Will the SSGN be a truly dual-mission submarine?
(2) Missile role: What is the scenario in which a submarine (clandestine)
launch of perhaps 150 missiles will be of value? (Remember, almost every SSN
carries twelve vertical-launch Tomahawks, and additional missiles can be
launched from their torpedo tubes.)
What is the availability of Tomahawk missiles? The fleet already has many
more Tomahawk “holes” than can be filled. With the plan to keep two-plus
SSGNs deployed at all times—using the Blue and Gold crew concept—will the
U.S. Navy be able to purchase at least three hundred additional Tomahawk
missiles?
The Tomahawk-launch role, especially employing the Tactical Tomahawk
(TacTom), will undoubtedly require two-way communications. Will this com-
promise the SSGN’s location?
(3) Special operations role: How will special forces reach the beach? The Ad-
vanced Swimmer Delivery System (ASDS)—hailed for years as the principal
means of SSGNs putting people on the beach—has been canceled. Thus, the only
means of getting SEALs to the beach will be the few, outdated Mark VIII “wet
vehicles” and rubber raiding craft. What is the relative vulnerability of these
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craft to hostile detection? What is the time-versus-fatigue factor for troops being
carried in a wet vehicle whose mission may require them to remain in the water at
the objective?
What are the probable distances from the beach that an SSGN would operate
while launching wet vehicles or rafts? An 18,750-ton, 560-foot submarine re-
quires a significant depth of water for safe operation.
And is there “something wrong with this picture” when one considers an
SSGN with a crew of 150-plus men being employed to put a half-dozen people
on the beach or into an enemy harbor for a clandestine mission? Indications are
that not since 1950 have more than a dozen Americans been sent onto a hostile
beach or into a hostile harbor by submarine. (In 1950 the submarine Perch
landed sixty-seven British marines behind communist lines in Korea to blow up
a railroad tunnel.)
What are the scenarios in which the sixty-six troops carried by an SSGN
would be landed for a clandestine operation? Or even two geographically linked
operations of thirty-plus SEALs, or . . . ?
Again, effective operations with special forces will require a high degree of
communications. Will such connectivity be possible from a submarine, espe-
cially without revealing the submarine’s presence in the area?
These and other questions about SSGN operations should be answered by
Captain Sykora. These questions should have been satisfactorily answered be-
fore the decision to convert four Trident ballistic-missile submarines to the
SSGN configuration.
NORMAN POLMAR
Author, Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet
and coauthor, Cold War Submarines
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Mark J. Valencia is an internationally known maritime
policy analyst, political commentator, and consultant
focused on Asia. He was a senior fellow for twenty-six
years with the East-West Center, where he originated,
developed, and managed international, interdisciplin-
ary projects on maritime policy and international rela-
tions in Asia. Most recently he was a visiting senior
scholar at Japan’s Ocean Policy Research Foundation
and a visiting senior fellow at the Maritime Institute of
Malaysia. Before joining the East-West Center, Dr.
Valencia was a lecturer at the Universiti Sains Malaysia
and a Technical Expert with the UNDP Regional Proj-
ect on Offshore Prospecting, based in Bangkok. He re-
ceived a PhD in oceanography from the University of
Hawaii and a master’s degree in marine affairs from the
University of Rhode Island.
Dr. Valencia has published over 150 articles and books
and is a frequent contributor to the public media, such as
the Far Eastern Economic Review, International Her-
ald Tribune, Asia Wall Street Journal, Japan Times,
and Washington Times. Selected works include The
Proliferation Security Initiative: Making Waves in
Asia, Adelphi Paper 376 (International Institute for
Strategic Studies, October 2005), Military and Intelli-
gence Gathering Activities in the Exclusive Economic
Zone: Consensus and Disagreement (co-editor, Marine
Policy Special Issues, March 2005 and January 2004);
Maritime Regime Building: Lessons Learned and
Their Relevance for Northeast Asia (Martinus Nijhoff,
2002); Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea
(with Jon Van Dyke and Noel Ludwig, Martinus Nijhoff,
1997); A Maritime Regime for Northeast Asia (Oxford
University Press, 1996); China and the South China Sea
Disputes, Adelphi Paper 298 (Institute for International
and Strategic Studies, 1995); Atlas for Marine Policy in
East Asian Seas (with Joseph Morgan, University of Cal-
ifornia Press, Berkeley, 1992); and Pacific Ocean
Boundary Problems: Status and Solutions (with
Douglas Johnston, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991).
Dr. Valencia has been a Fulbright Fellow, an Abe Fel-
low, a DAAD (German Government) Fellow, an Inter-
national Institute for Asian Studies (Leiden University)
Visiting Fellow, and a U.S. State Department–
sponsored international speaker. He has also been a
consultant to international organizations and NGOs
(e.g., IMO, UNDP, UNU, the Nautilus Institute,
PEMSEA); government institutions and agencies (in,
e.g., Brunei, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the United
States); and numerous private entities (e.g., Shell,
CONOCO, and legal firms handling maritime issues).
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RESEARCH & DEBATE
IS THE PSI REALLY THE CORNERSTONE OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL NORM?
Mark J. Valencia
This essay was written in response to the article “The Proliferation Security Ini-
tiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm,” by Joel Doolin, published in
the Naval War College Review (Spring 2006, vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 29–57).
Doolin’s article contains some serious substantive flaws in interpretation,
logic, and conclusions. The general thrust and conclusion of the paper is that
through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) it has become or is becoming
customary international law to be able to interdict and board vessels on the high
seas without flag-state consent to search for and seize weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD) and related materials. This contention, however, is not supported
by the relevant facts and is deleterious to the regime of freedom of navigation,
which the U.S. Navy has held sacrosanct and zealously defended for centuries.1
Doolin’s specific arguments marshaled to support the contention that inter-
diction of vessels on the high seas without flag-state consent has become or is
becoming customary international law include widespread support for the PSI,
state sovereignty in its territorial sea, an “overwhelming majority” of nations
having signed conventions “outlawing” the proliferation of WMD, United Na-
tions Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540, and Article 51 of the UN Charter
(Right of Self-Defense). The following summarizes problems with these
arguments.
The paper repeats without analysis the U.S. government contention that “more
than sixty countries have signaled that they support the PSI and are ready to partic-
ipate in interdiction efforts” (page 31). As Sharon Squassoni of the U.S. Congres-
sional Research Service has pointed out, it is unclear what “support” for the PSI
means and how robust it is.2 The “concrete steps” for contribution to the PSI
listed on the U.S. State Department website are rather vague and conditional.3
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First and foremost, participating states are encouraged formally to commit to
and publicly endorse, if possible [my italics], the Statement of Interdiction Prin-
ciples. Follow-up steps are also replete with conditional language, such as “indi-
cate willingness,” “as appropriate,” “might contribute,” and “be willing to
consider.”
It is true that sixty-six countries attended a closed-door meeting in Warsaw
on 23 June 2006, marking the third anniversary of the initiation of the PSI.4
However, no list of participating countries has been made available, and the def-
inition of “supporting” countries remains unclear. Indeed, it is nigh impossible
to obtain an “official” list of PSI-supporting countries. Apparently this is because
some—perhaps many—so-called supporting states have not publicly endorsed
the PSI principles. Reasons given include not wanting to provoke North Korea,
wanting to avoid possible reprisals for cooperating with the United States,
fearing that interdictions on the high seas will jeopardize international trade
and undermine international law, and not perceiving the PSI as a top security
priority.5 This reluctance to publicly endorse the PSI principles in itself indicates
less than stalwart support in general, let alone in time of specific need. Indeed,
given the flexibility of cooperation, many if not most of the so-called supporters
would not automatically participate in interdictions of vessels or aircraft at the
behest of the United States. Thus, in a pinch, support could easily evaporate. In
any case, such soft support does not warrant a conclusion that PSI activities will
change international practice regarding interdiction on the high seas without
flag-state consent.
Moreover, while there is indeed a growing list of nations willing to associate
themselves with different aspects of the PSI on a case-by-case basis, support in
Asia—a major focus of proliferation concern—is weak. Despite considerable
U.S. pressure to participate fully and publicly, key countries like China, India,
Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia remain outside the “coalition of the willing,”
and the cooperation of others that have nominally joined, such as Japan, South
Korea, and Russia, for various reasons is lukewarm at best.
A state may “approach, visit, and search any vessel in its territorial sea and con-
tiguous zone” (page 35). Navigation in the territorial waters of any coastal state is
subject to the innocent-passage regime—that is, it is allowed as long as it is not
prejudicial to the coastal state’s peace, good order, or security.6 Specific non-
innocent acts are listed in the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the
Sea (1982 UNCLOS) Article 19, and transporting WMD components or missiles
is not among them. Moreover, the 1982 UNCLOS Article 23 implicitly gives ships
carrying nuclear weapons the right of innocent passage. These articles were a
U.S.-led compromise with those nations that wanted the Convention to explic-
itly declare carriage of nuclear weapons in foreign territorial seas to be
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non-innocent. Thus for a coastal state to legally interdict a vessel in its territorial
sea without flag-state consent because the vessel is thought to be carrying WMD
or related materials, the coastal state would probably have to have in place legis-
lation criminalizing WMD transport or demonstrate that the vessel is threaten-
ing its security due to the presence on board of WMD destined for persons
intending to undertake terrorist activities in areas under its jurisdiction.7 Per-
haps in a stretch the coastal state could argue that because the recipient of the
WMD is unknown, it has to assume they are bound for an enemy. But a coastal
state cannot, as the author contends, simply “approach, visit, and search any ves-
sel in its territorial sea.”
WMD are subject to seizure because “the overwhelming majority of nations have
signed treaties outlawing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons” (page 37). “The NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty], CWC [Chemi-
cal Warfare Convention], and BWC [Biological Weapons Convention] are argu-
ably enforceable against nonsignors. The implication for military operations would
seem to be that seizure of WMD items found aboard foreign ships or aircraft may be
authorized” (page 37). Doolin provides his own counterargument to this ex-
treme statement. “No interpretation is permitted when the text of a treaty is
clear—and none of the WMD or terrorism conventions authorizes maritime in-
terdiction. Each treaty was the product of negotiation by states, and subse-
quently changed security needs, however compelling, cannot add a right to
maritime interdiction that does not exist in its language” (page 38). Indeed!
UNSC Resolution 1540 strengthens the evolution of customary international
law toward accepting “the boarding of vessels on the high seas to search for
[WMD]” (page 51). Doolin hedges by implying that flag-state consent is still
needed. Indeed, this is made clear in the background to UNSC Resolution 1540.
In March 2004 the United States tried to obtain a UN Security Council reso-
lution specifically authorizing states to interdict, board, and inspect any vessel or
aircraft if there were reason to believe they were carrying WMD or the technol-
ogy to make or deliver them, and to seize or impound missiles or related tech-
nology or equipment. This was a difficult—and, as it turned out, frustrating—
tacit admission by the United States that it needs a UN mandate to legitimize
high-seas PSI interdictions.
There were several initial objections to the draft. Foremost was the question
of what constitutes “weapons-related materials”—a definitional problem that
continues to undermine the legitimacy of the PSI. Another particular area of de-
bate was the text’s proposal that parties “to the extent consistent with their na-
tional legal authorities and international law” cooperate on preventing, and if
necessary interdicting, shipments of WMD and related materials. In other
words, the United States sought UN support for PSI interdictions. The text did
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not include a British proposal for a UN counterproliferation committee or a
French proposal for a permanent corps of UN weapons inspectors. In other
words, according to the U.S. proposal, enforcement would be outside the UN
system.
After considerable debate in and outside the Security Council, a revised draft
resolution emerged that asked all UN members to “criminalize” the prolifera-
tion of WMD, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials
within their own borders.8 The final resolution that emerged after further debate
was introduced to the Security Council on 24 March 2004 and passed on 28
April 2004 (UNSCR 1540). It requires all 191 UN members to “adopt and en-
force appropriate effective laws to prevent any nonstate actor from being able to
manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport or use nuclear, chemical or bi-
ological weapons and their means of delivery.”9 Specifically, it compels all coun-
tries to adopt laws to criminalize the spread of weapons of mass destruction, to
ensure that they have strong export controls, and to secure sensitive materials
within their borders.10
Significantly, Russia and China prevented a specific endorsement of interdic-
tion and the PSI in the resolution.11 Indeed, the text was agreed upon only after
the United States accepted China’s demand under a threat of a veto to drop a
provision specifically authorizing the interdiction of vessels suspected of trans-
porting WMD, a cornerstone of the PSI. China also objected to any suggestion
that the Council would endorse ad hoc frameworks like the PSI.
With these amendments, China, France, and Russia supported the revised
draft. However, a vote was delayed because Council members wanted every UN
member state to be briefed on the resolution.12 Ironically, Pakistan, a prominent
U.S. ally in the war on terror, led opposition to the resolution until it was assured
it would not be retroactive and a provision allowing intrusive inspections was
deleted.13 Opponents of the resolution were also concerned by the Security
Council’s assumption of the authority essentially to make national law and by
possible sanctions against UN members that do not comply. They also objected
to the secret and arrogant manner in which the text was negotiated among only
the Permanent Five before its introduction. In the end, the resolution did little to
strengthen the effectiveness of the PSI, since it focused only on nonstate actors
and did not clearly authorize interdiction or any action outside current inter-
national law.
Without a clearly worded UNSC resolution specifically authorizing high-seas
interdiction, any such interdiction over the objection of the flag state would be
tantamount to aggression and could be considered an act of war. Even if a coun-
try were to enforce the PSI principles only in its own territorial waters, each
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interdiction may require Security Council approval,14 or only be legal in very
specific circumstances.
Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, supports the goals
of the PSI.15 But he would prefer that such issues and actions be addressed and
undertaken collectively through and by the United Nations.16 He has said that
the Security Council must be “the sole source of legitimacy on the use of force.”17
Other core PSI members such as France favor this approach and have proposed a
Security Council summit meeting to frame a UN action plan against prolifera-
tion and to create a corps of inspectors to carry it out.
Article 51 of the UN Charter could be used “as a trump card” [to interdict with-
out flag-state consent vessels on the high seas carrying WMD] (page 46). Pre-
emptive self-defense includes anticipatory self-defense and preventive
self-defense.18 For an action to be compatible with current international legal in-
terpretations of anticipatory self-defense, the United States and its coalition
partners would probably have to demonstrate not only that the interdicted cargo
required such action because it posed a specific and imminent threat of attack
on the United States or its allies, but also that the necessity of self-defense was in-
stant and overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no time for delibera-
tion.19 That is, a response was necessary, proportional to the threat, and the
threat was imminent.20 Otherwise such action and argument would be greatly
expanding the traditional definition of self-defense to include preemptive
self-defense regarding non-imminent threats and would set a very dangerous
precedent that could undermine the very foundations of the United Nations. In
fact, Article 51 provides the right of self-defense only in the case of an armed at-
tack, and only until the UN “Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.”21
Doolin himself acknowledges that “universal condemnation of [WMD] and
terrorism cannot be used as justification for violation of another state’s sover-
eignty” (page 48). Indeed, as he says, the only time national defense could be
used to justify maritime interdiction on the high seas without flag-state consent
would be “if the facts established that the transport of [WMD] toward the
coastal nation constituted an imminent threat of an armed attack” (page 48).
In sum, the underpinnings of Doolin’s argument are not substantiated. Interna-
tional law does not permit high-seas interdictions and boardings without flag-
state consent except in very specific circumstances that do not include transport
of “WMD, related materials and delivery systems.” It is highly questionable
whether such interdictions are allowed even for a vessel in innocent passage in
the territorial sea. Neither the PSI, existing nonproliferation treaties and weap-
ons conventions, UNSC Resolution 1540, nor Article 51 support interdiction on
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the high seas in violation of the freedom-of-navigation regime. Such interdic-
tion without flag-state consent is not, and is not likely in the foreseeable future
to become, customary international law.
As for amending Article 110 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea as suggested by Doolin (pages 50, 51), the United States as a non-party has
no official role in the matter. Indeed, one of the most egregious inconsistencies
of this piece is that it frequently cites the 1982 UNCLOS to support its argu-
ments. The United States is not a party to this grand bargain and cannot “pick
and choose” which provisions it will follow.
The sad fact is that the PSI and ancillary measures have done little or nothing
to restrict the movement of WMD and closely related materials on flagged ships
and planes of North Korea, Iran, or other “countries of proliferation concern,”
especially those owned and operated by their governments.22 Another sad fact is
that the implementation, if not the conception, of the PSI was and is seriously
flawed. Yet the PSI’s proponents and its defenders continue to ignore many of its
problems and to exaggerate its progress and effectiveness.
All this is not to say that trade in WMD and related items should be ignored,
although it may not be possible to prevent it altogether. To help nonconsensual
high-seas interdictions for WMD transport to become customary international
law, wider and more robust state support is required. To engender this support,
the PSI’s shortcomings must be acknowledged and addressed. Most of the PSI’s
shortcomings stem from its ad hoc, extra–United Nations, U.S.-driven nature.
Bringing it into the UN system would rectify many of these shortcomings by
loosening U.S. control, enhancing the initiative’s legitimacy, and engendering
near-universal support. Whether or not the PSI is formally brought into the UN
system, its reach and effectiveness could be improved by eliminating hypocrisy
and double standards (e.g., when it comes to India, Pakistan, and Israel), and in-
creasing transparency. Needed is a neutral organization to assess intelligence,
coordinate and fund activities, and to make decisions regarding specific or ge-
neric interdictions. Such an organization could provide more objective and le-
gitimate definitions of states “of proliferation concern” and “good cause” (for
interdiction). It would also help avoid erroneous judgments, resolve disagree-
ments, provide consistency and a concrete structure and budget, and ensure
compliance with international law—or be a vehicle for any agreed changes
therein.
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NOTE S
Parts of this commentary are derived from
Mark J. Valencia, The Proliferation Security
Initiative: Making Waves in Asia, Adelphi
Paper 376 (London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, October 2005).
1. This regime is customary international law,
and several of its relevant components are
also enshrined in the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Freedom
of the high seas comprises among others the
freedoms of navigation and of overflight (art.
87 and art. 90). The right of visit is severely
constrained (art. 110). Ships on the high seas
are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
flag state (art 92). And ships owned or oper-
ated by a state, and used only on government
noncommercial service, shall, on the high
seas, have complete immunity from the juris-
diction of any other state (art. 96).
2. Sharon Squassoni, “Proliferation Security Ini-
tiate,” Congressional Research Service, 7 June
2005, Order Code RS21881.
3. U.S. State Dept., The Proliferation Security
Initiative (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of
Nonproliferation, 26 May 2005), available at
www.state.gov/E/np/rls/fs/46839.htm.
4. “Proliferation Security Initiative High Level
Political Meeting,” Cracow, Warsaw, 23 June
2006, available at www.psi.msz.gov.p1/.
5. Brendon Pearson, “Tokyo Treads Warily in
Use of Interdiction Force,” Australian Finan-
cial Review, 12 July 2003; Takashi Ono and
Yoshiro Mino, “Japan Nervous as Star of
WMD and Exercise,” Asahi Shimbun, 15 Sep-
tember 2003; “Russian Diplomat Says Inter-
ception Training May Prolong Nuclear
Crisis,” ABCNews Radio Online (Australia), 11
September 2003; “China Voices Concern over
WMD Non-proliferation Plan’s Legality,” 9
December 2003, as quoted in Andreas Persbo
and Ian Davis, “Sailing into Uncharted Wa-
ters: The Proliferation Security Initiative and
the Law of the Sea,” BASIC Research Report
2004, 2 June 2004, available at www.basicint
.org/pubs/Research/04PSI.htm; Ye Ru’an and
Zhao Qinghai, “The PSI: Chinese Thinking
and Concern,” Monitor 10, no. 1 (Spring
2004), p. 23; Stephen Rademaker, Assistant
U.S. Secretary of State for Arms Control,
Testimony before the House Internal Rela-
tions Committee, Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Terrorism and Nonproliferation,
Washington D.C., 9 June 2005, available at
www.State.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/47715.htm.
6. United Nations, Official Text of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(New York, 1983), Article 19, available at
ww.un.or/Depts/los/convention_agreements/
texts/unclos/closindx.htm.
7. Natalino Ronzitti, “The Law of the Sea and
the Use of Force against Terrorist Activities,”
in Maritime Terrorism and International Law,
ed. Natalino Ronzitti (New York: Kluwer Law
International, 1990), pp. 1–15; Benjamin
Friedman, “The Proliferation Security Initia-
tive: The Legal Challenge,” Bipartisan Security
Group, 4 September 2003, available at www.fas
.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm.
8. Mark Turner, “U.S. Drafts UN Move to Re-
duce Flow of Weapons,” Financial Times, 18
December 2003.
9. Colum Lynch, “U.S. Urges Curb on Arms
Traffic,” Washington Post, 25 March 2004, p.
A20; Jim Wust, “U.N. Draft Resolution Could
Require States Deny Terrorists WMD,” U.N.
Wire, 25 March 2004.
10. Maggie Farley, “Resolution Seeks Ban on
Spread of Weapons,” Los Angeles Times, 29
April 2004.
11. Ralph Cossa, introduction to “Countering
the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
The Role of the Proliferation Security Initia-
tive,” Issues and Insights 4, no. 5 (July 2004),
pp. 1–6.
12. Evelyn Leopold, Reuters, 25 March 2004.
13. William Varner, “Pakistan Leads Opposition
at UN to Terrorism Measure,” Bloomberg, 5
April 2004; Daily Times, editorial, 1 May
2004.
14. Foreign Policy Association, Proliferation Se-
curity Initiative: Principles and Practices, 7
September 2003.
15. “World Leaders Urged to Act Boldly,” Finan-
cial Express, 22 March 2005.
16. “Listen to Annan,” International Herald Tri-
bune, 26 September 2003, p. 8.
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17. Quoted in John R. Bolton, “Remarks at Prolif-
eration Security Meeting,” Paris, France, avail-
able at www.state.gov/t/us/rm/23801.htm.
18. Anticipatory self-defense is an attack upon
another state that actively threatens violence
and has the capacity to carry out the threat
but has not yet done so; preventive self-
defense is an attack against another state
when a threat is feared or suspected but there
is no evidence that the threat is imminent.
Daniel H. Joyner, “The PSI and International
Law,” Monitor 10, no. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 7–9.
19. Gerald F. Seib, “A Bush Doctrine Is Put in
Jeopardy by Weapons Hunt,” Asian Wall
Street Journal, 9 October 2003; Robert A.
Hamilton, “International Maritime Expert:
Law Supports War on Terror—German Law
School Vice Dean Speaks to Coast Guard
Class,” The Day website, 9 November 2003.
20. Ibid.
21. United Nations, “Charter of the United Na-
tions,” chap. VI, art. 51.
22. UNSC Resolution 1695 of 15 July 2006 does
prohibit all UN member states from provid-
ing to or receiving from North Korea WMD
and related materials or technology, specifi-
cally including missiles. But this resolution
was passed after the Doolin paper was pub-
lished. Besides, it is not part of the PSI (al-
though it has similar objectives), it does not
authorize the use of military force to ensure
compliance, and it does not apply to other
states seeking or supplying WMD-related
materials (except to North Korea). Edith M.
Lederer, “U.N. Imposes Limited Sanctions on
N. Korea,” Associated Press, 15 July 2006;
Warren Hoge, “U.N. Demands End to North
Korean Missile Program,” New York Times,
15 July 2006. Although the United States in-
sists that the resolution is “mandatory” and
“binding” and that all UN member states are
“required” to comply, it is unclear if and how
it will be enforced. “UN Resolution on North
Korea Result of Multilateral Efforts,” USINFO,
available at www.state.gov, 16 July 2006;
“U.S., Japan Turn Up Heat on N. Korea,”
Asahi.com, 18 July 2006; Kwang-Am Cheon,
“U.S. Mulls Own Sanctions on N. Korea,”
Asahi.com, 24 July 2006. Moreover, enforce-
ment by military means would be counter to
both the intent of the compromise Resolution
and to the 1982 UNCLOS.
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REVIEW ESSAYS
TECHNOLOGIES THAT MAY YET REVOLUTIONIZE WARFARE
William C. Martel
Beason, Doug. The E-Bomb: How America’s New Directed
Energy Weapons Will Change the Way Future Wars Will Be
Fought. Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo, 2005. 256pp. $26
This work examines the development of directed-energy technologies and their
implications for future warfare. From the principle that the “first DE [directed
energy] weapons [will] . . . be more revolutionary than the longbow, machine
gun, stealth airplane, cruise missile, nuclear sub-
marine, or nuclear bomb,” Beason argues that directed-
energy weapons represent the next development in the
“revolution in military affairs.” His thesis is that directed
energy represents “a completely new way of thinking, a
new way of employing both strategic and non-lethal
force, and interacting in the international community.”
If his analysis is correct, the age of kinetic weapons
(which destroy targets by explosions or impacts) will
be transcended by weapons based on lasers and
microwaves.
This book reviews the origins of directed-energy
weapons and how these weapons may alter warfare.
The observation that directed-energy technologies
and weapons are revolutionary is not new. The mili-
tary services have been developing these technologies
for decades. In fact, the U.S. Air Force and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have
invested billions of dollars in directed-energy
William C. Martel, associate professor of international
security studies, is at the Fletcher School at Tufts Uni-
versity in Medford, Massachusetts. His research interests
are in the fields of international security, technology, policy
analysis, and governmental decision making. He received
his doctorate in international relations from the University
of Massachusetts (Amherst) and was a postdoctoral re-
search fellow at the Center for Science and International
Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. For-
merly a professor of national security affairs at the Naval
War College in Newport, Rhode Island, Dr. Martel held
the Alan Shepard Chair of Space Technology and Policy
Studies; directed a number of studies on space and policy
issues for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), the U.S. Air Force, and the Office of Secretary
of Defense; and was a member of the professional staff of
the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C. His publica-
tions include Strategic Nuclear War (1986), How to Stop a
War (1987), The Technological Arsenal (2001), and var-
ious scholarly articles. His latest book, Victory in War:
Foundations of Modern Military Policy, will be pub-
lished in the fall of 2006 by Cambridge University Press.
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technologies. Since their invention in the early 1960s, lasers have been heralded
as the preeminent technological advance in military capabilities, but the laser
(often described as a “solution in search of a problem”) has only recently begun
to match these expectations. In examining the development of directed-energy
technologies and weapons, Beason pays particular attention to technical and en-
gineering difficulties that complicate the task of translating energy into effective
and practical weapons.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of The E-Bomb is its detailed analysis of
the history of the development of directed-energy technologies. We should ex-
pect nothing less from Beason, whose work in the trenches of directed energy
has given him firsthand knowledge of those who struggled to make it a reality.
This history alone makes this book worthwhile.
In contemporary terms, Beason argues convincingly that recent strides have
made it possible for policy makers to believe that significant advances in mili-
tary capabilities are truly on the immediate horizon. Perhaps the best and most
visible example is the Airborne Laser (ABL), which is being developed by the
Missile Defense Agency and the U.S. Air Force. Despite significant technical and
engineering difficulties, the concept of using a laser on a 747 aircraft to destroy
ballistic missiles will soon become an operational reality. At the other end of the
spectrum, advances in microwave technology have put within reach the possi-
bility of nonlethal weapons that disable, but do not harm, people.
Although E-Bomb offers the reader the basis for understanding the techno-
logical and operational forces that will determine whether directed-energy tech-
nologies will change U.S. defense capabilities, the book is plagued by several
weaknesses that diminish its overall value. First, the author shows a
none-too-subtle enthusiasm for the merits of directed energy. As one would ex-
pect, Beason has unmitigated, sometimes even contagious, zeal for these tech-
nologies. Despite cautionary notes about significant technical and engineering
problems to be overcome and a chapter on “The Problem with Directed Energy,”
with its extensive discussions of the challenges in using directed energy for mili-
tary purposes, Beason’s unabashed advocacy weakens the analysis. Having said
that, there is still a balanced feel to these discussions; the reader is left with the
sense that directed-energy technologies may yet revolutionize warfare—which
is essentially the same conclusion, with notable amendments, that we would
have drawn a decade or two ago.
Second, the book is characterized by uneven discussions that shift between
analyses of directed-energy issues using scientific language and casual discussions
often bordering on the mundane. They range from “If the new photon is emit-
ted in the same direction and has the same phase as the incoming photon, this
is known as coherent emission,” to references to “Disco Duck,” “megapecking
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order,” “our government—you know, the one you pay taxes to support,” “The
summer of love: 1969,” and “blowing the enemy to hell.” I could go on. None of
this language belongs in a serious work, and its presence raises unsettling ques-
tions about editorial control. My suspicion is that Beason was trying to make a work
written primarily for members of the defense community more accessible to lay read-
ers. Third, the book’s credibility and persuasiveness are weakened by what could best
be thought of as numerous cases of editorial sloppiness: “foyer” rather than “foray”;
using the acronym “ATCD” for “advanced concept technology demonstrator” along
with the correct one, “ACTD,” twice in the same paragraph; citing the Air Force “sci-
ence advisory board” rather than the correct “Scientific Advisory Board.”
By what standard should we judge this book? E-Bomb is a useful work, one that
contributes to the literature on the relationship between advanced technologies
and defense. It provides new and useful background and insights into an arcane
area of technology that could have a decisive influence on the future of warfare. In
the end, it will help policy makers evaluate directed energy in terms of the limita-
tions and costs of making decisions to invest scarce resources in defense. My only
wish is that the author had kept a tighter rein on editorial comments, and on his
enthusiasm for directed-energy technology, and avoided the unevenness associ-
ated with the shifting back and forth between scientific language and casual dis-
cussions—all of these detract from the work. My recommendation, however, is
that the reader overlook these shortcomings and focus instead on the fact that this
book is a valuable aid in understanding the development of the next set of tech-
nologies that could revolutionize military operations.
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PART AND PARCEL OF A NATION’S TOTALITY
John B. Hattendorf
Rodger, N. A. M. The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History
of Britain, 1649–1815. New York: W. W. Norton, 2005. 907pp.
$45
It is no exaggeration to say that this multivolume study is the single most important
contribution to scholarship on British naval history that has been written in more
than a century. It clearly surpasses the previous multivolume general history: Sir
William Laird Clowes’s The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Time to the Pres-
ent, originally published in seven volumes between 1897 and 1903. The Command
of the Ocean is the second volume of a projected trilogy. The first volume, The Safe-
guard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 660–1649,
appeared in 1998, so the volume allotted for the two
centuries from 1815 through the end of the twentieth
century may be expected some years hence.
Rodger’s purpose in the trilogy is not to write an
institutional or operational history of the Royal Navy
but rather to present a naval history of Britain that
puts naval affairs into context as part of general Brit-
ish history. This means that the focus is not limited to
isolated battles, organizational development, or
prominent leaders but includes and stretches be-
yond these aspects to see naval activity within the
multiple contexts of all kinds of history, including po-
litical, social, economic, diplomatic, administrative,
medical, religious, scientific, and technological.
Rodger’s intent is to spread the meaning of naval his-
tory beyond the naval service itself and to see it, much
more appropriately, as the national endeavor that it is.
Reflecting the best scholarly views of our era, Rodger
strives to understand naval affairs as they involve all
parts of government and society in Britain. In doing
this, his trilogy is a trailblazing effort and a masterful
achievement in the making.
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Professor Hattendorf, chairman of the Naval War Col-
lege’s Maritime History Department, has served since
1984 as the College’s Ernest J. King Professor of Mari-
time History. His service to the U.S. Navy extends over
three decades—as an officer with combat experience at
sea in destroyers, at the Naval Historical Center, and as
both a uniformed and civilian Naval War College fac-
ulty member. He earned his master’s degree in history
from Brown University in 1971 and his doctorate in war
history from the University of Oxford in 1979. Kenyon
College, where he earned his bachelor’s degree in 1964,
awarded him an honorary doctorate in 1997, and the
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, awarded him
its Caird Medal in 2000 for his contributions to the field
of maritime history. Since 1988 he has directed the Ad-
vanced Research Department in the Center for Naval
Warfare Studies. He is the author, coauthor, editor, or
coeditor of numerous articles and more than thirty
books on British and American maritime history, in-
cluding Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History
of the Naval War College, studies on Alfred Thayer
Mahan and Stephen B. Luce, and America and the Sea:
A Maritime History. His most recent works include
coediting War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Re-
naissance (2002) and a major exhibition catalog for the
John Carter Brown Library, The Boundless Deep: The
European Conquest of the Oceans, 1450–1840
(2003).
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Any attempt to write naval history on the broad level where Rodger operates
immediately faces the problem of how to deal simultaneously with so many di-
verse levels of understanding and interpretation. Rodger takes his cue from John
Ehrman’s famous comment that “if national history may be compared to a cake,
the different layers of which are different aspects of national life, then naval his-
tory is not a layer, but a slice of that cake.”Rodger sees his slice of cake as one with
four layers: the first, policy, strategy, and naval operations; the second, finance,
administration, and logistics, including their technical and industrial intercon-
nection; third, social history; and fourth, ships and weapons. Rather than trying
to deal with these matters simultaneously in a way that would clot the brain,
Rodger wisely shifts from one layer to another in a kind of symphonic orchestra-
tion that varies in its concentration and intensity. Each of his chapters has a the-
matic title, but each also has a short subtitle that tells the reader to which of the
four levels the author is now turning his focus. Of the thirty-six chapters, nine-
teen deal with operations, nine with social history, six with administration, and
two with ships.
The text itself occupies only 65 percent of the 583 pages of this weighty vol-
ume. In addition to the running text, sixty-one pages are devoted to seven
appendixes that provide, respectively, a chronology of the period 1649–1815;
statistics on the comparative strength of the Royal Navy with respect to four
other powers; the size of the fleet and the types of vessels constituting it at eleven
key points in this period; tables of rates of pay for officers and men at seven dif-
ferent points; a list of the admirals and officials who successively held eight key
positions; annual statistics for the total number of seamen from 1688 to 1815;
and annual statistics for naval expenditures from 1649 to 1815. Additionally,
there are twenty-seven pages devoted to a glossary of English and foreign naval
terms, eighty-nine pages of bibliography, ninety-nine pages of endnotes, and
forty-two pages of index. Then, there are sixteen unnumbered pages of
black-and-white illustrations in two sections. Thus, this volume and its prede-
cessor are (as undoubtedly their successor will be) not only substantial works of
fundamental interpretative importance but major reference works, books that
belong in every library, personal or institutional, that has anything to do with
naval affairs and its history.
Beyond such substantial statistics of girth and weight, this volume is even
more importantly a new interpretation, one that arrived on the historio-
graphical scene at a very timely moment to set the tone and provide the back-
ground for the bicentenary commemorations of Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar.
Unlike many works that preceded it, Rodger’s does not glory in famous victories
won but looks beyond them to think about the Royal Navy’s more fundamental
meaning to the nation. Rodger concludes that the significance of seapower for
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British history lies equally in domestic politics and in foreign policy and war.
The basic and fundamental foundation of British naval power was the ability of
the state to maintain a strong national economy that could provide the state
enough revenue to allow it to spend a huge proportion on a navy, with domestic
political support for doing so. The ability to find such economic resources, in
turn, was based on the broad relationships between domestic agricultural and
industrial productivity, the system of international trade, and the defense of that
trade and the nation in general—defense that the navy provided as its funda-
mental contribution. In bringing all of this about and making it a successful ven-
ture for national purposes, the skill, courage, and professional abilities of naval
men were essential, as was an effective and efficient naval administration that
built the ships, supported the fleets at sea, and fed and provided for the health of
their crews. A navy is not an isolated feature of a nation or of a nation’s history; it
is fundamentally part and parcel of a nation’s totality. Nicholas Rodger deftly ex-
plains all that with grace, wit, penetrating insight, and a brilliant command of
the language.
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BOOK REVIEWS
NUCLEAR ESCALATION AND CHINA
Quester, George. Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press, 2006. 159pp. $22.95
Bolt, Paul J., and Albert S. Willner, eds. China’s Nuclear Future. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2006.
221pp. $52
George Quester’s Nuclear First Strike:
Consequences of a Broken Taboo, is a
thought-provoking speculative analysis.
His first chapter appeared in modified
form as an essay in the Spring 2005 is-
sue of the Naval War College Review.
With well over three decades of experi-
ence in the field of security studies and
deterrence theory, Quester backs up his
examination of this speculative topic
with very impressive credentials that
span the disciplines of analysis, writing,
and teaching. Quester has taught at a
number of universities and colleges
and is currently a professor of govern-
ment and politics at the University of
Maryland.
Having chosen his topic well, Quester
could not fail to deliver a fresh, insight-
ful piece of scholarship. The book is
solidly framed on a structure that iden-
tifies a range of potential nuclear crises
and propagates each through the vari-
ous phases of use decision-making,
from pre-use considerations to post-
response international reactions. Essen-
tially, Quester divides the spectrum of
use into seven generic scenarios along
functional lines as follows: ambiguous
use, use involving little or no collateral
damage, use under conditions of com-
promised or uncertain command and
control, government-directed nuclear
use with weak international reaction,
government-directed nuclear use with
strong international reaction, full nu-
clear warfare, and limited nuclear war-
fare. Clearly, since the third and fourth
generic scenarios differ only in the in-
ternational responses they evoke, he
probably ought to have combined
them—they diverge temporally (that is,
through the phases of use decision
making) rather than functionally.
Quester then sequentially evolves these
representative scenarios of use through
the crisis phases that he envisions:
pre-use considerations and use itself,
likely world reactions, likely U.S. public
reactions, and appropriate U.S. policy
responses. He rightly makes and adeptly
demonstrates the valuable point that in
analyzing possible U.S. policy responses,
we should be careful to avoid limiting
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our examination to the case per se but
rather look also to the potential prece-
dents set by such use. He also docu-
ments his background material and
speculations quite well and extensively—
a distinct strength of the book.
One curiosity is that he did not choose
to carefully examine the specific case of
nuclear escalation between the United
States and China in a Taiwan Strait con-
flict. Such a scenario not only would have
to rank fairly high on the probability-
of-occurrence spectrum but also receive
a good deal of attention, and would
have benefited from Quester’s insight-
ful analysis.
There may be one other way in which this
otherwise very useful book could have
been improved. Quester’s decision to cut
his speculative analysis “horizontally”—
essentially handling each nuclear use
decision phase separately, while span-
ning the entire range of scenarios
within each phase—does not help the
management of this complex topic. A
“vertical” cut, in which each scenario is
played out from cradle to grave before
moving to the next, would have been
more helpful to the reader. His result-
ing digressions and diversions into
other scenarios and other crisis phases
become confusing at points, detracting
slightly from the otherwise enjoyable
readability of his style.
In China’s Nuclear Future, Paul Bolt
and Albert Willner have edited an ex-
ceptional volume, which should be read
by both nuclear strategists and China
experts. Bolt is a professor of political
science at the U.S. Air Force Academy,
having also taught in China, and
Willner is a colonel in the U.S. Army
and chief of the Liaison Affairs Section
at the American Institute in Taiwan.
The volume presents valuable scholar-
ship across quite a range of issues under
the umbrella of China’s nuclear weap-
ons future: strategy, doctrine, force de-
velopment, political perceptions, and
the Taiwan issue. Though all seven
chapters are strong, three in particular
stand out as exceptionally valuable to
researchers: Evan Medeiros on Chinese
nuclear strategy and doctrine, Ronald
Montaperto on the effects of Beijing’s
political perceptions, and Brad Roberts
on possible future paths for China’s nu-
clear force and doctrine.
Evan Medeiros marshals substantial
new Chinese-language materials to
probe the history, development, and fu-
ture evolution of China’s nuclear doc-
trine. His historical outline of the
maturation of strategic doctrine within
China and its subcommunities of inter-
est is well researched, crisp, and accu-
rate. Equally important, however, the
historical context sets the stage for his
argument that China’s deterrent strat-
egy ought to be looked at, not in typi-
cally Western terms, such as “minimal”
or “limited,” but rather as embodying
the Chinese decision to maintain an
“effective” and “sufficient” posture.
This is a highly informative, well writ-
ten, and thought-provoking chapter,
but it is possible that the distinctions
raised in the deterrent terminology may
be more of a semantic than substantial
nature. Clearly, this is an issue ripe for
further research, and the field would be
well served by more of the same schol-
arly, analytic thinking from Medeiros.
In Ronald Montaperto’s chapter on the
effects of Chinese perceptions upon the
nuclear weapons program, particular
attention is devoted to how U.S. actions
and policy might affect the direction of
force planning and doctrine.
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Montaperto keenly states China’s over-
arching political dilemma as: “How does
a rising nation committed to achieving
reunification and a world class level of
economic development so order its ex-
ternal relations that it is able to achieve
its objectives and not provoke the op-
position of a suspicious great power
that possesses overwhelming compre-
hensive national power?” Four particular
issues are claimed as critical in defining
the evolving character of the China-
U.S. relationship: counterterrorism,
Taiwan, participation in international
and multilateral organizations, and
proliferation and arms control. Argu-
ably, this short list should include mis-
sile defense, which strikes directly at the
credibility of China’s deterrent, in turn
striking at U.S. freedom of action, U.S.
intentions vis-à-vis China, and the na-
ture of the bilateral relationship. Never-
theless, Montaperto makes the most
salient point in the chapter when he
concludes that both the Taiwan issue
and the future character of the U.S. nu-
clear posture (including missile de-
fense) strike directly at Chinese vital
interests. On these matters, Montaperto
claims, Beijing will not compromise,
putting these two issues in a transcen-
dent category of their own in the bilat-
eral relationship.
With characteristic clarity, Brad Roberts
outlines both the broad paths open to
China’s nuclear force over the coming
decades and identifies the external and
internal factors that will drive the deci-
sion making in choosing what Beijing
calculates is the appropriate path. This
chapter is perhaps the best in the book,
giving the most accurate assessments re-
garding the current shape of the Chinese
force, as well as the motivators and chal-
lenges to its evolution and maturation.
Roberts makes the good point that re-
gardless of external stimuli, such as U.S.
development of missile defense, the
Chinese force will modernize along a
certain predictable baseline. Beyond
that baseline, the greatest driver to the
size and character of China’s future nu-
clear force will be the exact character of
the coevolving U.S. national missile
defense architecture. Since that archi-
tecture’s final shape is uncertain, so is,
to a large extent, the final shape of
China’s nuclear force.
Finally, Roberts lays out three broad
paths along which the Chinese nuclear
force may evolve: one defined largely by
modernization and incremental re-
sponse to U.S. missile defense, another
in which China “sprints” to a window
of maximum strategic leverage (partic-
ularly with an eye to a Taiwan conflict)
vis-à-vis the not-yet-fully-mature “new
triad” of the 2003 Nuclear Posture Re-
view, and a third that would posture
China for Eurasian nuclear superiority
and avoid any near-term competition
with the United States. Roberts con-
cludes by offering a bit of very penetrat-
ing advice on dissuasion: a prudent
course for the United States, especially
with respect to missile defense, might
be characterized by some amount of
transparent restraint, attempting in the
process to engender reciprocal restraint
by China in its nuclear force evolution.
CHRISTOPHER YEAW
Naval War College
Fukuyama, Francis, ed. Nation-Building: Beyond
Afghanistan and Iraq. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hop-
kins Univ. Press, 2006. 262pp. $21.95
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Given that Francis Fukuyama publicly
retracted his support for the 2003 inva-
sion of Iraq, it is not surprising that his
edited volume Nation-Building: Beyond
Afghanistan and Iraq should be gener-
ally critical of America’s reconstruction
efforts in those two countries. Still,
readers of every perspective will find
this volume a collection of well in-
formed and insightful critiques of the
American-led efforts at nation building
in both countries, one that offers nu-
merous useful caveats for the future.
Minxin Pei, Samia Amin, and Seth Garz
offer an overview of the profound chal-
lenges of nation building. The record is
not encouraging. For the fifteen recon-
struction efforts America has concluded
since 1989, a full eleven have failed to
establish and sustain democratic govern-
ments. Based on their analysis, the often-
cited examples of Japan and Germany are
not representative.
Also, institutional shortcomings abound
in the U.S. government. Michèle
Flournoy observes that, outside the mil-
itary, the U.S. government lacks a sys-
tematized effort to identify lessons
learned from past experiences. Learning
from such failures, while politically
awkward, may be of crucial importance
in the long struggle against terrorism.
Sadly, there are also many institutional
failures. Fukuyama observes that, strik-
ingly, the United States put more effort
into preparing for oil fires and a refugee
crisis for the 2003 invasion of Iraq,
largely because these were the chal-
lenges that arose during the 1991 libera-
tion of Kuwait.
One unfortunate aspect of the book’s
organization is the considerable overlap
between the six chapters that focus on
Iraq and Afghanistan. In the three
chapters on Afghanistan, foci more
readily emerge. S. Fredrick Starr’s dis-
cussion of the prelude to international
involvement in Afghanistan, Marvin
Weinbaum’s assessment of the social
impediments to reconstruction, and
Larry Goodson’s treatment of provin-
cial reconstruction teams are all distinc-
tive contributions.
The chapters on Iraq, however, are
more vulnerable in this regard. There is
certainly virtue in having three knowl-
edgeable authors—Larry Diamond,
Johanna Mendelson Forman, and James
Dobbins—opine on all aspects of these
occupations. However, when one reads
for the third time that disbanding the
Iraqi army was a serious mistake, the rev-
elation has by then lost some of its punch.
Diamond’s piece on Iraq, though critical
of the Bush administration, must receive
special consideration, given that Diamond
worked with the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) in early 2004. His criti-
cisms, in particular of the CPA, are often
telling. Still, he argues that many of the
Iraqis he met genuinely crave opportuni-
ties for democratic political expression,
and he believes that analysts and politi-
cians who promote the idea of propping
up a benevolent strongman “do not
grasp the divisions and aspirations in
Iraqi society.”
Nation building can be a dangerously
tempting enterprise; the clearly malig-
nant nature of such governments as
Saddam Hussein’s can generate unwar-
ranted optimism regarding a society’s
susceptibility to political reengineering.
As Fukuyama argues, the United States
must be “far more cautious” about how
it engages in such vastly complicated
endeavors.
ANDREW STIGLER
Naval War College
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Hart, Gary. The Shield and the Cloak: The Security
of the Commons. New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
2006. 194pp. $22
Gary Hart offers a bold grand strategy
to deal with the complexities of security
in the twenty-first century. He states
that America will fail in defining its role
in the world if it does not recognize a
broader definition of security. Security
narrowly defined as “prevention of
physical harm by creating a protective
shield” is insufficient. The “cloak” of
economic, environmental, health, en-
ergy, educational, and government se-
curity provides “genuine security.”
Hart argues against the Bush adminis-
tration’s “narrow” focus on the war on
terrorism, the promotion of democracy,
and its emphasis on unilateralism and
preemptive use of military force.
Hart’s cooperative security strategy
embraces liberalism expanded to deal
with a multidimensional security envi-
ronment. A major theme is securing
the “commons.” “Central, is a sense
that we are not alone, that our secu-
rity, in an age of global integration, is
reliant on a global community—a
commons—with increased opportu-
nity and responsibility.”
Three principles inform Hart’s grand
strategy. First, “Our economic cloak is
the basis of our strength, and our
strength is the basis for our world lead-
ership.” Hart calls for investment in
knowledge through a new national se-
curity education act to increase scien-
tists, engineers, and teachers. His
energy policy would encourage moves
toward independence (zero imports).
A Persian Gulf treaty alliance compris-
ing oil-producing and consuming
nations would guarantee oil flow.
Hart’s economic agenda would reward
savings, investment, and productivity
and penalize borrowing, debt, and
consumption.
Second, “America’s role in the world is
to resist hegemony without seeking he-
gemony by the creation of a new global
commonwealth focused on stability,
growth, and security.” Hart proposes
reforming international institutions, fo-
cusing global development assistance
on individuals, and increasing control
of weapons of mass destruction. He
suggests an international “peace-making”
force that would be “part constabulary
and part special forces . . . inserted into
zones of violence.”
Third, “to respond to this century’s new
threats, the U.S. military shield must be
comprised of these principles: flexibility,
reform, and intelligence.” Hart recom-
mends appreciation of fourth-generation
warfare and establishment of a human
intelligence corps within the CIA. He
consolidates all special forces into a
fifth service, and brings the National
Guard home to reassume its traditional
duties of guarding the homeland.
One minor weakness is repetition in
successive chapters.
Hart has served as a U.S. senator for
twelve years, serving on the Armed Ser-
vices Committee—the first congressio-
nal committee to investigate the CIA.
Most important is his work as co-chair
of the U.S. Commission on National
Security for the Twenty-first Century,
which in 1999 predicted catastrophic
terrorist attacks on the United States,
and in January 2001 recommended a
department of homeland security.
Readers will do well to consider his
proposed grand strategy. It is rare to
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find a single plan laid out in such com-
plete detail.
RICHMOND M. LLOYD
William B. Ruger Chair of
National Security Economics
Naval War College
Turner, Stansfield. Burn before Reading: Presidents,
CIA Directors, and Central Intelligence. New York:
Hyperion, 2005. 319pp. $23.95
Presumably Stansfield Turner did not
devise the nonsensical title of this history
of the DCI’s (Director, Central Intelli-
gence) relationship with the president of
the United States.
In twelve chapters on chief executives
from Franklin D. Roosevelt through
George W. Bush, Turner discusses the
nineteen men who headed America’s in-
telligence organization. “Within six
months of Pearl Harbor, FDR’s enthusi-
asm for ‘Wild Bill’ [Donovan’s] ‘innova-
tive thinking’ had evaporated,” Turner
writes, noting that Donovan was never
given access to the ULTRA/MAGIC
code-breaking program, and he regularly
lost struggles with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and J. Edgar Hoover.
In January 1946, Harry Truman created
the Central Intelligence Group and ap-
pointed Sidney Souers as the first direc-
tor of central intelligence, with simple
expectations: “to keep him personally
well-informed of all that was going on in
the outside world.” By September 1949,
however, the CIA had not been privy to
Atomic Energy Commission informa-
tion, so the day after Truman learned
that the Soviet Union had exploded its
first atomic bomb, he read Intelligence
Memorandum 225: “The earliest possi-
ble date by which the USSR might be
expected to produce an atomic bomb is
mid-1950 and the most probable date is
mid-1953.”
Turner recounts subsequent intelligence
failures, but because the manuscript was
submitted to the CIA for security review,
few readers should be surprised by this
history.
While most facts are familiar, Turner’s
thesis is that the director of Central In-
telligence serves the president in two ca-
pacities: leading the CIA in providing
unbiased intelligence; and heading the
intelligence community, “fifteen federal
agencies, offices, and bureaus within the
executive branch.” Turner evaluates the
eighteen DCIs before Porter Goss on
how each performed both tasks, includ-
ing his own service under Jimmy Carter.
If Turner is frank about errors he made,
he excoriates his successor, Bill Casey.
“Overall, I found this transition group to
be as unbalanced, opinionated, and un-
willing to listen as any group I have ever
encountered. They came to their task
with their minds made up, and no facts
were going to change their conclusions.”
Fifteen blistering pages recount Casey’s
politicization of the agency and obses-
sion with covert actions, culminating in
his leading Ollie North to undertake
“two highly illegal operations—selling
arms to Iran and funneling the money to
the contras in Nicaragua.”
Turner devotes the final chapter to re-
flections on the 2005 Intelligence Re-
form Act. “The big question, then, is
whether President Bush will line up with
the presidents since FDR who have fa-
vored giving more authority to the DCI
or whether he will give in to the Defense
Department’s persistent efforts to keep
the DCI’s authority limited.” Noting that
“the CIA’s reputation in the country is at
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a nadir today,” Turner calls for “the dis-
solution of the CIA” as part of “a bold
transformation” of U.S. intelligence.
The 444 endnotes citing interviews,
NARA files, articles, and many books
prove that Turner has maintained a
scholar’s interest in the field he once
practiced. A surprise may be that no
endnote cites John Ranelagh’s The
Agency or any book written by Jeffrey
Richelson—or perhaps Langley’s review-
ers extirpated every one of them.
TOM GRASSEY
Naval War College
Herrick, Robert Waring. Soviet Naval Doctrine
and Policy 1956–1986. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin
Mellen, 2003. 3 vols., 1,415 pp. $129.95, $129.95,
$139.95
It is no accident that each volume in
this set comes with Fleet Admiral Sergei
Gorshkov’s picture on the cover. In
fact, the time period encompassed by
this trilogy coincides precisely with the
Gorshkov era—the central figure in all
of the strategic and doctrinal debates of
this study. This massive series is the
capstone achievement of Robert Waring
Herrick, a former U.S. naval attaché to
the Soviet Union and an experienced
student of Soviet navy development.
The subject, the Soviet navy’s growth
from a small coastal force into a bal-
anced force capable of contesting the
United States for command of the seas,
is similarly the capstone achievement of
Admiral Gorshkov, who played a key
role in its development. Appointed
chief of the Soviet navy in 1956, he
took the job surrounded by an army-
oriented general staff and the political
leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, who
was obsessed with missiles and nuclear
weaponry. Over his thirty-year tenure
Gorshkov brought the Soviet navy “into
the world ocean” and seriously chal-
lenged American-led Western suprem-
acy at sea. From the official Soviet
perspective, this work dissects the
smaller debates that attended this
growth: coastal versus oceangoing;
offensive versus defensive; submarines
versus balanced fleet; navy nuclear first
strike versus strategic reserve.
If one follows the maxim that “budgets
are strategy,” Gorshkov comes out the
clear winner in his competition within
the Soviet bureaucracy, ultimately build-
ing not only a bigger navy, but also a
“balanced” blue-water force. In fact, the
book would offer additional insights if it
managed to relate official pronounce-
ments with actual building programs.
This would lay to rest the speculation
made throughout the book that some of
these official pronouncements were un-
varnished reality while others were exag-
gerations or Aesopian fables in which
the Navy lobbied for forces as projec-
tions of Western successes.
The most useful contributions this
study offers are found as Gorshkov
evaluates and assesses the effect of the
growing U.S. Navy during the Reagan
administration. Most notably, Herrick
shows that Western practices were the
foundation upon which Gorshkov built
his navy. The Lehman “Oceanic Strat-
egy” of the early 1980s gave a second
wind to Moscow’s shipbuilding pro-
gram. Herrick also reveals the complete
disutility of using “dissuasion” as part
of a deterrence strategy with the Sovi-
ets. Could a nation ever build a navy so
large that the nearest competitor simply
was dissuaded from trying to keep up?
Reflecting classical balance of power
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theory, Herrick’s evidence persuasively
suggests that there was no single factor
that induced Soviet shipbuilding more
than the fear that America might surge
too far ahead in the naval arms race of
the 1980s. The Reagan “600-ship Navy”
was all the ammunition Gorshkov
needed to lay the keel of his first real
aircraft carrier. Ironically, however,
Gorshkov’s winning campaigns against
the Soviet defense bureaucracy helped
bankrupt the Soviet Union.
This study is designed for the specialist.
It is not easy to read. It is overly long
(1,415 pages)—it quotes, paraphrases,
and synthesizes too many articles and
editorials found in Soviet newspapers
and journals from over the thirty-year
period. Herrick is comfortable in this
terrain and appreciates the way Soviet
leaders conducted their strategic de-
bate, helping the reader to understand
the hidden (and sometimes contradic-
tory) messages they made. He is partic-
ularly good at helping readers “split the
hairs” of the debate, noting the shifting
doctrinal priorities from year to year,
which few laymen could discern. How-
ever, he repeatedly revisits such central
topics of strategic debate as command
of the sea, homeland defense, and
sea-lane attack. Few readers will have
the patience to follow.
TOM FEDYSZYN
Naval War College
Hornfischer, James D. The Last Stand of the Tin
Can Sailors. New York: Bantam, 2004. 499pp. $14
James D. Hornfischer writes a gripping
novel of the U.S. Navy’s last major sur-
face engagement of the twentieth
century. The battle described here is the
engagement between Task Unit 77.4.3
“Taffy 3” under the command of Rear
Adm. Clifton “Ziggy” Sprague and the
Japanese Center Force under Vice Adm.
Takeo Kurta, charged with ultimately
halting Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s
Leyte invasion force. By October 1944
the war in the Pacific seemed well in
hand, yet the Japanese navy still posed
a threat.
From the first line in the book, “A giant
stalked through the darkness,” the
reader is caught up in life onboard a
World War II ship. Hornfischer begins
his story with a desperate Japanese fleet.
The Japanese carrier force is virtually
ineffective because of the severe loss of
planes and, to a greater extent, the loss
of pilots to fly them. The remaining
Japanese strength resides in its battle-
ships—two of the largest ever built,
assigned to the Japanese Center Force—
Yamato and its sister ship Musashi.
Hornfischer describes the battle that
took place in the morning hours of 25
October 1944 between the overwhelm-
ing firepower of the Japanese Center
Force and the relatively slow and poorly
armed Taffy 3.
The tone is set with carefully provided
background on the ships of Taffy 3 and
their crew while the combat informa-
tion centers and radio shacks try to
work out the puzzle of random reports
flowing in. At the same time, a signifi-
cant portion of American firepower, the
U.S. Third Fleet, under Adm. William F.
Halsey, is rapidly steaming north in
hot pursuit of the remaining Japanese
carrier fleet. This deception move,
which was part of the Japanese strategy,
worked as it was designed—it essen-
tially took Halsey out of the fight.
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Around sunrise the Japanese Center
Fleet, twenty-three ships in all, transited
through the San Bernardino Strait, pass-
ing between the southern end of Luzon
and the northern part of Samar Island.
They met with the thirteen ships of Taffy
3, comprising six small escort carriers,
three destroyers, and four destroyer es-
corts. By rights, Taffy 3 should have been
annihilated; however, the fog of war
loomed large. The Japanese tactical pic-
ture was so confused and blurred by
misinformation, inadequate reconnais-
sance, and poor communication that the
Japanese broke off the attack late in the
morning and left the battle to the north.
Hornfischer uses the majority of the
book to describe, in amazing detail,
events as the battle unfolded.
Hornfischer’s detail is eerily precise.
He thoroughly provides a play-by-play
action including the formations and ac-
tual intentions of each commanding of-
ficer. However, Hornfischer carefully
did his homework, interviewing count-
less survivors and reviewed hundreds of
documents in order to piece together
details of that morning off Samar.
The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors is
a must read for anyone interested in na-
val history.
DAN DUSEK
Commander, U.S. Navy
Smith, Starr. Jimmy Stewart: Bomber Pilot. St.
Paul, Minn.: Zenith, 2005. 287pp. $21.95
The defining era of actor Jimmy Stewart’s
life was his service in the air force, ac-
cording to his biographer, Starr Smith,
who served with him in the Eighth Air
Force during World War II. This biog-
raphy deals mainly with that period of
Stewart’s life. The theme of the story is
how a man approaching middle age
joined the armed forces at the lowest
grade possible and in only four years
rose to the rank of “bird colonel.” This
accomplishment was carried out not
through favoritism but through hard
work, technical competence, and
leadership.
A famous actor at the beginning of
1941, Jimmy Stewart was about to take
on the biggest challenge of his life: fly-
ing bombers in the U.S. Army Air
Corps. He was born James Maitland
Stewart in Indiana, Pennsylvania, in
1908. At an early age he developed an
interest in aviation that stuck with him
all his life. He was a student of Prince-
ton University, where he found his
other interest—acting.
When France fell to the Nazis in 1940
and Britain was battling for its life,
Stewart concluded that the United
States could no longer avoid the war.
Not soon after, his draft notice arrived
and he was sworn in as a private. He
was already an accomplished pilot and
so he was accepted for flight training.
Jimmy Stewart was assigned to a B-24
squadron slated for transfer to the
Eighth Air Force to train in Iowa, where
he excelled to become squadron com-
mander and then was promoted to ma-
jor. He flew twenty missions, many of
them in hotly contested air space.
When the war in Europe ended, he was
a wing commander whose job became
one of deactivating the wing and bring-
ing the men home.
There are a few minor quibbles that an
editor would have caught. The early
chapter on Eisenhower seems unneces-
sary, and much of the end material that
deals with the careers of some of Stewart’s
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fellow Air Force officers detracts from
the story. Nevertheless, this is an im-
portant book that would be of interest
to many.
ROBERT WHITTEN
Cupertino, California
Fick, Nathaniel. One Bullet Away: The Making of a
Marine Officer. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005.
384pp. $25
Perhaps not since Robert Graves and
Siegfried Sassoon served together in
the 2nd Battalion, Royal Welch Fusi-
liers during World War I has so much
literary talent been employed to re-
count the operations of a single unit as
we find now in the case of the 1st Re-
connaissance Battalion during Opera-
tion IRAQI FREEDOM I. In Generation
Kill (reviewed by me in the Winter
2005 Naval War College Review), Evan
Wright wrote about his experiences
with 1st Recon as an embedded jour-
nalist. His perspective is that of an in-
telligent outsider who related most to
the junior enlisted Marines of a single
platoon. The commander of that pla-
toon, Nathaniel Fick, has now written
his own story. The military memoir
written by a junior officer was a main-
stay of war literature in the twentieth
century, which saw such distinguished
examples as Robert Graves’s Good-bye
to All That, Ernst Junger’s Storm of
Steel, John Masters’s Bugles and a Ti-
ger, and Phillip Caputo’s A Rumor of
War. The authors of such works are in
general well educated and intelligent,
dedicated to their jobs, but also sensi-
tive to the unaccustomed demands and
horrific scenes of war. Fick’s book
belongs to this tradition while elo-
quently speaking to our own time.
The best of the junior officer memoirs
are both compelling as narrative and
instructive in the broad sense. A lieu-
tenant with a gift for writing brings an
informed but open mind to his tale,
and the reader is able to learn about
war, about this war, along with the
writer. In One Bullet Away, Fick moves
from the Dartmouth College campus,
to the training areas of Quantico, Vir-
ginia, to active service in Afghanistan
and in Iraq. He develops from under-
graduate to Marine infantry and re-
connaissance officer in combat. The
book contains some excellent battle
pieces, but some of the best parts oc-
cur early and late, as Fick tries to adapt
to his new circumstances and later to
begin succinctly to sort out what he
feels and thinks about his experiences.
A classics major, he often sees events
through a lens of ancient history. Like
many other junior officers, his military
service often appears as an effort to re-
capture a lost nobility and simplicity
that he has found lacking in his previ-
ous surroundings. Hearing journalist
Tom Ricks speak about the Marine
Corps at Dartmouth before enlisting,
Fick observes that, “Ricks used words
like ‘duty’ and ‘honor’ without cyni-
cism, something I’d not often heard at
Dartmouth.”
Of course, he also acquires the skills
and outlook of an infantryman. An
early scene in the book has him con-
ducting a night attack while in training.
By now, Fick has learned the rules, but
he is also beginning to understand how
to apply them imaginatively and effec-
tively to changing and uncertain cir-
cumstances. Fick’s first taste of war is in
Afghanistan. He observes senior
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leadership at its most inspiring and ef-
fective in the person of Lt. Gen. James
Mattis, the division commander, who is
seen visiting front-line positions in the
middle of a freezing night.
After the campaign in Afghanistan, Fick
transfers to the 1st Reconnaissance Bat-
talion, an organization whose emphasis
on finesse over force appeals to the
thoughtful young officer. The war in
Iraq finds this unit at the point of the
advance toward Baghdad. It is impossi-
ble to summarize all that Fick and his
platoon see and do in the space of few
lines; indeed, it may be impossible even
for a Homer or a Tolstoy to render
them adequately into words at all.
Fick decides to leave the Corps after his
unit is withdrawn from Iraq. A “reluc-
tant warrior,” he has decided that he
will not be one of those who live and
define their lives by fighting on com-
mand, without much questioning, as
professional soldiers are perhaps re-
quired to do. Some of his comrades re-
turn to Iraq after he has left the service,
and Fick learns of the death of his re-
placement, Capt. Brent Morel. The end-
ing chapter of the book may seem
rushed, as if Fick has not yet come to
terms with his service by the time he
has finished writing his story. He fin-
ishes on a positive note, but the full
meaning of what he has seen might be
years in coming. Fick appears to be too
decent and honest a man to be content
with simple answers. Classicist Fick of-
ten intersperses his tale with classical al-
lusions, none more meaningful or
moving than the quotation with which
he opens his last chapter.
REED BONADONNA
Commander, U.S. Navy
Edgerton, Robert B. Remember the Maine, To Hell
with Spain: America’s 1898 Adventure in Imperial-
ism. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen, 2005. 225pp.
$109.95
Robert Edgerton, a noted anthropolo-
gist and member of the UCLA faculty
for more than forty years, has written
extensively about the small wars of em-
pire that dot the historical landscape of
the nineteenth century. Among the
better known of his works is Like Lions
They Fought, an examination of the
Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, which no col-
lection on the subject should be with-
out. He would, therefore, seem to be
eminently qualified to explore the his-
torical and cultural aspects and ramifi-
cations of the Spanish-American War.
Like many conflicts of the era, the
Spanish-American War has until re-
cently been under-examined and largely
forgotten. Yet it remains one of Amer-
ica’s more important armed conflicts.
The war marked the emergence of the
United States upon the world stage as a
major, externally focused power. It was,
in many ways, the physical manifesta-
tion of the strategic thinking of Alfred
Thayer Mahan. The war left the United
States with a physical as well as com-
mercial empire, forever altering the
lives of millions of peoples, as well as
the development of state power in the
Caribbean, Latin America, and Asia.
The war occurred when both the U.S.
Navy and Army were in the process of
revolutionary change. The war would
eventually involve U.S. forces across a
wide variety of points on the spectrum
of conflict, from fleet-to-fleet actions to
protracted nation-building efforts.
Some scholars have gone as far as to
suggest that the U.S. experience in the
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occupation and pacification of the Phil-
ippines still contains lessons that may
be applicable to current operations in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and the global war
on terror. Thus by any reasonable mea-
sure Remember the Maine, To Hell with
Spain would seem to be one of those
books that cover the right subject at the
right time, by the right author.
Alas, Edgerton does not replicate his
success in dealing with the Anglo-Zulu
War when it comes to the United States
in 1898. This may be due in part to the
greater physical scope of the Spanish-
American war, its longer duration, and
the involvement of a much larger cast
of characters. Perhaps the war was sim-
ply too big and too complex to do the
subject justice in one volume of less
than three hundred pages.
To his credit, Edgerton tries to cover all
theaters of the war, as well as social and
political currents that led to the fight-
ing. Unlike most historians who have
examined the subject, he devotes an en-
tire chapter each to the conquests of
Puerto Rico and Guam. Little has been
written about these theaters of opera-
tions, predominately because neither
saw much fighting.
Remember the Maine, To Hell with Spain
suffers from a lack of cohesion. It is an
untidy work that leaves intellectual
threads to dangle almost immediately
after it picks them up. For example,
Edgerton touches on the work of
Mahan but fails to examine similar tec-
tonic shifts in Army thinking—shifts
that changed the culture of the institu-
tion and have been well chronicled in
Graham A. Cosmas’s An Army for Em-
pire. Edgerton also attempts to correct a
historical injustice paid to the Cuban
insurrectos, who made crucial contribu-
tions to the defeat of the Spanish.
Indeed, it is highly likely that while U.S.
intervention hastened the Spanish de-
feat, the defeat was already inevitable.
Yet again, this look is cursory and the
reader is left wondering about just how
the insurrectos won the “hearts and
minds” of the populace, and how the
movement was funded.
These shortcomings pale in compari-
son, however, to those that occur when
the book looks at the U.S. invasion and
occupation of the Philippines. To be
sure, the Philippine campaign was infi-
nitely more complex and lengthy than
that in Cuba. It is even misleading to
speak of the war or the campaign. In ac-
tuality, there were numerous insurrec-
tions, and the revolt of the Moro came
from very different cultural wellsprings
than that found in the more northern
islands. Rather than provide a detailed
look at the insurgency and counter-
insurgency, Edgerton reviews only a few
of the better known events, such as the
Balangiga massacre and the trial of Brig.
Gen. Jacob H. Smith for war crimes.
Not only does Edgerton fail to paint a
complete picture of the insurrection,
but he is also equally sketchy when it
comes to describing U.S. efforts to
achieve victory. These efforts were by
no means uniform and ranged from co-
operation to confrontation, from na-
tion building to tactics of scorched
earth. A far better treatment of this sub-
ject can be found in the works of Brian
McAllister Linn, notably The U.S.
Army and Counterinsurgency in the
Philippine War 1898–1902; another ex-
ceptional treatment that focuses on one
center of the resistance is The War
against the Americans: Resistance and
Collaboration in Cebu, 1899–1906, by
Resil B. Mojares.
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In a nutshell, this work is a disappoint-
ment. It fails to serve as either a balanced
introduction to the Spanish-American
War or a useful addition to our knowl-
edge of the imperial era or the impact
of colonialism. Its shortcomings may be
due more to structure than scholarship,
but they are still severe enough to war-
rant bypassing it in favor of more com-
prehensive and balanced works.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College
Little, Benerson. The Sea Rover’s Practice: Pirate
Tactics and Techniques, 1630–1730. Washington,
D.C.: Potomac, 2005. 253pp. $27.50
There is a fascination about pirates of
old. Most of us as children first learned
about them from Peter Pan in the fig-
ure of Captain Hook or from Robert
Louis Stevenson’s Treasure Island.
This work provides a detailed historical
examination of sea rovers (an umbrella
term used to cover pirates, privateers,
and others with the same essential mo-
tivation of greed), how they lived, what
they did, and how they did it. It will be
of high interest to the maritime spec-
trum, from armchair sailors to admirals.
Little, a former naval officer and SEAL,
details where many pirates came from
and their motivation, which was pri-
marily a desire for treasure. He notes
how the Hollywood image of a pirate
attack on the high seas was far different
from the real thing, and he discusses
attack planning and execution for both
at-sea and land assaults.
Within the book’s well documented
twenty-three chapters, Little provides fas-
cinating material on pirate personalities
and their lives both ashore and at sea.
Rovers, of course, all had different per-
sonalities, some more savage than others.
It is easy to see how one would not
choose to be at the mercy of L’Ollonois,
who cut out one man’s heart and ate it.
The ships are also described, along with
the weapons of choice. Line drawings
are numerous and include a wide vari-
ety of personal weapons, such as mus-
kets, pistols, swords, and pikes, as well
as cannons of various types.
Another value of this book lies in its
seven appendixes, which include a sea
rover’s lexicon, weapons and ranges,
and, for those with a desire to dine like
a pirate, a description of what they ate
and drank. These appendixes are excel-
lent, with definitions provided for all
reasonably relevant (and generally un-
known) items, such as kilderkins and
demiculverins. There are many foot-
notes, a complete bibliography, and a
good index.
This is a really good book. Be prepared—
after reading only a few pages—to feel
the wind in your face and taste the salt air.
The only downside for ever-optimistic
adventurers is that no treasure maps are
provided for some sandy beach. The pi-
rates never buried their treasure.
JACK A. GOTTSCHALK
Livingston, New Jersey
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IN THE JOURNALS
George P. Shultz, “Sustaining Our Re-
solve,” Policy Review, August/Septem-
ber 2006. Reflections by the former
secretary of state on the way ahead for
the United States in the war on terror,
with emphasis on the importance of
better intelligence and better communi-
cation with the Arab world.
James Fallows, “Declaring Victory,”
The Atlantic, September 2006. An
unconventional yet intriguing ap-
proach to managing our al-Qa‘ida
problem.
Tony Corn, “Clausewitz in Wonder-
land,” Policyreview.org, September
2006. A provocative attack on the con-
tinuing influence of Clausewitz in
American military education.
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RECENT BOOKS
Dear, I. C. B., and Peter Kemp, eds. The
Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea.
2nd ed. Oxford, U.K., and New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2005. 678pp. $65
This new edition (dated 2005 according
to the copyright page, but March 2006
by the publisher’s flyer) of the late Peter
Kemp’s 1976 work is to be a “compan-
ion” to the forthcoming four-volume
Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History,
of which the Naval War College’s Profes-
sor John B. Hattendorf, D.Phil., is gen-
eral editor. The present volume updates
and cross-references many of the origi-
nal entries and adds coverage in such
areas as piracy, maritime and naval
technology, oceanography, the law of
the sea, and environmental concerns.
There are now some 2,600 entries,
many with line drawings, figures, and
period plates. A cross-referenced index
has also been added. It certainly passes
the test posed by the Daily Telegraph
blurb on the dustcover: “Open to check
a point and you can be lost for hours”
(encountering, among many other
things, an appalling sense of the phrase
“comb the cat” and some remarkable
scholarship on the biblical Noah’s Ark).
Rohwer, Jürgen, comp. Chronology of
the War at Sea 1939–1945: The Naval
History of World War Two. 3rd ed. Lon-
don: Chatham, 2005. 532pp. £40
Dr. Rohwer points out in his preface
that this third edition of the Chronology
of the War at Sea represents fifty years
of scholarship, by himself and a distin-
guished group of associates and col-
leagues. First appearing in 1956 as a
column in a German periodical, then as
a series of articles, then as a German-
language book, it was first published in
English in 1972, with a second edition
in 1992. This, then, is the third edition
of the title but the sixth form in which
the work has existed. It is updated, re-
vised, and expanded largely on the basis
of new books appearing since 1992, es-
pecially for the Royal, U.S., and Soviet
navies. The bulk of the book comprises
brief entries by day and place—from 19
August 1939, North Atlantic (the Ger-
man Naval Staff sends fourteen U-boats
into waiting position), to 30 November
1945, Western Atlantic (HMCS Merit-
tonia, a corvette, is wrecked off Nova
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Scotia). Indexes of warships, merchant
ships, personnel, convoys, operations,
U-boat packs and patrol lines, mine-
fields, and mine barrages.
Polmar, Norman, comp. The Naval In-
stitute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of
the U.S. Fleet. 18th ed. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2005. 672pp.
$89.95
This series forms, with the Jane’s family
and Combat Fleets of the World, the
standard reference in the field—anyone
familiar enough with the subject to
need such a book is already aware of its
use and value. The eighteenth edition
adds chapters on littoral combat ships
and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well
as updates on carrier air wing compo-
sition, prepositioning ships, submarine
rescue systems, unmanned undersea
vehicles, the MH-60R/S helicopter,
and the Coast Guard’s DEEPWATER
program. The volume contains 918
photos and 114 other illustrations,
general and ship-name/class indexes,
and appendixes (four of them tabular,
plus essays on the Arsenal Ship and
transformation).
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BOOKS RECEIVED
Fighting for Rights: Military Service and
the Politics of Citizenship, by Ronald R.
Krebs. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ.
Press, 2006. 265pp. $45
Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for
Uncertain War, by John Wilson Lewis
and Xue Litai. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stan-
ford Univ. Press, 2006. 362pp. $60
Making Things Work: Solving Complex
Problems in a Complex World, by
Yaneer Bar-Yam. Cambridge, Mass.:
Knowledge, 2005. 306pp. $28.95
Most Succinctly Bred, by Alex Vernon.
Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press, 2006.
100pp. $16.95
Women of Valor: The Rochambelles on
the WW II Front, by Ellen Hampton.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
233pp. $24.95
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn2006.vp
Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:31:25 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
159
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2006 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
